Report and Recommendations: Transmitted to the President and Congress by U.S. Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
External Papers and Reports Upjohn Research home page 
1-31-1995 
Report and Recommendations: Transmitted to the President and 
Congress 
U.S. Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/externalpapers 
Citation 
U.S. Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation. 1994. "Report and Recommendations: 
Transmitted to the President and Congress." Washington, D.C.: Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation. 
https://research.upjohn.org/externalpapers/3 















Transmitted to the President and Congress 

Table of Contents 
Letter of Transmittal 
Members of the Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation 
Acknowledgments 
SECTION I: RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS OF THE 
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION 
Chapter 1: Introduction: Unemployment Insurance 
in a Changing Economy 
Chapter 2: Recommendations and Findings 
Purpose of the Extended Benefits Program 7 
The Trigger for Extended Benefits 8 
Financing Extended Benefits Reform 11 
Work Search Test Under Extended Benefits 12 
State Trust Fund Solvency 13 
FUTA Taxation of Alien Agricultural Workers 13 







Chapter 3: Overview 17 
Unemployment Compensation Programs 17 
The Unemployed Population 19 
Trends in Regular State Unemployment Insurance Programs 21 
Chapter 4: Trends in Unemployment Insurance Recipiency 31 
Recipiency Trends and Implications 32 
Causes of the Long-Term Decline in Recipiency 37 
Causes of the Short-Term Decline in Recipiency 39 
Chapter 5: Dislocated Workers 45 
Worker Dislocation: Definitions 45 
Extent of Worker Dislocation 46 
Characteristics of Dislocated Workers 47 
iii 
iv ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
Consequences of Dislocation 48 
Programs Serving Dislocated Workers 49 
Effectiveness of Dislocated Worker Programs 53 
Current Proposals 54 
Chapter 6: Extended Benefits Reform 57 
Current Status of Extended Benefits 58 
Reforming Extended Benefits 59 
Extended Benefits as a Countercyclical Program 61 
Extended Benefits as a Program Targeted to Dislocated Workers 79 
Extended Benefits as a Program Available Both to Cyclically 
and Structurally Unemployed Workers 81 
Chapter 7: State Trust Fund Solvency 83 
Unemployment Insurance Financing 83 
Review of the Findings 92 
Federal Actions to Address State Solvency 107 
State Responses to Federal Actions and Solvency Issues 110 
Policy Options 117 
Chapter 8: Alien Agricultural Workers 123 
Treatment of Agricultural Workers Under 
Unemployment Insurance 123 
Relevant Categories of Alien Agricultural Labor 124 
Number of H-2A Workers and Special Agricultural Workers 125 




A. Extended Benefits Reform: Principles and Related 
Policy Options 155 
B. Charter of the Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation 167 
C. Council Calendar 171 
D. Public Hearings 173 




List of Figures 
3-1 UI Benefits Paid in Constant 1992 Dollars, 1948-1992 18 
3-2 Percentage of Claimants Exhausting Regular UI 
Benefits, 1940-1992 21 
3-3 Extended Unemployment Spells, 1947-1992 22 
3-4 Unemployment by Reason, 1967-1992 23 
3-5 Annual Covered Employment as a Percentage of 
Total Employment, 1947-1992 24 
3-6 Average Weekly Benefits as a Percentage of Average 
Total Covered Weekly Wages, 1938-1992 26 
3-7 Duration of UI Benefits and Unemployment 
(in Weeks), 1948-1992 29 
4-1 Recipiency Rates for Regular State UI 
Programs, 1947-1992 33 
4-2 Ratio of VI Claimants to Job Losers, 1967-1992 35 
4-3 Recipiency Rates for Regular State UI Programs and 
Total Vnemployment Rate, 1947-1992 36 
6-1 Seasonally Adjusted and Nonseasonally Adjusted 
Total Unemployment Rates, January 1990 
to August 1993 66 
6-2 Nonseasonally Adjusted TUR and Estimated Percent 
of Monthly VI Exhaustees Eligible for EB under 
6.5% Trigger, No Threshold, January 1990 
to August 1993 72 
6-3 Nonseasonally Adjusted TUR and Estimated Percent 
of Monthly VI Exhaustees Eligible for EB 
under 6.5% Trigger, 110% Threshold, 
January 1990 to August 1993 73 
7-1 Flow of FUTA Funds Under Existing Federal Statutes 85 
7-2 FUTA Tax Collections in Constant 1992 Dollars, 
Fiscal Years 1954-1992 86 
7-3 Net Balance in Federal Trust Fund Accounts in 
Constant 1992 Dollars, 1970-1992 87 
7-4 VI Taxes Paid as Percent of Taxable Wages, 
by Major Private Industry, 1991 90 
7-5 Amount of Federal Loans and Number of States with 
Outstanding Loans, 1972-1992 94 
v 
vi ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
7-6 High Cost Multiple for the Overall 
VI System, 1954-1992 95 
7-7 States with Adequate Reserves as Measured by 
High Cost Multiple, 1954-1992 97 
7-8 Reserve Ratio and FVTA Wage Base, 1938-1992 98 
7-9 Relationship Between Trust Fund Solvency and UI 
Recipiency, 1947-1992 102 
7-10 State Unemployment Insurance Tax Collections per 
Worker in Constant 1992 Dollars, 1938-1992 103 
7-11 Average Employer Tax Rate, (as Percentage of 
Taxable and Total Wages), 1938-1992 105 
7-12 State Taxable Wage Base, 1993 112 
List of Tables 
3-1 Demographic Characteristics in 1992 20 
3-2 Average Weekly Benefits as a Percentage of 
Average Total Covered Wages, by State in 1992 27 
3-3 Weekly Benefit Amount, by State in 1992 28 
4-1 Ratio of UI Claimants to Total Unemployed, 
by State in 1992 34 
6-1 Estimated Impacts of Alternative EB Triggers 
(January 1990 to August 1993) 69 
7-1 Per Worker State Taxes Collected, by State in 1992 88 
7-2 Experience Rating Index, by State in 1992 91 
7-3 High Cost Multiple, by State in 1992 96 
7-4 Reserve Ratio, by State in 1992 99 
7-5 Relationship Between the High Cost Multiple and 
Changes in VI Recipiency 101 
7-6 Average Employer Tax Rate as a Percent of Total 
Wages and Taxable Wages, by State in 1992 106 
7-7 Federal Unemployment Tax Rate, Wage Base, and 
Per-Worker Cost 109 
7-8 Relationship Between Changes in Tax Rate and 
Minimum Earnings and Changes in High 
Cost Multiple 113 
8-1 Jobs Certified by Crop of Activity and Country of 
Origin of H-2A Workers in 1991 127 
vii 

Letter of Transmittal 
February 1, 1994 
To the President and Congress: 
I have the honor to submit the interim Report and Recommendations 
of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation, 
transmitted in accordance with the provisions of Section 908 of the 
Social Security Act, as amended by the Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-164). 
This interim report responds to the questions Congress requested the 
Council to consider before undertaking a basic review of the 
Unemployment Compensation system. Although there is much 
work that remains before the Council, we are in agreement that there 
is a pressing need to reform the Extended Benefits program and that 
it requires prompt Congressional consideration. 
My fellow members-Owen Bieber, Thomas R. Donahue, William D. 
Grossenbacher, Robert C. Mitchell, John J. Stephens, and Tommy G. 
Thompson-and I look forward to continuing this important work. 
Sincerely, 
~ .. tt:~ / Janet L. Norwood 
Chair 
The President 
rhe President of the Senate 
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Insurance in a Changing 
Economy 
THE UNITED STATES' system of Unemployment Insurance, first established in 1935 as a part of the Social Security Act, 
was intended by its founders to serve both as a countercyclical 
economic stabilizer for the economy and as a central part of the nation's 
economic security system for workers. Almost sixty years later, the 
twin goals of a strong economy and economic security for working 
Americans are again at the center of the major policy debates in which 
our nation is engaged. The recent debate surrounding the North 
American Free Trade Agreement made it clear that the major policy 
challenge of this decade is to find ways to ensure that working 
Americans can achieve an acceptable degree of job and income security 
while simultaneously promoting employers' capacity to compete in an 
increasingly global economy. 
It is likely that the high level of worker dislocation of the past 
decade will continue in the near future. Defense downsizing will result 
in the permanent loss of 1.5 to 2 million jobs. The continuing 
globalization of the economy will cause additional restructuring in the 
private sector which could result in further worker dislocation. Welfare 
reform could result in millions of low-wage workers seeking 
employment. These events require that the nation's Unemployment 
Insurance system be on solid footing. 
The Unemployment Insurance system serves as the foundation of 
economic security for millions of workers who are temporarily laid off 
or permanently lose their jobs. This requires that careful consideration 
be given to the appropriate role for Unemployment Insurance in the 
changing U.S. economy, particularly in light of the declining percentage 
of the unemployed who receive UI benefits. Without a system that 
replaces some portion of unemployed workers' lost earnings, economic 
3 
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security would prove to be an elusive goal for tens of millions of 
Americans. At the same time, however, the needs of these workers and 
their families must be weighed against the costs of the Unemployment 
Insurance system which are financed through payroll taxes paid by 
employers. 
The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation was 
created by an Act of Congress in November 1991 to provide guidance 
on this important set of issues. The Congressional mandate was a 
broad one, instructing the Council "to evaluate the unemployment 
compensation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical 
effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding 
of State administrative costs, administrative efficiency, and other 
aspects of the program and to make recommendations for 
improvement. " 
There is broad-based agreement among the members of the 
Council, who represent the perspective of business, labor, and the 
States that the ongoing globalization of the economy will place 
increasing demands on the Unemployment Insurance system. 
Unemployed workers have a growing need for services and 
information. Workers need information about what types of jobs are 
available and where these jobs are located, as well as information about 
the skill requirements of jobs and the opportunities that are available 
for acquiring those skills. It is the view of the Council that in addition 
to providing income maintenance to unemployed workers, the 
Unemployment Insurance system must develop a capacity to provide 
this information in an efficient and cost-effective manner. The system 
must become a facilitator of change, helping to get people back to 
productive work as quickly as possible. 
Although the Council did not hold its first meeting until May 1993, 
its members have been able to reach substantial agreement on some 
areas of the Unemployment Insurance system that are in most urgent 
need of reform. This report, the first of three annual reports, 
summarizes the preliminary findings and recommendations of the 
Council. 
In light of the failure of the Extended Benefits program to trigger 
on in a meaningful way during the most recent recession, there is a 
clear and immediate need for reform of the program. Consequently, 
the Council has focused most of its deliberations and recommendations 
to date on that aspect of the Unemployment Insurance system. The 
Council strongly urges timely Congressional consideration of these 
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recommendations, because it believes that the country needs a 
functioning Extended Benefits program. The Council believes that 
Congressional extension of Extended Benefits to provide assistance to 
the long as well as the short-term unemployed could reduce the need 
for emergency extensions of unemployment benefits in the future. 
In addition to reform of the Extended Benefits program, this report 
addresses some specific issues on which Congress asked the Council 
to comment. In particular, the report makes recommendations on the 
following: the use of sub-state or regional data for triggering Extended 
Benefits, the work search requirements of the Extended Benefits 
program, and the treatment of alien agricultural workers with H2-A 
visas by the Unemployment Insurance system. 
Together, these recommendations represent a first step in a 
comprehensive rethinking of the Unemployment Insurance system as 
the foundation of the job and income security for u.s. workers. Much 
work remains. Over the course of the next year, the Council intends to 
re-examine the fundamental assumptions on which the Unemployment 
Insurance system was founded. This reconsideration of the most basic 
questions regarding the system is especially important, given the 
profound changes that have taken place in the U.S. economy. 
The labor market, in particular, has undergone significant change 
since the inception of the Unemployment Insurance program. Married 
men who are the sole breadwinners for their families no longer 
constitute the majority of the work force. Taken together, women, 
,'ontingent workers, part-time workers, temporary workers, single 
. leads of households, and single individuals now make up the majority 
of workers. The Council intends to give careful consideration to the 
responsibilities that the Unemployment Insurance system has to serve 
these individuals. 
Among the other matters which the Council will address are the 
following: the experience rating mechanism used to finance the 
Unemployment Insurance system, the nature of the federal-state 
partnership upon which the system is based, administrative funding 
dnd efficiency within the system, and the extent to which the system 
an and should be expanded beyond income maintenance for the 
unemployed and turned toward re-employment of the unemployed. 
Furthermore, the Council intends to continue its deliberations about the 
funding and solvency of the Unemployment Insurance system. Future 
reports will make recommendations to ensure that the solvency of the 
system, and therefore its ability to provide adequate coverage and 





PURPOSE OF THE EXTENDED BENEFITS PROGRAM 
Findings 
The Council finds that the nature of unemployment has changed 
since the inception of the Unemployment Insurance system. The length 
of time that individuals are unemployed, which increases sharply 
during recessions, has also increased slowly but steadily during non-
recessionary times. Workers who have been laid off from their jobs are 
now less likely to return to their previous jobs than has historically 
been the case. This indicates an increase in the level of long-term 
unemployment in the economy. 
The Unemployment Insurance system was designed primarily as 
a means of alleviating the hardship caused by short-term 
unemployment. The system was never intended to combat long-term 
unemployment. The purpose of the Unemployment Insurance system, 
and in particular the Extended Benefits program, must be expanded if 
the system is to deal effectively with the changing nature of 
unemployment. In doing so, however, careful consideration must be 
given to the funding of the system, in order to ensure that expenditures 
for combatting long-term unemployment do not drain the 
Unemployment Insurance trust fund reserves. It must also be 
recognized that while Unemployment Insurance reform is a necessary 
component of developing effective strategies for dealing with long-term 
unemployment, other reforms--especially among programs for 
dislocated workers-will be needed. 
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Recommendation 
The scope of the Extended Benefits program should be expanded 
to enhance the capacity of the Unemployment Insurance system to 
provide assistance for long-term unemployed workers as well as 
short-term unemployed workers. Those individuals who are long-
term unemployed should be eligible for extended Unemployment 
Insurance benefits, provided they are participating in job search 
activities or in education and training activities, where available and 
suitable, that enhance their re-employment prospects. To maintain 
the integrity of the Unemployment Insurance income support system, 
a separate funding source should be used to finance job search and 
education and training activities for long-term unemployed workers.1 
THE TRIGGER FOR EXTENDED BENEFITS 
Findings 
The Council finds that receipt of Unemployment Insurance benefits 
by the unemployed has slowly but steadily declined since at least 
1947-the first year for which data on the system are available. In 
addition to the long-term downward trend in receipt of benefits, there 
was a pronounced decline in the early 1980s, just as the economy 
entered a recession. 
The reasons behind the decline in the Unemployment Insurance 
system are many. The long-term decline appears to have been caused 
by the changing demographics of the labor force, the changing 
industrial and geographic composition of employment, and a decline 
in the solvency of states' Unemployment Insurance trust funds. The 
sharp decline in receipt of benefits in the early 1980s appears to be 
attributable primarily to changes in federal policies which encouraged 
the states to increase the solvency of their trust funds by restricting 
eligibility for Unemployment Insurance benefits and! or increasing 
lOne member of the Council emphasizes that an increase in employers' 
payroll taxes should not be used as the funding source. Another member 
emphasizes that such a recommendation must be considered in the context of 
reform of dislocated workers programs. 
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employers' tax rates, as well as independent state efforts to improve 
their trust fund solvency. 
The utilization of the Unemployment Insurance system is measured 
by the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR). The IUR is the number of 
Unemployment Insurance recipients, relative to the number of 
individuals in UI-covered employment. Since the inception of the 
Extended Benefits program in 1970, states have been required to use the 
state IUR as a "trigger" that determines whether or not individuals who 
have exhausted their regular UI benefits are eligible for Extended 
Benefits. 
Research has shown that the decline in the utilization of the 
Unemployment Insurance system has caused the IUR to become a less 
reliable indicator of economic conditions, reducing the likelihood that 
Extended Benefits will trigger on in states with high unemployment. 
In addition, just as the IUR was experiencing a marked decline during 
the recession of the 1980s, the "trigger" level required to become eligible 
for Extended Benefits was raised. 
The combination of the reduction in the IUR and the increase in 
the trigger level resulted in the failure of the Extended Benefits 
program to trigger on as unemployment continued to rise during this 
most recent recession. As a result, Congress found it necessary to pass 
a series of emergency extensions of Unemployment Insurance benefits. 
The Council finds that emergency extensions of Unemployment 
Insurance benefits are extremely inefficient since they are neither well-
timed nor well-targeted. Therefore, it is necessary to reform the 
Extended Benefits program prior to the onset of the next recession, in 
order to minimize the need for future emergency legislation. 
The Council has considered a variety of measures that could be 
used to trigger the Extended Benefits program. While no perfect 
measures exist, the best available evidence about the condition of the 
overall labor market within a state is the Total Unemployment Rate 
(TUR), which indicates the supply of individuals who are unable to 
find work. It should be noted, however, that, beginning in January 
1994, the TUR rates will be affected by the redesign of the Current 
Population Survey. An alternative measure of the labor market 
conditions that are faced by Unemployment Insurance recipients is the 
Adjusted Insured Unemployment Rate (AIUR), which is the IUR 
adjusted to include those individuals who have exhausted their regular 
Unemployment Insurance benefits. 
The Council finds that while substate (or regional) data are 
available on some measures of local labor market conditions, these data 
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are extremely unreliable measures of the true conditions that the 
unemployed face. Furthermore, there would be substantial 
administrative difficulties in using either substate or regional data for 
triggering Extended Benefits. 
The Council finds that, in addition to problems with the triggers 
that have been used to determine whether or not Extended Benefits are 
available within a state, the thresholds built into the triggers have been 
problematic. These thresholds require that a state's unemployment rate 
(whether measured by the IUR or the TUR) exceed the level that 
prevailed over the previous two-year period (by a factor of 120 percent 
for the IUR or 110 percent for the TUR). 
The threshold requirements do not significantly affect the number 
of states in which Extended Benefits trigger on during a recession. 
However, the thresholds have the effect of delaying the point at which 
Extended Benefits trigger on in some states with the highest 
unemployment, as well as hastening the point at which such states 
trigger off the Extended Benefits program. As a result, the thresholds 
have caused dissatisfaction among some with the operation of the 
program since those states suffering the most economic hardship are 
triggered on for the shortest period of time. This problem could be 
addressed by eliminating the thresholds and setting the triggers at a 
slightly higher level. 
Recommendation 
The Council is unanimous in the view that there is a pressing 
need to reform the Extended Benefits program. 
The majority of the Council recommends that the Extended 
Benefits program should trigger on when a state's seasonally adjusted 
total unemployment rate (STUR) exceeds 6.5 percent as measured 
before the Current Population Survey redesign.2 Two members of 
the Council recommend that each state should have the choice of 
using either the STUR trigger of 6.5 percent with a threshold 
requirement of 110 percent above either of the two previous years, or 
an IUR or AIUR trigger set at 4 percent with a threshold requirement 
of 120 percent over the previous two year period. 
2Two members of the Council recommend that the trigger should be set at 
6.5 percent regardless of any changes in the measured unemployment rate that 
result from the redesign of the Current Population Survey. 
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The Council hopes Congress can implement these reforms 
promptly. Although the Council has reservations about the 
inefficient targeting of emergency benefits, Congress should extend 
the existing Emergency Unemployment Compensation for a six 
month period to provide a bridge program until these Extended 
Benefits reforms can be implemented.3 
Recommendation 
Neither substate nor regional data should be used for the 
purpose of determining whether or not Extended Benefits are 
available within a given area. 
FINANCING EXTENDED BENEFITS REFORM 
Findings 
The Council finds that the integrity of the Unemployment 
Insurance system as well as its capacity to adapt to the changing nature 
of unemployment are compromised by incorporating its trust funds 
into the unified federal budget. While the flow of funds into the 
Extended Unemployment Compensation account may be adequate to 
finance the recommended Extended Benefits reform, such reform is 
complicated by the use of dedicated Unemployment Insurance trust 
funds for the purpose of deficit reduction. Several members of the 
Council believe that prompt action should be taken to correct this 
situation. Other members feel that the issue of how trust fund accounts 
should be treated in the budget is a very complex one, and requires 
careful consideration within a broader context. The Council intends to 
revisit this issue in its future deliberations. 
3'fwo members do not agree to the recommendation that Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation should be extended. 
12 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
Recommendation 
If additional revenue is required to implement the Council's 
recommendations, such revenue should be generated by a modest 
increase in the FUTA taxable wage base, to $8,500.4 
WORK SEARCH TEST UNDER EXTENDED BENEFITS 
Findings 
The Council finds that another problematic aspect of the Extended 
Benefits program is the federal requirement that, with some exceptions, 
those individuals who are receiving Extended Benefits must accept a 
minimum wage job if one is offered, or become ineligible for benefits. 
While the Council understands that recipients of both regular and 
extended Unemployment Insurance benefits have an obligation to 
search actively for work and accept appropriate job offers, the Council 
finds the current federal requirements to be excessively onerous. All 
states use a "suitability" test to determine the jobs which claimants are 
required to accept to remain eligible for benefits. This test gives states 
the flexibility to ensure adequate work search by claimants, while 
protecting unemployed workers' living standards and job skills by 
permitting them to decline substandard jobs. The states are in a better 
position to determine appropriate mechanisms for enforcing a work 
search test, given the particular conditions of their labor markets. 
Recommendation 
The federal requirement that individuals who are reCeIVIng 
Extended Benefits must accept a minimum wage job if one is offered, 
or become ineligible for benefits, should be eliminated. Each state 
should be allowed to determine an appropriate work search test, 
based on the conditions of its labor market. 
4Two members object to this recommendation. 
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STATE TRUST FUND SOLVENCY 
Findings 
The Council finds an overall decline in receipt of Unemployment 
Insurance benefits among the unemployed. This decline is at least 
partially caused by the inadequate reserves of many states' trust funds. 
During the past decade, many states with low or negative trust fund 
reserves have found themselves in the position of either having to 
increase taxes on employers in the midst of an economic downturn, or 
having to take measures to restrict eligibility and benefits for the 
unemployed. Some believe that this reliance on pay-as-you-go funding 
has worked to the overall detriment of the Unemployment Insurance 
system. 
The Council believes that it would be in the interest of the nation 
to begin to restore the forward-funding nature of the Unemployment 
Insurance system, resulting in a building up of reserves during good 
economic times and a drawing down of reserves during recessions. 
The Council finds, however, that any move toward creating federal 
guidelines for states' Unemployment Insurance trust fund accounts 
must be carefully weighed. Otherwise, there will be a risk of creating 
undue incentives for the states to restrict the eligibility and level of 
Unemployment Insurance benefits in order to achieve the solvency 
guidelines. The Council intends to make specific recommendations on 
this issue in future reports. 
FUTA TAXATION OF ALIEN AGRICULTURAL WORKERS 
Findings 
The Council was asked by Congress to consider the treatment of 
alien agricultural workers within the Unemployment Insurance system. 
Currently, the wages paid to alien agricultural workers with H2-A visas 
are exempt from the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). This 
exemption is scheduled to expire on January I, 1995. 
The Council finds that there are arguments both for and against 
continuing this exemption. Under the current exemption, alien 
agricultural workers are less costly to hire than domestic workers, on 
whom FUTA taxes must be paid. This cost differential may create an 
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incentive for substitution of foreign workers for U.S. workers, which 
argues in favor of repeal of the exemption. Furthermore, the process 
of certifying workers and issuing H2-A visas imposes costs on the 
federal and state governments that have the responsibility for 
overseeing this process. The vast majority (97 percent) of the cost of 
the certification process is funded through the FUTA tax. Since FUTA 
serves as the mechanism for funding the costs of the certification 
process, there is an additional rationale for repealing the exemption of 
H2-A workers from FUTA taxation. 
On the other hand, H2-A workers are ineligible to receive 
Unemployment Insurance benefits since their visas require that they 
return to their country of origin within ten days after their employment 
terminates. Consequently, these individuals cannot meet the "available 
for work" test of the Unemployment Insurance system. Thus, FUTA 
taxes would be imposed upon the wages of individuals who cannot 
receive Unemployment Insurance benefits, which argues against 
imposing the FUTA tax on their wages. 
On balance, the Council finds that the arguments in favor of FUTA 
taxation of alien agricultural workers outweigh the arguments against 
continuing that exemption. 
Recommendation 
As of January 1, 1995, the wages of alien agricultural workers 
(H2-A workers) should be subject to FUTA taxes. 
Section II 






THE FEDERAL-STATE Unemployment Insurance (UI) system, created in 1935, is designed to fulfill two primary 
objectives: (1) to provide temporary wage replacement for unemployed 
workers who have demonstrated a strong attachment to the labor force 
and (2) to assist in stabilizing the national economy during periods of 
cyclical economic downturn. The federal-state nature of the system 
assigns different responsibilities to the federal and state governments. 
Although broad federal laws ensure consistency in those areas where 
uniformity is considered essential, states determine most of the details 
of program operations and administration. As a result, many features 
of the system vary greatly across states. 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAMS 
Currently, three separate, but interrelated, programs provide 
income support to qualified unemployed workers: (1) permanent 
regular state UI programs, (2) the federal-state Extended Benefits 
program, and (3) the temporary federal Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation program. The characteristics of the three components of 
the UI system are discussed in more detail below. Figure 3-1 illustrates 
the benefits paid under each of the three components of the UI system 
over time. 
Regular State Unemployment Insurance 
Regular state Unemployment Insurance programs generally 
provide up to 26 weeks of benefits to qualified unemployed workers. 
Eligibility is determined according to specific state laws on an 
individual basis, with the duration and amount of benefits based upon 
"There are two principal authors of the chapters contained in Section II of 
this report. Amy B. Chasanov is primarily responsible for Chapters 7 and 8, 
and Daniel P. McMurrer is primarily responsible for Chapters 4, 5, and 6. They 
co-authored Chapter 3. 
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FIGURE 3-1 
UI BENEFITS PAID IN CONSTANT 1992 DOLLARS, 1948-1992 
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an individual's recent employment and earnings history. State taxes on 
employers! finance most benefits paid under the program? Tax rates 
vary among employers within the same state and are based partially 
upon the level of past VI claims that were made by an employer's 
former employees. Federal taxes imposed under the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) pay for the administration of state VI 
programs (as well as the federal share of the Extended Benefits 
program). The total amount paid by the regular program is cyclical in 
nature, with the level increasing as the number of unemployed increase 
during periods of economic downturn. During 1992, over $25 billion 
were paid in benefits. 
Federal-State Extended Benefits 
The federal-state Extended Benefits (EB) program provides up to 
13 additional weeks of benefits to individuals who have exhausted their 
regular VI benefits. Half of the cost of EB benefits is financed by the 
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federal government, and half is paid by the state distributing the 
benefits. Benefit amounts under EB correspond to the same level of 
benefits received in the regular state programs. This extension in 
benefit duration is available to individuals only when a measure of 
state unemployment rises above a given level. Most states currently 
use the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR) as the only "trigger" for the 
program. Because the IUR is determined by the number of regular UI 
claimants in a state, eligibility for EB in most states is affected directly 
by states' UI eligibility laws. Thus, a decline in the percentage of the 
unemployed who receive regular UI benefits has directly contributed 
to the reduction in the number of states in which EB is available. 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
The Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program is 
a temporary program similar to a number of past emergency programs 
enacted during periods of recession.3 EUC was enacted by Congress 
in November 1991 and has been extended on a number of different 
occasions since that time. It is scheduled to terminate in February 1994. 
The number of additional weeks of benefits that are made available 
under EUe depends upon three factors: (1) when the claimant first 
applied for EUe, (2) the state total unemployment rate, and (3) the 
national total unemployment rate. EUe claimants must meet state 
eligibility criteria, as well as additional federal requirements regarding 
employment history and work search. The EUC program has, in 
essence, provided states with the opportunity to use EVC in place of 
EB. Because the costs of Eue benefits are financed entirely by the 
federal government, and only 50 percent of EB costs are borne by the 
federal government, all states have taken advantage of the option of 
providing EUC rather than EB. Thus, in the wake of the most recent 
recession, EUe has almost entirely supplanted EB. To date, EUe has 
cost over $23 billion, with a significant percentage of that amount 
financed out of general revenues. 
THE UNEMPLOYED POPULATION 
In comparison with the civilian labor force, there are some slight 
differences in the unemployed (see Table 3-1). In particular, younger 
individuals, males, and blacks are disproportionately represented 
among the unemployed. In comparison with the unemployed 
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TABLE 3-1 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS IN 1992 
Civilian Total UI 
Labor Force Unemployed Claimants 
Age 
16 to 34 38% 59% 43% 
33 to 54 38% 33% 45% 
55 and over 12% 8% 12% 
Gender 
Men 54% 57% 60% 
Women 46% 43% 40% 
Race 
White 89% 78% N/A 
Black 11% 22% 
Source: USDOL/ETA/UIS/Division of Actuarial Services. 
population, individuals who make VI claims tend to be older, with men 
also represented disproportionately. 
A number of trends among the unemployed are evident. The 
percentage of VI claimants who have exhausted regular VI benefits 
during recessions has been increasing since 1970 (see Figure 3-2). The 
average duration of unemployment spells has increased, 
as has the percentage of individuals experiencing particularly long 
unemployment spells (see Figure 3-3). With regard to reasons for 
unemployment, the number of job losers on layoff has increased over 
time, while the percentage of the unemployed who are new entrants to 
the labor force has decreased (see Figure 3-4). The impact that broad 
demographic changes in the labor force have had on the VI system is 
discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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TRENDS IN REGULAR STATE UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE PROGRAMS 
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There are a number of dimensions along which the regular VI 
system can be examined. Included among these dimensions are the 
following: (1) the percent of the labor force that is covered under the 
VI program, (2) the standards regarding eligibility for VI benefits 
among the unemployed, (3) the percent of the unemployed who 
actually receive VI benefits, (4) the amount of VI benefits received, and 
(5) the duration of the benefits. Each of these elements are discussed 
in greater detail below. 
FIGURE 3-2 
PERCENT AGE OF CLAIMANTS EXHAUSTING REGULAR UI BENEFITS, 
1940-1992 
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FIGURE 3-3 
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Coverage 
The percentage of the workforce covered by the VI system (i.e., 
those jobs in which the employer pays VI taxes on a worker's wage) 
has increased over time (see Figure 3-5). The most recent significant 
increases in coverage were legislated in the 1970s, when a number of 
groups were covered for the first time, including state and local 
government employees, many household workers, and employees of 
small businesses. Now VI coverage is almost universal, extending to 
over 90 percent of all civilian employment in the Vnited States. This 
includes almost all wage and salaried workers, representing 106 million 
individuals. The only major group that currently remains uncovered 
is the self-employed. 
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Eligibility 
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While the eligibility criteria for UI benefits among unemployed 
workers varies from state to state, there are three general principles that 
apply in all states: (1) individuals must earn a certain minimum amount 
in a given period of time in order to be eligible; (2) eligible individuals 
must be willing and able to work, with most states also requiring that 
they actively seek work; and (3) eligible individuals must have lost 
their jobs through no fault of their own. This latter requirement tends 
to exclude most job quitters and individuals who have been fired for 
cause. 
Although many state policy changes have tended to restrict 
eligibility, individual wages have simultaneously increased as a result 
of inflation, thereby allowing more individuals to reach the minimum 
earnings threshold. Estimates suggest that these two trends have 
almost canceled one another, with eligibility remaining fairly constant 
at approximately 43 percent of the unemployed.4 
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almost canceled one another, with eligibility remaining fairly constant 
at approximately 43 percent of the unemployed.4 
FIGURE 3-5 
ANNUAL COVERED EMPLOYMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
EMPLOYMENT, 1947-1992 
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Source: Economic Report of the President (1993), and 
Employment and Wages, BLS/USDOL. 
Receipt of Benefits 
The percentage of unemployed workers who receive 
unemployment insurance benefits under regular state programs has 
exhibited two significant trends: (1) it has declined slowly but 
consistently since the 19405; and (2) it dropped dramatically between 
1980 and 1984, and has remained at a low rate throughout the 1980s 
and early 19905. The causes and implications of these trends are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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Level of Benefits 
The weekly level of benefits (i.e., the weekly benefit amount) that 
an individual is eligible to receive is determined by individual state 
formulae that are based upon the prior recent earnings of that 
individual. Each state also has a minimum and maximum level of 
weekly benefits that can be received. The average benefit received by 
workers in 1992 was approximately $173 per week.s 
The replacement rate, defined as the level of UI benefits paid 
divided by wages in UI-covered employment, is often used as a 
measure of the capacity of the UI system to replace an individual's pre-
unemployment wages. The replacement rate has been quite constant 
over time, remaining around 35 percent (see Figure 3-6). This average, 
however, masks significant variation across states, with the replacement 
rate ranging in 1992 from a low of 27.5 percent in California to a high 
of 49.5 percent in Hawaii (see Table 3-2). In addition, there is 
significant variation across individuals within states, with UI benefits 
typically replacing a higher percentage of lost earnings for low-income 
individuals than for high-income individuals.6 Similarly, the average 
level of weekly benefits varies across states, ranging in 1992 from a low 
of $83 in Puerto Rico to a high of $239 in Hawaii (see Table 3-3). 
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Duration of Benefits 
In most states, the potential duration of benefits for an individual 
is calculated based upon that individual's recent eamings.7 There is 
substantial uniformity across states with regard to the maximum 
duration of VI benefits, with all but three states providing for a 
maximum of 26 weeks of benefits in 1993.8 In general, the national 
average of potential maximum duration has gradually increased over 
time, as has the average duration of individual unemployment spells 
(see Figure 3-7). 
FIGURE 3-6 
AVERAGE WEEKLY BENEFITS AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE TOTAL 
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Source: ur Financial Data Handbook. 
1983 and 1984 figures were recalculated and substituted for erroneous data. 
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TABLE 3-2 
AVERAGE WEEKLY BENEFITS AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE TOTAL COVERED 
WAGES, BY STATE IN 1992 
California 27.5 New Jersey 36.4 
Louisiana 27.8 Texas 36.9 
Indiana 28.1 Virgin Islands 37.2 
Alaska 28.1 Montana 37.2 
New Hampshire 28.5 Colorado 37.4 
Tennessee 28.7 North Carolina 37.4 
Alabama 28.8 South Dakota 37.9 
Puerto Rico 31.1 Ohio 38.4 
New York 31.8 Oregon 38.5 
Georgia 32.0 West Virginia 38.7 
Missouri 32.6 Oklahoma 39.1 
Arizona 33.4 Arkansas 39.5 
Connecticut 33.7 Massachusetts 39.8 
Mississippi 33.8 Wisconsin 39.9 
District of Columbia 34.0 Idaho 40.0 
Nebraska 34.4 Michigan 40.2 
Illinois 34.4 Maine 40.6 
Kentucky 34.7 Wyoming 40.8 
South Carolina 35.2 Pennsylvania 40.9 
New Mexico 35.3 North Dakota 40.9 
Virginia 35.4 Minnesota 41.0 
Maryland 35.5 Vtah 42.3 
Delaware 35.6 Iowa 42.7 
Nevada 35.6 Kansas 42.9 
Florida 35.9 Rhode Island 44.6 
Washington 36.1 Hawaii 49.5 
Vermont 36.2 
Source: VI Financial Data and Handbook. 
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TABLE 3-3 
WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNT, BY STATE IN 1992 
Hawaii $239.80 West Virginia $162.74 
District of Columbia $227.72 Virgin Islands $160.58 
Massachusetts $226.31 Oklahoma $159.50 
New Jersey $224.88 North Carolina $158.50 
Michigan $211.29 Florida $158.01 
Connecticut $210.78 Idaho $156.22 
Rhode Island $206.09 Vermont $155.31 
Pennsylvania $200.92 California $152.07 
Minnesota $198.09 Arkansas $150.63 
New York $197.42 Georgia $148.17 
Illinois $183.21 Arizona $146.75 
Delaware $181.02 North Dakota $146.22 
Maryland $180.25 Missouri $146.07 
Ohio $179.87 Kentucky $144.43 
Kansas $179.06 South Carolina $142.89 
Colorado $177.54 New Mexico $138.28 
Texas $176.11 New Hampshire $135.55 
Washington $175.62 Montana $134.62 
Wisconsin $175.46 Nebraska $132.95 
Utah $174.49 South Dakota $127.84 
Oregon $171.81 Indiana $125.98 
Iowa $170.38 Tennessee $123.85 
Alaska $169.92 Mississippi $122.62 
Nevada $167.89 Alabama $120.95 
Maine $166.73 Louisiana $118.06 
Virginia $164.15 Puerto Rico $83.50 
Wyoming $163.42 
Source: USDOL/ETAjUIS/Division of Actuarial Services. 
OVERVIEW 
FIGURE 3-7 
DURATION OF VI BENEFITS AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
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Trends in Unemployment 
Insurance Recipiency 
THE PERCENTAGE of unemployed workers who receive UI benefits under regular state programs has exhibited two 
significant trends: (1) the national recipiency percentage has declined 
slowly, but consistently, since the 1940s; and (2) the recipiency 
percentage dropped dramatically between 1980 and 1984 and has 
remained at a low rate throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. 
These declines have raised considerable concern, in large part 
because they threaten to undermine the two primary functions of the 
UI system: to provide partial wage replacement for unemployed 
workers, and to counter economic downturns by automatically 
pumping more money into the economy when the unemployment rate 
is high. Because the Insured Unemployment Rate (lUR) is the primary 
mechanism through which the Extended Benefits program (EB) is 
activated during recessions, the decline in the IUR, reflecting the decline 
in recipiency, has also weakened the countercyclical effectiveness of the 
EB component of the UI program. 
The two declines cited above likely have been caused by a 
combination of factors that tend to have similar effects upon the UI 
system. It is probable that the long-term decline partially is a result of 
broad shifts in the demographics of the labor market, coupled with 
industrial shifts and increases in UI coverage. To the extent that the 
percentage of the unemployed receiving UI benefits has decreased over 
the long term, the UI program has become unresponsive to the needs 
of a growing portion of the unemployed population. 
A number of researchers have worked to identify the causes of the 
recent, more short-term decline in national UI recipiency. Four factors 
have been identified as the primary causes, although the results have 
not been wholly consistent and researchers have had substantial 
difficulty in separating the effects fully. First, policy changes were 
made on both the federal and state levels that appear to have reduced 
recipiency. Second, an increasing percentage of the unemployed live in 
states where UI recipiency is consistently below the national average. 
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Third, the lUlionized percentage of the work force, where UI claims 
rates historically have been high, has declined. Fourth, the percentage 
of the work force employed in the manufacturing sector, where VI 
claims rates also have been high, has declined, as well. 
RECIPIENCY TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS 
There are two primary measures of recipiency. The first measure 
is the ratio of the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR) to the Total 
Unemployment Rate (TVR),l and the second is the ratio of UI claimants 
(IU) to the total number of unemployed (TV). 2 Both these ratios have 
shown a long-term decline and a more short-term decline (see Figure 
4-1). Recipiency measures also vary considerably across states, with the 
ratio of claimants to total unemployed ranging from 21 percent in 
Virginia to 60 percent in Alaska during 1992 (see Table 4-1). An 
alternative measure of recipiency, the ratio of UI claimants to total job 
losers, has also demonstrated both long-term and short-term declines 
(see Figure 4-2). 
In an analysis of the characteristics of all unemployed individuals 
who were not receiving benefits, the Congressional Research Service 
found that such individuals were typically young, did not head 
families, and were not the primary source of income within their 
families. Generally, they have lower than average incomes both before 
and after the unemployment spell. The study also found that, as 
expected, as attachment to the labor market decreases, likelihood of 
receiving VI benefits also falls. Even among those individuals who had 
been employed full-time for a full year before the beginning of their 
unemployment spell, however, only 42 percent of such individuals 
receive benefits.3 
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FIGURE 4-1 
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TABLE 4-1 
RATIO OF UI CLAIMANTS TO TOTAL UNEMPLOYED, 
BY STATE IN 1992 
Virginia 20.7% Maryland 35.0% 
New Hampshire 23.6% Tennessee 37.2% 
Florida 24.5% Minnesota 37.3% 
Texas 24.6% Iowa 37.4% 
Indiana 24.7% Nebraska 37.6% 
West Virginia 24.9% Massachusetts 38.9% 
South Dakota 25.0% Arkansas 39.2% 
Oklahoma 26.4% Missouri 39.4% 
Colorado 27.3% New York 39.7% 
Arizona 27.9% New Jersey 39.9% 
New Mexico 28.4% California 40.7% 
Louisiana 28.6% Delaware 40.7% 
Georgia 28.9% Maine 43.0% 
Alabama 29.0% Pennsylvania 44.6% 
Utah 29.4% Kansas 44.9% 
Mississippi 29.6% Connecticut 45.2% 
Puerto Rico 29.7% Rhode Island 46.2% 
North Carolina 30.6% Idaho 46.7% 
Kentucky 30.8% Oregon 46.9% 
Ohio 33.1% Nevada 46.9% 
North Dakota 33.1% Washington 47.1% 
Wyoming 33.9% Wisconsin 47.4% 
Michigan 33.9% Vermont 48.3% 
South Carolina 34.4% Hawaii 50.0% 
Montana 34.6% District of Columbia 51.2% 
Illinois 34.7% Alaska 60.0% 
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area UI Statistics and National 
Office of Unemployment Insurance, Weekly Report. 
Note: Data for the Virgin Islands are not available. 
TRENDS IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE RECll'IENCY 35 
FIGURE 4·2 








1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 
Year 
Lines represent recessions at peak. 
Source: Economic Report of the President (1993). 
36 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
Long-Term Trends 
In the long term, the IUR/TUR has dropped approximately 
60 percent since 1947, and the IV lTU has declined approximately 
40 percent over the same period. Vntil1980, both ratios displayed an 
overall downward trend, with some upward movement during periods 
of high unemployment. Figure 4-3 illustrates the relationship between 
the IVR/TUR and the unemployment rate over time. These trends 
suggest that the VI program has been serving an ever-decreasing 
percentage of the unemployed, with periodic increases during 
recessions, largely a result of recessionary increases in the percentage 
of the unemployed who are job losers. 
FIGURE 4-3 
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Short-Term Trends 
The long-term decline in VI reClplency was combined with a 
pronounced drop in both measures of recipiency during the early 1980s. 
By 1984, the number of unemployed collecting VI as a percentage of 
total unemployment had dropped to 28.5 percent, the lowest recorded 
percentage since 1947, when such data were first collected. The ratio 
has increased slightly since 1984, but has remained lower than its 
historical average. This period is the first one during which recipiency 
measures did not increase significantly as the unemployment rate 
peaked. This represents a fundamental shift away from the dynamic 
trends that had marked the VI program since its inception.4 
The declines in VI recipiency are potentially significant for a 
number of reasons. First, they threaten to undermine the two primary 
functions of the VI system: to provide partial wage replacement for 
unemployed workers and to counter economic downturns by 
automatically pumping more money into the economy during periods 
of high unemployment. The effectiveness of the system in performing 
these two functions is a direct function of the percentage of the 
unemployed who are served by the program. To the extent the 
program serves a decreasing percentage of the unemployed, the 
system's capacity to perform its two primary functions is eroded. 
Further, the decline of the IVR relative to total unemployment has 
weakened the countercyclical effectiveness of the VI system as a whole, 
because the IUR is the primary mechanism through which the EB 
program is activated during recessions. Thus, the decline in the IVR 
has resulted in a significant reduction in the number of states in which 
EB is made available during recessions.s 
CAUSES OF THE LONG-TERM DECLINE IN 
RECIPIENCY 
While there is relatively little research that has examined the long-
term phenomenon, the research that does exist suggests that the long-
term decline is primarily a result of two factors: (1) changes in the 
demographic composition of the labor force and (2) increases in VI 
coverage. It is likely that both of these factors have served generally to 
reduce the percentage of eligible workers who apply for VI benefits. 
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Broad Demographic Changes 
Burtless and Saks suggest that a primary cause of the decline in the 
IV lTV before 1980 was the changing demographic composition of the 
jobless. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as many women and young 
workers from the baby boom generation entered the labor force, they 
also became a higher percentage of the unemployed. As a result, men 
of prime working age, who are the most likely to receive VI benefits, 
declined considerably as a percentage of the unemployed. Burtless and 
Saks find that such demographic changes explain a large percentage of 
the decline in the IV lTV ratio before 1980. 
While the demographic changes described by Burtless and Saks 
declined in their impact after 1980, other demographic changes have 
continued or even accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. Perhaps the most 
significant change is the continuing increase in the number of two-
earner families. Although no empirical research has addressed this 
issue, it is likely that the increase in two-earner households has reduced 
the need of some workers to apply for VI benefits upon becoming 
unemployed. Thus, it is possible that various broad demographic 
.changes have continued to have a negative impact upon VI recipiency. 
Increases in VI Coverage 
As noted above, significant increases in VI coverage occurred 
during the 1970s. It is likely that these newly covered employees were 
less likely to make VI claims than previously covered groupS.6 If this 
is true, then, all else being equal, the number of VI claimants as a 
percentage of VI-covered jobs (i.e., the IVR) would decline simply as a 
result of the increased coverage of the system. Burtless and Saks 
suggest that the IVR may have declined by between 0.5 and 0.8 
percentage points because of the extensions in coverage in the 1970s. 
Such a decline would account for a large percentage of the decline in 
the IVR/TUR over this period. 
Decline in Manufacturing 
The shift of workers from manufacturing and other industries with 
high VI recipiency rates was also identified by Burtless and Saks as a 
primary cause of the long-term decline in recipiency, although they 
report that it is quite difficult to estimate with precision the magnitude 
of this effect. As discussed below, the decline in manufacturing also 
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has been identified as a significant cause of the decline during the 
1980s? 
CAUSES OF THE SHORT-TERM DECLINE IN RECIPIENCY 
Considerable inconsistency continues to exist in the research 
exanUning the decline in VI recipiency that occurred in the early 1980s. 
The variability of the results is a strong indication of the difficulty that 
researchers have had in quantifying the impacts of various factors. 
Four primary factors have emerged as the most common explanations 
of the short-term decline in recipiency: (1) federal and state policy 
changes, (2) population shifts to states with traditionally low VI claims 
rates, (3) the decline in the unionized percentage of the work force, and 
(4) the decline in the manufacturing sector of the economy. It is likely 
that a combination of some or all of these factors contributed 
significantly to the short-term decline. 
Policy Changes 
During the 1980s, a number of changes in federal and state law 
appear to have contributed to the reduction in the percentage of the 
unemployed who received unemployment benefits. Overall, the u.s. 
General Accounting Office (GAO) finds that policies designed to 
improve the solvency of state trust funds had the effect of reducing VI 
recipiency among unemployed individuals.8 Most significantly, 
numerous state laws were changed to restrict eligibility and reduce 
benefit levels. In part, these state laws were in response to federal 
policies that provided incentives to states to adopt more restrictive 
legislation for regular state unemployment programs. A number of 
federal laws, most notably the decision to tax UI benefits, directly 
reduced the value of unemployment benefit levels. 
Federal Policies 
During the 1980s, a number of significant changes were made in 
federal regulations governing state VI trust funds. Beginning in 1982, 
states were required to repay federal loans to their trust funds with 
interest (previously, the loans had been interest-free and there was some 
uncertainty regarding whether repayment would be required at all), and 
states with loans were required to adopt other specific measures to 
ensure solvency. Overall, these changes provided incentives to states 
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to avoid the need for future loans by reducing the scope of state 
programs. In addition, states were given other direct incentives, linked 
to federal EB funds, to tighten VI eligibility requirements and to reduce 
VI benefits. Taken as a whole, these federal policy changes were 
reflected to some extent in the state policy changes discussed below. 
Federal laws also were changed in ways that directly affected the 
recipiency rate. In 1979, VI benefits were partially taxed for the first 
time, and in 1986, all unemployment benefits became subject to taxation. 
States also were required to reduce or eliminate VI payments to 
unemployed workers receiving pensions or Social Security payments. 
Corson and Nicholson find that, overall, between 11 percent and 23 
percent of the total decline can be directly attributed to various federal 
policy changes. Specifically, between 11 and 16 percent is due to partial 
taxation of benefits and up to 7 percent to less generous EB programs.9 
State Policies 
During the 1980s, many states adopted tighter monetary eligibility 
standards or stricter disqualification provisions for their regular VI 
programs. The GAO reports that 44 states tightened their standards in 
one or both of these regards between 1981 and 1987. It is likely that 
many of these state changes came about in response to the federal 
incentives to tighten eligibility discussed above, although it is 
impossible to determine the precise impact that changes in federal 
legislation alone had on the policy decisions of states. Some research 
has found that these and other changes in state policy account for a 
significant percentage of the decline in recipiency. Corson and 
Nicholson find that 21 percent to 54 percent of the decline in recipiency 
is attributable to state policy changes. Specifically, the decline is due to 
the following: 9 to 11 percent to increases in denial rates for 
disqualifying income, 3 to 11 percent to increases in the minimum 
earnings required to qualify for VI, 2 to 11 percent to increases in the 
denial rate for misconduct, up to 13 percent to changes in voluntary 
separation standards, 5 percent to reductions in maximum duration of 
benefits, and 2 to 4 percent to changes in wage replacement rates.lO 
They also find that the IV lTV increased between 1 percent and 13 
percent as a result of reductions in work test denials, partially canceling 
the effects of the other factorsY 
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Burtless and Saks also conclude that state legislative and 
administrative changes are the primary cause of the decline in 
recipiency, but they do not present estimates of the magnitude of the 
effects of these changes. 12 
Baldwin and McHugh's findings suggest that state policy changes 
account for 54 percent of the decline in recipiency rates between 1979 
and 1990.13 An updated work by Baldwin, however, found sharp 
reductions in the apparent effects of state policy changes.14 Baldwin 
and McHugh suggested that the decline can be attributed to the 
following: 21 percent to increases in the minimum earnings required to 
qualify for VI, 16 percent to increases in the earnings required to 
qualify for the maximum benefit, 8 percent to increases in the number 
of states with disqualification periods for job quitters, 7 percent to 
increases in the number of states with disqualification periods for 
refusal of suitable work, and 1 percent to increases in the number of 
states with right-to-work laws.15 
Blank and Card, however, found little evidence that state policy 
changes had any impact on recipiency. They did find that individual 
eligibility for VI benefits appeared to decline slightly as a result of 
tighter state eligibility standards, although these effects were offset by 
increasing wage levels.16 
Population Shifts 
An increasing share of U.S. unemployment is located in Southern 
and Mountain states, where the IV /TU ratio consistently has been 
lower than the national average. Thus, as the percentage of national 
unemployment located in these states increases, the national IV /TU 
ratio would be expected to fall accordingly. This is a long-term 
demographic trend, occurring throughout the last three decades and 
continuing into the present. Blank and Card found that these regional 
shifts in population accounted for approximately 50 percent of the 
decline in the national IV /TU ratio between 1977 and 1987. Vroman 
asserts that 25 percent is a more appropriate figure, and Corson and 
Nicholson attribute 16 percent of the variation to geographic population 
shiftsP These analyses do not, however, explain the underlying 
variations in IV /TU across states that have actually caused the national 
rate to be affected by interstate migrations. It is quite likely that much 
of this variation can be attributed to the state policy differences 
discussed above. The exact extent to which this is the case, however, 
has not yet been determined. 
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Decline in Unionization 
In recent years, the percentage of workers who are members of 
unions has declined significantly. Between 1979 and 1988, the 
unionization percentage decreased 25 percent.18 Because unions have 
traditionally represented a powerful source of information regarding 
available benefits for unemployed workers, it is possible that the decline 
in union membership exacerbated any existing information problem 
among the unemployed. In addition, unions have often facilitated the 
filing of members' VI claims by helping to guide them through the VI 
system. Finally, many unions' members are only eligible for 
supplemental unemployment benefits paid by their union if they apply 
for regular VI. 
Blank and Card attribute 25 percent of the decline in recipiency to 
the decline in unionization. Baldwin and McHugh assign 29 percent of 
the reduction in recipiency to the decline in unionization. Vroman also 
points to the potential importance of the unions' information role by 
noting that the most important reason for nonapplication for VI benefits 
by unemployed individuals is their belief that they are ineligible for VI. 
If individuals' understanding of eligibility is incorrect, then eligible 
workers may not be applying because they believe they are ineligible.19 
Decline in Manufacturing Sector 
As noted above, Burtless and Saks suggest that industrial shifts 
contributed to the long-term decline in recipiency. This trend continued 
in the 1980s, as manufacturing as a percentage of total employment fell 
by 22 percent between 1979 and 1990. This factor has been identified 
as a significant cause of the short-term decline, as well. Corson and 
Nicholson find that between 4 percent and 18 percent of the decrease 
in the VI claims ratio can be attributed to the decline in the 
manufacturing sector, while Baldwin and McHugh attribute 16 percent 
of the total decline in IV jW to this factor. In addition, Corson and 
Nicholson note that an unemployed worker previously employed in 
manufacturing is 25 percent more likely to collect VI than a similar 
worker from another industry. These findings are partially called into 
question, however, in analyses by Corson and Rangarajan, and Baldwin. 
Both find that a decrease in manufacturing employment actually leads 
to an increase in the IUR. 20 
Overall, it should be noted that because unions traditionally have 
been composed disproportionately of workers in the manufacturing 
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sector, the decline in manufacturing is closely linked to the decline in 





As NEW COMMODITIES and technologies develop, the . nature of the economy changes, with some individuals 
losing their jobs as a result. Such workers are termed "dislocated" 
workers. While dislocated workers come from all fields, individuals 
who work in declining industries are particularly likely to be 
dislocated. In addition, workers in fields that are adversely affected by 
changes in public policy are also vulnerable to dislocation. In the 
coming years, it is likely that two particular government policies will 
increase the number of worker dislocations. Some increases in 
dislocated workers are expected to result from the implementation of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Reductions in 
spending in the defense sector also are likely to dislocate a significant 
number of workers. 
Economists often argue that some worker dislocation is efficient, 
because it serves to direct human resources to those areas where they 
are most useful and valuable. This efficiency, however, imposes a 
significant burden upon those individual workers who are dislocated. 
In recognition of the individual costs that are borne by dislocated 
workers, a number of government programs exist that are designed to 
meet their needs, providing income support and reemployment 
services. The UI program represents the primary source of income 
support. Currently, the Trade Adjustment Assistance program and the 
Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance program 
represent the primary complements to the UI program for dislocated 
workers, providing training and job search assistance, as well as 
additional income support. 
WORKER DISLOCATION: DEFINITIONS 
Before beginning a direct discussion of worker dislocation, it is 
important to recognize that not all analysts agree on how to define 
dislocated workers. As a result, the number and characteristics of 
workers who are actually classified as dislocated vary greatly, 
depending upon the specific definition that is chosen. Some suggest 
that all workers who lose a job because of a plant closing or permanent 
45 
46 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
layoff should be considered dislocated, while others believe that a 
worker must also have had a stable previous employment history in 
order to be classified as dislocated. This latter definition, with a 
requirement that a worker has been employed in the previous job for 
at least three years, is the one generally used by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, as well as many other researchers, in their analyses of 
dislocated workers. 
Nevertheless, it is in many ways instructive to consider all workers 
who have permanently lost their jobs, regardless of their job tenure, in 
order to understand the relationship between various lengths of job 
tenure and the experiences of dislocated workers. Indeed, analysis 
reveals that half of all dislocated workers were with their previous 
employer for fewer than three years. Therefore, this chapter considers 
all dislocated workers, regardless of their job tenure. 
EXTENT OF WORKER DISLOCATION 
Many have come to believe that the extent of dislocation among 
American workers has increased in recent years. The long-term shift 
in employment opportunities from the manufacturing sector to the 
service sector reflects a turmoil in the labor market that is likely to 
cause worker dislocations. Further, indirect measures of dislocation 
have increased in recent years. Both the average duration of 
unemployment spells and the percentage of unemployed workers who 
are unemployed for extended periods of time have increased 
throughout the last decades.1 At the same time, the unemployment 
rate has been steadily increasing, with some economists attributing a 
percentage of this rise to increases in the number of dislocated 
workers.2 Indeed, as indicated in Figure 3-3, the relationship between 
the unemployment rate and the average duration of unemployment is 
quite a strong one. In addition, the number of permanent separations 
as a percentage of job losses has increased over time.3 
In an effort to achieve a direct measure of the number of dislocated 
workers over time, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conducted 
a major study of the characteristics and the experience of workers who 
were identified as having been dislocated during the 1980s.4 The CBO 
found that approximately two million workers in the United States lost 
or left a job each year in the 1980s because of a plant closing, an 
employer going out of business, a layoff from which they were not 
recalled, or other similar reason. The number of such dislocated 
workers each year was reflective of the condition of the economy, with 
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numbers ranging from 1.5 million in the relatively strong labor market 
of 1988 to 2.7 million in the recession year of 1982.5 Analysis reveals 
that much of the cyclical variation over the decade was a result of 
workers who lost jobs because of "slack work," rather than the closing 
of plants or abolition of jobs or shifts. Thus, the number of workers 
who were dislocated because their plant was closed or job abolished 
remained generally constant throughout the decade, slightly below one 
million workers per year, despite the variations in the overall 
unemployment rate. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF DISLOCATED WORKERS 
Under any broad definition, dislocated workers are a 
heterogeneous population with varied backgrounds, characteristics, and 
needs for adjustment assistance. Indeed, the heterogeneity of this 
population is increasing, as greater numbers of white collar and 
nonmanufacturing workers are being dislocated. In large part, 
however, the characteristics of those workers with the greatest need for 
assistance in finding new employment still can be distinguished from 
the characteristics of dislocated workers who are unlikely to encounter 
significant difficulty in finding reemployment. 
Dislocated Workers in General 
Despite the relationship noted above between the condition of the 
economy and the number of dislocated workers, the characteristics of 
dislocated workers tend to remain generally consistent, regardless of 
the prevailing economic conditions. A high percentage of dislocated 
workers have lost their jobs in goods-producing industries, although 
the percentage of service workers who were dislocated increased 
throughout the 1980s, rising from approximately 40 percent to 50 
percent of all dislocated workers. Despite the decrease in the 
percentage of dislocated workers from goods~producing industries, 
dislocation among such workers is still twice the rate among workers 
from other industries. In addition, a number of other individual factors 
affect the likelihood of a worker becoming dislocated. The CBO notes 
that workers who have not finished high school are twice as likely to 
be dislocated as workers with a college degree. Younger workers are 
more likely to become dislocated than older workers. Overall, despite 
these differences in risk of dislocation by age, education level, and 
industry, the characteristics of the population of dislocated workers 
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generally resemble the characteristics of the civilian labor force as a 
whole. 
Reemployment Difficulty Among Dislocated Workers 
It is important to recognize that labor market experiences vary 
significantly among those workers who become dislocated. Those 
workers who (1) incur the largest wage losses, (2) are jobless for 
extended periods, or (3) do not find reemployment at all tend to be 
disproportionately the least well educated, the oldest, and those with 
the longest tenure with their previous employer. Statistical analysis to 
isolate the effect of each characteristic shows that age and years of 
schooling have the largest effects upon dislocated workers' likelihoods 
of each of these three forms of reemployment difficulty. In addition, 
among dislocated workers, females and minorities are significantly 
more likely to have such difficulties than males and whites, regardless 
of economic conditions. The variety of difficulties experienced by some 
dislocated workers is discussed in greater detail in the following 
section. 
CONSEQUENCES OF DISLOCATION 
The experiences of dislocated workers varies considerably. Some 
find new jobs at comparable wages with little difficulty. A significant 
percentage of those dislocated, however, exhaust their VI benefits, 
experience long spells of unemployment, and/ or receive lower wages 
in their new jobs. There is evidence that workers who are dislocated 
from their jobs experience long spells of unemployment and that many 
suffer significant losses in earnings.6 The CBO finds that even one to 
three years after being dislocated/ half of the workers who had lost 
jobs either are not working or have new jobs that pay less than 80 
percent of their prior earnings.8 On the other hand, almost one quarter 
of dislocated workers receive an increase in earnings of at least 20 
percent by that point. Those who suffer lower earnings tended to take 
longer to find a job than other dislocated workers. While those who 
receive a significant increase in earnings are unemployed for an average 
of 14 weeks, those whose earnings decline by more than 20 percent are 
jobless for an average of 26 weeks. Dislocated workers who eventually 
find reemployment are unemployed for an average of 20 weeks, while 
all dislocated workers, including those with continuing unemployment 
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spells at the time of the survey, are unemployed for an average of 29 
weeks.9 
As noted above, the workers who experience the most difficulty 
tend to be disproportionately older, less educated, and to have longer 
previous job tenure. For example, 
.. Workers over the age of 60 are unemployed for an average of 
53 weeks, with only 32 percent able to find reemployment. 
.. Workers with more than 10 years of job tenure are unemployed 
for an average of 37 weeks, with only 65 percent able to find 
reemployment. 10 
.. Dislocated workers who have not completed high school (20 
percent) are unemployed for an average of 39 weeks, with only 
58 percent able to find reemployment. 
It is also important to note that the condition of the economy 
seems to play little role in improving the prospects of comparable 
reemployment for those workers who incurred substantial decreases in 
earnings. Although the average duration of unemployment for all 
workers fell from almost 30 weeks during the recession year of 1981 to 
15 weeks in 1988, the percentage of reemployed dislocated workers 
whose earnings fell by at least 20 percent remained generally constant. 
PROGRAMS SERVING DISLOCATED WORKERS 
The UI program represents the primary means of income support 
for covered dislocated workers who are seeking new employment. In 
order to respond to the more specific needs that these workers have, an 
array of other programs currently exists; these programs serve 
primarily either to supplement the UI benefits that are available to 
dislocated workers or to complement those benefits by providing 
training or other reemployment assistance. Currently, the Department 
of Labor is in the process of developing a plan to create a 
comprehensive worker adjustment program, with existing worker 
adjustment programs consolidated into one. 
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Unemployment Insurance 
The VI program is the primary source of income support to 
dislocated workers. In addition, it provides benefits to other workers 
who lose their jobs. While dislocated workers comprise approximately 
20 percent of the unemployed, approximately 80 percent of dislocated 
workers are served by the VI program. 
In general, dislocated workers are much more likely to exhaust 
their VI benefits before they find a job. During the 1980s, more than 
half of all dislocated workers who received ill benefits exhausted them, 
while only about one-third of VI recipients as a whole exhausted 
benefits. As expected, the characteristics of workers and the 
circumstances of dislocation that are associated with lengthy spells of 
unemployment are also associated with a greater probability of 
exhausting benefits. 
Other Programs 
Although ill represents the primary source of benefits for 
dislocated workers, it serves all covered workers who lose their jobs; 
therefore, it is not tailored to the needs of dislocated workers. 
Historically, there have been numerous other programs that have been 
targeted at specific groups of workers. Today, the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance (TAA) program and the Economic Dislocation and Worker 
Adjustment Assistance (EDW AA) program represent two significant 
sources of reemployment assistance for dislocated workers in general. 
In addition to these programs, programs similar to EDWAA have been 
implemented to serve workers affected by the Clean Air Act and cuts 
in defense spending. Further, a number of other smaller programs exist 
that have eligibility standards restricted to workers who are in a single 
industry or who are affected by more narrow government policiesY 
Trade Adjustment Assistance 
T AA is the largest of the special programs created to assist 
displaced workers whose job losses are associated with federal policies, 
with recent annual expenditures ranging from $150 to $250 million. 
The program provides assistance to workers who are unemployed as 
a result of import competition. In order to qualify for assistance, 
workers from a firm must petition for certification. Certification criteria 
require that a significant share of the firm be threatened with 
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dislocation; sales or production have decreased; and increased imports 
have "contributed importantly" to the reductions in employment, sales, 
or production'. The certification process for TAA services can be a 
lengthy one, requiring an intensive investigation by representatives of 
the Department of LaborY 
Cash benefits are available under TAA for certified workers after 
their VI benefits have been eXhausted. The weekly TAA benefit level 
is available for up to 52 weeks after VI eXhaustion if the worker is 
participating in an approved training program. Generally, weekly TAA 
benefits are equal to an individual's weekly VI benefit level. In 1991, 
25,000 displaced workers received cash assistance totalling $116 million, 
in an average amount of $170 per week and average duration of 23 
weeks per individual. More than 85 percent of these recipients came 
from the manufacturing sector Y 
In addition to cash assistance, various types of reemployment 
assistance increasingly have been available since the 1980s, with 
training now an entitlement for eligible workers and mandatory for 
those workers who receive cash benefits under TAA and have not 
received a waiver from the training requirement. A recent evaluation 
of the TAA program, however, found no statistically reliable evidence 
that TAA-provided training has a substantial positive impact upon 
employment and earnings for participants in the first three years 
following an initial VI claim.14 
Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance 
EDWAA amended Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act 
(JTPA) in 1988. Vnder the program, states are allocated federal funds 
to provide training and related services to dislocated workers. Funds 
are distributed to states on the basis of various measures of state 
unemployment. The criteria for being designated "dislocated" (and 
therefore eligible for services) under EDWAA are quite broad. 
Generally, the criteria require only that workers be either terminated, 
laid off, or long-term unemployed and have limited opportunities for 
future employment in their previous industry, occupation, or 
community. This assessment is made on the state or local level. 
Available funding under EDW AA, however, is insufficient to cover 
all eligible workers. For 1993, $517 million was appropriated to 
EDWAA, which is estimated to be sufficient to allow approximately 10 
percent of all dislocated workers to receive services. 
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EDW AA funds are generally used to provide classroom training, 
on-the-job training, and job search assistance to program participants. 
Few participants receive income support under EDW AA. Relocation 
assistance was also authorized by EDW AA, but is offered by very few 
of the local programs. Overall, no evaluations of the impact of the 
program have been conducted. 
TAA and EDWAA: A Comparison 
EDW AA and TAA represent two significantly different approaches 
to addressing the problem of dislocated workers. TAA targets a more 
narrow population affected by one government policy. Further, TAA 
provides cash assistance that resembles an extension of VI payments to 
affected individuals. EDW AA, on the other hand, primarily provides 
training and other reemployment services, with little cash assistance. 
Responding to a Bush Administration proposal that the two 
programs be replaced by a single, comprehensive program, the GAO 
testified that one significant problem in both EDWAA and TAA was 
their inability to respond to the needs of dislocated workers in a timely 
manner. 1S Because research indicates that workers who receive timely 
assistance are more likely to find rapid reemployment, this limitation 
is significant. Further, the GAO found that coordination between the 
two programs is limited, despite legislative mandates for such 
coordination.16 
Additional Programs 
Programs similar to EDW AA also have been enacted under JTP A 
to serve workers whose job losses are related to the implementation of 
the Clean Air Act or to cuts in defense spending. The Clean Air 
Employment Transition Assistance program was authorized under the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, with a total of $250 million 
available for 1992 through 1997. The Defense Conversion Adjustment 
program of 1990 authorized a total of $150 million to assist dislocated 
defense workers through 1997. The Defense Diversification Adjustment 
program also provides reemployment assistance to dislocated defense 
workers, with $75 million appropriated to the program in 1993. The 
services provided under these programs are also similar to those 
provided by EDWAA. 
DISLOCATED WORKERS 
EFFECTIVENESS OF DISLOCATED WORKER 
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Three primary types of reemployment services have been made 
available to unemployed workers: job search assistance (JSA), on-the-job 
training (OJT), and classroom training. Each of these also has been 
made available specifically to dislocated workers through various 
programs, including those discussed above. JSA is designed primarily 
to assist unemployed workers in developing effective job search skills. 
OJT provides for the acquisition of firm-specific skills that can only be 
attained on the job. Finally, classroom training provides formal 
classroom-style instruction that is intended to assist unemployed 
workers in the development of skills that are potentially of interest to 
a variety of employers.17 
Job Search Assistance 
A variety of social experiments, demonstrations, and other projects 
provide consistent evidence that JSA is the most cost-effective 
reemployment service. It has positive effects on a number of labor 
market outcomes, including earnings, placement, and employment 
rates. As a result, JSA programs typically result in a reduction in the 
length of time that workers receive VI benefits. JSA has two other 
significant advantages over classroom training and OJT. First, it allows 
for quick intervention after a plant closing or layoff. Second, the cost 
per worker is quite low in comparison with training programs. In view 
of the difficulty involved in early identification of unemployed workers 
who are likely to encounter significant reemployment difficulties, the 
low cost of JSA makes it feasible to provide such services early, even 
to those workers who prove to have little difficulty in finding new 
comparable employment. 
On-the-Job Training 
Findings regarding OJT are somewhat mixed. When provided in 
programs focused specifically upon worker training, rather than 
reemployment of unemployed workers, OJT generally has been found 
to be quite effective, with positive effects upon employment and 
earnings. When targeted upon the specific clientele of dislocated 
workers, however, such positive effects are no longer evident. Most 
54 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
studies do agree that, becaus~ of its significantly higher cost, it is not 
as cost-effective as JSA programs. 
Classroom Training 
Evidence regarding classroom training suggests that its effects are 
no greater than those realized through the provision of JSA alone. As 
a result, the significantly higher cost of classroom training suggests that 
it is not typically a viable alternative to JSA. A recently completed 
evaluation of JTP A confirmed the negative findings regarding the 
impact of classroom training programs, finding clear supporting 
evidence that such programs do not generally have the desired impact 
for unemployed workers.18 
CURRENT PROPOSALS 
A number of proposals have been made regarding new programs 
or techniques for serving workers who are identified as dislocated. 
Three of these are discussed briefly below. 
Comprehensive Worker Adjustment Program 
Currently, the Department of Labor is developing a comprehensive· 
worker adjustment program, into which existing dislocated worker 
programs would be consolidated. Services would be available to all 
dislocated workers, regardless of the cause of dislocation. In large part, 
such a program is being developed as an effort to reduce the 
complexity and fragmentation of the currently existing system. A 
unified program should be both easier and less expensive to administer, 
thereby making it possible for more dislocated workers to receive 
reemployment services.19 
Profiling 
Profiling is a technique designed to identify those new VI 
recipients who are likely to be dislocated, to encounter reemployment 
difficulties, and to exhaust their VI benefits. Such workers are then 
referred to reemployment services by their fifth week after filing for VI 
benefits. The profiling program serves to link VI with other efforts to 
assist dislocated workers. 
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Restructuring the Extended Benefits Program 
Finally, dislocated workers could be served through a restructuring 
of the existing federal-state Extended Benefits program. This option is 





THERE are four fundamental answers to the question of what the purpose of an extended VI benefits program 
should be. First, the program could be countercyclical in nature, 
paying benefits during cyclical economic downturns. This is the 
current orientation of the program. Second, the program could address 
some problems associated with structural unemployment, paying 
benefits to individuals identified as dislocated workers. Third, the 
program could combine the above goals, paying benefits to both 
cyclically and structurally unemployed workers. Fourth, it could be 
determined that there is no need for any form of extended VI benefits. 
There are a number of more detailed policy questions that must be 
answered, with the specific questions dependent upon the particular 
purpose that is chosen for the program. All of these are discussed in 
additional detail in the text that follows. 
Vnder a countercyclical extended VI benefits program, decisions 
must be made regarding the following general issues: (1) the method 
of determining periods of high cyclical unemployment, (2) the 
requirements that should be imposed upon benefit recipients, (3) the 
method of financing the program, and (4) the determination of the 
potential duration of benefits. 
Vnder an extended VI benefits program directed at dislocated 
workers, decisions must be made regarding the following general 
issues: (1) the identification of "dislocated workers" (which can include 
the issue of requirements imposed upon benefit recipients), (2) the 
method of financing the program, and (3) the determination of the 
potential duration of benefits. 
If both general goals are pursued in an extended VI benefits 
program, a decision must be made regarding the relationship between 
the two components of the program, in addition to the other specific 
policy options. Finally, if it is determined that there is no need for an 
automatic extended VI benefits program, then no additional policy 
decisions must be made. 
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CURRENT STATUS OF EXTENDED BENEFITS 
EB was enacted in 1970 as an attempt to create a permanent 
program that would automatically provide VI benefits for extended 
durations during periods of particularly high unemployment in a state. 
Such a program, when functioning effectively, would make additional 
benefits available to many regular VI exhaustees and would provide an 
added countercyclical stimulus for the macroeconomy in periods of 
recession. As designed, therefore, EB would eliminate the need for the 
emergency supplemental VI benefits programs that have been enacted 
by Congress on an ad hoc basis during every economic downturn since 
1958. Despite the presence of EB, however, the implementation of 
emergency benefits programs (such as EVC) during recessions has 
continued. This suggests that the EB program, as currently structured, 
is incapable of performing its intended function during periods of 
significant unemployment. 
As a result, a number of proposals to reform EB triggers have been 
pu t forth. In large part, the impetus for these proposals has come from 
two factors: (1) the decrease in availability of EB in recent years and 
(2) the increase in structural unemployment, which has led to 
suggestions that the EB program be targeted more directly at those 
workers who were dislocated by structural economic adjustments. 
These two factors are discussed below. 
Decreased EB Availability 
Fewer states have been eligible for benefits under the EB program 
during the last decade. This was particularly evident during the last 
recession. This has resulted in a decline in the effectiveness of EB as 
a countercyclical device. Two factors related to the definition of the EB 
trigger have caused a decline in the availability of EB. First, federal 
legislation in 1981 required that state IVR triggers be raised from four 
percent to five percent. Second, a combination of factors during the 
early 1980s worked simultaneously to reduce the scope of most regular 
state VI programs.! As a result of these changes, the percentage of the 
unemployed who received benefits decreased, which directly reduced 
the IVR. Thus, state IVRs were generally in decline at the same time 
the federal government increased the minimum IVR required to be 
eligible for EB. 
Consequently, EB first payments declined dramatically. Estimates 
suggest that first payments in the recession years of 1982 and 1983 
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declined by as much as 55 percent from the level that would have been 
expected based upon the earlier historical relationship between EB and 
the TUR.2 During the 1991 recession, EB was activated only briefly in 
eight states, and then only because high cyclical unemployment 
coincided with high seasonal unemployment.3 The Congressional 
Research Service noted that "the availability of EB in so few states 
during the trough of the recession indicated to many that the current-
law EB trigger was too restrictive."4 Overall, the increased IUR trigger 
rate, in combination with lower state IURs, greatly reduced the 
effectiveness of the EB program. 
Increased Structural Unemployment 
Policy interest has also turned to the potential use of the EB 
program as one means of addressing some of the problems associated 
with increases in structural unemployment and worker dislocation. 
Figure 3-3 provides additional detail on the increase in the duration of 
unemployment spells. Triggers could be selected that would increase 
the targeting of EB benefits to dislocated workers who find themselves 
unemployed due to structural changes in the economy. This could also 
allow the variety of existing programs that currently serve various 
specific dislocated populations to be consolidated.s 
REFORMING EXTENDED BENEFITS 
In considering reform of the EB program, the most fundamental 
issue that must be addressed is the question of the purpose of the 
program. The answer to the question has profound implications for all 
other elements of the program, including its eligibility criteria, 
financing mechanism, requirements that are imposed upon recipients, 
and potential duration and amount of benefits. 
Although the regular VI program would continue to provide 
income support to eligible jobless individuals, two primary goals could 
be pursued in an EB program. First, the program could perform a 
countercyclical role by paying benefits during cyclical economic 
downturns. This would provide an added macroeconomic stimulus 
during such periods. To accomplish such a purpose, determination of 
eligibility for the payment of benefits would be based upon the 
condition of the economy in the nation, a region, a state, or a substate 
area. 
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Alternatively, the program could address some problems associated 
with structural tmemployment by providing a longer period of UI 
payments to individuals who have been dislocated from their jobs as 
a result of structural changes in the economy.6 In this view of the 
program, the primary determining factor for benefits would be 
individual attributes7 or actions, rather than the condition of the 
economy. It is true, however, that the capacity of the economy to 
create new jobs has an effect upon the severity of the dislocated worker 
problem. A shift of this nature in the EB program would represent a 
major change in the orientation of the program. 
It should be recognized that it is not necessary to select only one 
of the two program goals described above. There are numerous 
combinations that could be created that would make possible the 
pursuit of both of the goals within the same program. For example, 
one such solution would be a two-pronged extended benefits system, 
in which extended benefits trigger "on" according to economic 
conditions, but are made available also to individuals identified as 
dislocated workers. In order to clarify the issues as fully as possible, 
however, much of the remainder of this chapter separates the 
discussion of the countercyclical focus of EB and the dislocated worker 
focus of EB. 
Finally, it should be noted that before determining the goal(s) of 
an extended benefits program, a basic decision must be made on 
whether or not UI benefits should ever be extended beyond the basiC 
26 weeks. The regular ur system itself represents a significant 
countercyclical structure, pumping billions of additional dollars into the 
economy during periods of recession. Some analysts question whether 
any additional unemployment benefit program is required. Further, EB 
is certainly not the only means through which the economy can be 
stimulated during recessions, nor is it necessarily the most effective 
method. Indeed, macroeconomic evidence from past decades indicates 
that any government efforts to fine-tune the economy through measures 
such as countercyclical stimuli are usually ineffective. This line of 
reasoning suggests that individual income maintenance should perhaps 
be the primary goal of an EB program. If one believes, however, that 
unemployment is not exclusively involuntary, then even the income 
maintenance goal can be troublesome, because extended benefits make 
it easier for a worker to be more selective in considering job offers, and, 
therefore, increase the likelihood that workers will remain tmemployed 
for longer durations. Evidence regarding the effect of potential benefit 
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duration on length of unemployment spells is discussed in greater 
detail below. 
Thus, if an extended benefits program is to be maintained, there 
are primarily two potential targets for benefits: (1) individuals who 
suffer long unemployment spells during periods of recessionary 
economic conditions and/or (2) workers who are dislocated. The EB 
program would be structured and function in a different manner 
depending upon which group(s) is/are selected as the target 
population. The principal program goals and policy options that are 
associated with targeting benefits at one or both of these groups are 
discussed in greater detail below. In addition, a brief, systematic menu 
of policy options for EB reform is presented in Appendix A. 
EXTENDED BENEFITS AS A COUNTERCYCLICAL 
PROGRAM 
Under the conception of EB as a countercyclical program, extended 
benefits are targeted to UI recipients who exhaust their regular benefits 
during periods of economic downturn. Thus, benefits under such a 
program are contingent upon cyclical changes within the 
macroeconomy. This provides additional income maintenance for 
eligible unemployed individuals during those periods and in those 
areas where jobs are particularly difficult to find. Moreover, if benefits 
under EB are paid out of a trust fund that was established earlier, a 
countercyclical EB program provides additional stimulus to the 
economy. 
In shaping a countercyclical EB program, a number of fundamental 
policy questions must be answered. These questions fall into four 
broad categories: (1) how should the activation of the program be 
triggered, (2) what requirements should be imposed upon benefit 
recipients, (3) how should the program be financed, and (4) how should 
the potential duration of benefits be determined? Each of these 
questions is discussed in greater detail below. 
Triggers 
Under a countercyclical EB program, some method must exist that 
allows the identification of those cyclical periods when, given the goals 
that are defined for the system, it is appropriate for the EB program to 
pay benefits to those individuals who are identified as eligible. Under 
the current EB program, this has been accomplished through the use of 
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what is commonly referred to as a "trigger," which is structured to 
activate the payment of EB benefits when the trigger exceeds a defined 
level. 
Overall, four questions must be answered regarding the triggering 
mechanism that is selected for a countercyclical EB program: (1) what 
measure of economic or labor market conditions should be used as the 
triggering mechanism, (2) at what level should the trigger be set, 
(3) should the conditions that activate the program be measured 
absolutely (i.e., without regard to conditions in previous time periods) 
or relatively (i.e., by taking previous conditions into consideration in 
determining whether the program triggers "on"), and (4) at what 
geographic level should triggers be measured and examined? Each of 
these four questions is discussed in greater detail in the sections below. 
It is particularly important to separate the question of the most 
appropriate triggering mechanism from the question of the level at 
which that mechanism should be set in order to trigger "on." The first 
issue is a function of the particular element of the condition of the 
economy that is deemed most appropriate to measure, combined with 
the reliability and availability of the data. The second is primarily a 
function of the desired level of EB availability and the level of benefits 
that can be financed. 
Overall, there is no triggering mechanism that is necessarily 
incompatible with any given level of either recipiency or program 
expenditures.8 It is generally possible to achieve similar levels of 
recipiency (and, therefore, expenditures) under all potential trigger 
measures. Because it is, therefore, possible to design a trigger to yield 
almost any level of recipiency I expenditure, the two issues should be 
considered independently. The merits and demerits of the each 
alternative triggering measure should be considered without regard to 
the desired level of recipiency I expenditure and the desired level of 
recipiency I expenditure should be determined without regard for the 
EB triggering mechanism that is selected. 
Triggering Mechanism 
Currently, the EB program requires states to trigger EB "on" if the 
IUR exceeds 5 percent and is 120 percent higher than the average IUR 
during the corresponding time period over the previous two years. 
The IUR is the required trigger that has been used throughout the 
history of the EB program. In March 1993, however, states were given 
the option of triggering EB "on" if the TUR exceeds 6.5 percent and is 
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110 percent higher than during the same time period in either of the 
previous two years. Only seven states have currently implemented this 
optional trigger. It is likely that this is partially a result of the short 
period of time in which the TUR trigger option has been available, 
combined with the existence of EVe. EVe is 100 percent funded by 
the federal government and has therefore rendered EB, which is only 
50 percent federally financed, an unattractive alternative from the 
states' perspective. 
In considering the appropriateness of the various possible 
triggering measures, two requirements must be met: (1) the data must 
accurately reflect those economic or labor market conditions that have 
been identified as the proper criteria for determining whether the 
program should be triggered "on" and (2) the data must be reliable and 
available on a timely basis. 
There are four measures that could potentially meet one or both of 
the requirements noted above. These measures are as follows: (1) the 
IVR, (2) the TUR, (3) the percentage of individuals who exhaust VI 
benefits, and (4) the deviation from the existing employment trend. 
Each of these is discussed in greater detail below. 
Insured Unemployment Rate. For the purposes of triggering EB, 
the IVR has been defined as the 13-week moving average of continuing 
regular VI claims divided by the average number of individuals in VI-
covered employment over the first four of the last six completed 
quarters. Thus, this measure is an output of the VI system itself. The 
IVR could, therefore, be considered an appropriate trigger, if it is 
determined that the conditions that activate extended benefits should 
be based on the experience of only the VI-covered population, and that 
the conditions facing individuals who are not covered by the VI system 
are different and/or are generally irrelevant for a program covering 
individuals who are already eligible for VI. 
As noted above, it is currently difficult for a state to qualify for EB 
under the existing IUR trigger. While the significant decline in EB 
eligibility is primarily a reflection of the level at which the IVR trigger 
has been set, it is also partially a result of a flaw that renders the IVR 
an imperfect measure of labor market conditions. The IUR is not 
exclusively a reflection of the condition of the labor market, but is also 
affected by factors that can change independently of labor market 
conditions. Such factors can include changes in state VI eligibility 
policy, participation rates in the VI program, and various demographic 
changes. 
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The potential impact of changes in state VI eligibility policies is a 
particularly clear example of the ability of factors external to the labor 
market to affect' the IVR. Because the state IVR is directly related to 
the number of VI recipients in a state, it is affected by state VI policies. 
States with stricter VI requirements are likely to have fewer claimants, 
and, therefore, will also have lower IVRs, all else being equal. As a 
result, when state policy changes serve to increase or decrease the level 
of VI recipiency, then the IVR will change, evert in the absence of any 
change in labor market conditions. Overall, therefore, the capacity of 
the IVR to reflect general economic conditions is neither constant nor 
stable. 
These problems in using the IVR as a trigger for all states suggest 
that equity problems could result from different VI policies in different 
states. Not only would unemployed individuals with similar 
characteristics have greater difficulty in becoming eligible for VI 
benefits in a state with stricter VI eligibility standards, but even eligible 
individuals in that state would be affected by the state laws because the 
state is less likely to trigger EB "on." Thus, the use of an IVR trigger 
for EB would have the potential to multiply the effects of cross-state 
differences in the VI treatment of individuals and extend these 
multiplied effects into the EB program, thereby diminishing the 
program's countercyclical effectiveness. 
With regard to the availability and accuracy of IVR data, the IUR 
is reported each week for each state. Although it is not currently 
available at the substate level, it is likely that it could be made available 
at that level at an increased cost. Because it is derived directly from 
unemployment claims information and is collected for administrative 
(rather than statistical) purposes, however, it is subject to measurement 
error that cannot be quantified. The quality is also likely to vary 
substantially across jurisdictions, Because the seasonal adjustment of 
a weekly data series is difficult, the IVR is not seasonally adjusted on 
a weekly basis at the state level, resulting in higher IVRs during winter 
months. As a result, the IVR at the state or substate level is unable to 
make a clear distinction between cyclical variation in unemployment 
and seasonal variation. 
An additional problem is that the IVR only includes current 
continuing claimants and, therefore, does not include exhaustees. The 
number of VI exhaustees is considered by many to be an important 
reflection of labor market distress. An alternative IUR measure that 
does include exhaustees has been termed the "Adjusted IUR" (AIUR), 
which is defined as the 13-week average IVR plus the exhaustion ratio 
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for the most recent three month period. This measure is used in the 
current EVC program. It is not currently available at the substate level. 
Total Unemployment Rate. The TUR is defined as the number of 
individuals without jobs who are actively seeking work divided by the 
civilian labor force. Vnlike the IUR, the TUR represents a larger 
population than that which is covered under the regular VI program. 
The TUR includes new entrants into the labor force, as well as part-time 
and contingent workers who are generally ineligible for VI. The TUR 
is a more inclusive measure than the IVR and is a measure of the 
supply of individuals in the economy looking for work. The TUR, 
therefore, is a better measure of the conditions of the economy than the 
IVR. For this reason, some believe that the TUR would be better than 
the IVR as an EB trigger. Others, however, believe that the trigger 
should be closely related to the workers eligible for VI and, therefore, 
prefer the IUR. 
With regard to data accuracy and availability, the TUR is an 
estimate that is derived directly from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) at the state level for the 11 states where CPS sample sizes are 
sufficiently large, and from a combination of the CPS, VI, and otller 
local data for the 39 other states and for most substate levels. The TUR 
is, therefore, subject to a methodological rigor on the state level that is 
absent in the administrative data used for the IVR. It should be noted 
also that the relationship between the TUR and the condition of the 
macroeconomy is not affected by external factors, such as changes in 
state VI policies, that can affect the IVR. 
At the substate level, however, the TUR is less accurate than at the 
state level. Further, it should be noted that the TUR, unlike the IVR, 
is currently published on a seasonally adjusted basis for each state. 
Consequently, the TUR is capable of making a clearer distinction 
between cyclical variation and seasonal variation in unemployment. 
The difference between monthly seasonally adjusted and nonseasonally 
adjusted TURs in recent years are illustrated in Figure 6-1. The TUR 
is available on only a monthly basis. This is not generally considered 
a significant problem, however, because moving averages are used with 
regard to other measures, such as the 13-week moving average IUR 
trigger that is currently in place. 
One difficulty with the use of the TUR relates to the redesign of 
the CPS that is taking effect in January 1994. Preliminary estimates 
suggest that the national TUR may increase by approximately 0.6 
percentage points as a result of the implementation of methodological 
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FIGURE 6-1 
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED AND NONSEASONALLY ADJUSTED TOTAL 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, JANUARY 1990 TO AUGUST 1993 
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changes in the survey. The impact upon individual state TURs is 
currently unknown, but is expected to vary across states. As a result, 
any selection of the TVR as the most appropriate EB trigger mechanism 
will require consideration of the relationship between the "new" and 
"old" TURs. 
Exhaustion Rates. Some have proposed the use of exhaustion 
rates on the state or subs tate level. The exhaustion rate is often defined 
as the number of individuals who have exhausted regular VI benefits 
in a given week, divided by the number of initial VI claims 26 weeks 
earlier. Thus, this measure represents a direct measure of job finding 
difficulty in a state or area. The exhaustion rate may, therefore, 
represent an appropriate trigger to consider for a countercyclical 
program. In addition, it allows the condition of long-term unemployed 
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individuals to be taken into direct consideration. Because the measure 
is lagged by 26 weeks, however, it is possible that it could be late in 
reflecting some'significant deteriorations in the labor market. 
Further, there are serious problems regarding the accuracy and 
availability of exhaustion data. These data are subject to the same 
problems with administrative data that mark the IUR. On the substate 
level, because of the small numbers of individuals involved, it is likely 
that the validity of this measure would be questionable. In addition, 
the data are collected by states at the substate level, but often are not 
saved. As a result, no quantitative analysis could be completed 
regarding the reliability of exhaustion rates at the substate level. 
Deviation from Trend Employment. A final measure of labor 
market conditions that might be considered as a potential EB trigger is 
the deviation from the existing employment trend. This is defined as 
the percentage deviation from the recent employment trend being 
experienced by a state or a local area. Such a measure could be an 
appropriate trigger for a countercyclical program because, by 
measuring the change that is occurring within a state or labor market, 
it allows the deterioration of the labor market to be taken into direct 
consideration. Employment data, however, are collected and published 
first on a preliminary basis with revisions in each of two consecutive 
months, with a final benchmarked revision in the spring of each year. 
These data also do not cover agricultural workers and would, therefore, 
require some form of supplementation for rural states. 
Triggering Mechanism Summary. Overall, there are a number of 
important points that should be taken into consideration in determining 
the triggering mechanism for a countercyclical extended UI benefits 
program. First, the TUR measures the total supply of individuals 
looking for work and, therefore, is a better measure than the IUR of the 
general state of the economy. Second, the IUR covers only those 
individuals who are eligible for UI and, therefore, reflects UI eligibility 
better than the TUR. Third, the TUR is calculated with methods that 
are aimed at providing data that are consistent across all states, while 
the IUR reflects rules of eligibility and other factors that differ from one 
state to another. Fourth, neither the TUR nor the IUR is as accurate at 
the state level as it is at the national level, but more is known about the 
quality and reliability of the TUR, which is controlled by statistical 
techniques, than about the IUR, which is compiled completely from 
administrative data. Finally, the reliability and accuracy of triggering 
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mechanisms based upon either exhaustion rates or deviation from trend 
employment are not yet clear. 
Trigger Levels 
Overall, two factors should be considered in determining the level 
at which a trigger should be set. First, the desired level of EB 
availability should be taken into account. Second, the amount of 
funding that would be required for a given level of availability also 
should be a factor in making the decision. 
With regard to availability, many agree that an effective 
countercyclical program would make extended VI benefits available in 
response to periods of recession. Because the impact of recession is 
often not geographically uniform, it follows that EB should be available 
in those states or areas that experience a significant deterioration of 
labor market conditions. Most such deteriorations occur in the wake 
of national recession or stagnant regional economic growth. 
Cost constraints also must be taken into consideration in setting 
trigger levels. It may be possible for a certain level of EB recipiency to 
be deemed appropriate, but for the necessary funds to be lacking. The 
setting of the triggering level, combined with the determination of the 
trigger mechanism, is one method for ensuring that scarce resources are 
targeted to those individuals in those circumstances that are deemed 
most in need of extended VI benefits. 
Table 6-1 reports estimates of the costs of an EB program operating 
under various triggers between January 1990 and August 1993. The 
EVC program, which largely supplanted EB since its inception in 
November 1991, has cost a total of over $23 billion as of August 1993. 
Thus, it should be noted that the costs of all potential EB triggers 
included in the table are significantly lower than the costs of the 
emergency program that was actually implemented. This is largely a 
result of the improved targeting of benefits that would have resulted. 
Thresholds 
In an EB program targeted at cyclical unemployment, threshold 
requirements (i.e., requirements that the trigger rate in a state or area 
must exceed not only a certain level but also exceed by some 
percentage the level experienced in that state or area in recent years) 
can be used to separate those areas with chronically high 
unemployment from those that have experienced a recent cyclical 
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TABLE 6-1 
ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE EB TRIGGERS 
(JANUARY 1990 TO AUGUST 1993) 
Trigger 
6.5% without threshold 
6.5% with 110% threshold 
6.5% with 120% threshold 
7.5% without threshold 
7.5% with 110% threshold 
7.5% with 120% threshold 
B.5% without threshold 
B.5% with 110% threshold 
B.5% with 120% threshold 
9.5% without threshold 
9.5% with 110% threshold 
9.5% with 120% threshold 
Estimated Cost 
(in billions) 
Number of States 
Triggering On 
at Least Once 













Average Total Months 













The cost figures should be considered upper-bound estimates, as they assume a uniform benefit cost of $1,810 far each 
exhaustee of regular ill benefits. The estimates assume that an EB program with a given trigger would have operated 
in the absence of EUC or any other emergency program. The estimates include the District of Columbia and Puerto 
Rico, but exclude the Virgin Islands. 
• indicates the current EB trigger. 
, Three-month moving average of the nonseasonally adjusted state ruN. 
, Thirteen-week moving average of the state IUR. [Calculations in this table were made on a monthiy basis, using 
monthly averages of weekly moving averages.1 
Source: Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation staff calculations using data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment insurance Service. 
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TABLE 6-1 (Continued) 
ESTIMATED IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE EB TRIGGERS 
(JANUARY 1990 TO AUGUST 1993) 
Trigger 
1.5% without threshold 
1.51X, with 110% threshold 
1.5% with 120% threshold 
3°,.{, without threshold 
3% with 110% threshold 
3% with 120% threshold 
4% without threshold 
4% with 110% threshold 
4% with 120% threshold 
5% without threshold 
51Yc, with HOIX, threshold 
SIX, with 120% threshold"" 
Estimated Cost 
(in billions) 
Nwnber of States 
Triggering On 
at Least Once 













Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
$23.0 52 
Average Total Months 














deterioration of the labor market. Thresholds under the EB program 
historically have been set at 120 percent for IUR triggers and at 110 
percent for TUR triggers. Without the use of thresholds, there is no 
way of distinguishing cyclical unemployment from chronically high 
unemployment. As a result, it is possible that the countercyclical 
effectiveness of the program would be eroded in the absence of 
thresholds, as more states or areas triggered EB "on" during periods 
when there is no actual deterioration in labor market conditions. 
As seen in Table 6-1, the threshold requirements do not appear to 
affect significantly the number of states in which EB eventually triggers 
"on" with a given trigger level. Within states with particularly high 
unemployment, however, the analysis suggests that thresholds often 
have the effect of delaying the point at which EB triggers "on" or 
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hastening the point at which EB triggers "off." Figures 6-2 and 6-3 
compare the effects of a 6.5 percent TUR trigger with 110 percent 
threshold and 6.5 percent TUR trigger without threshold. With regard 
to the percentage of total exhaustees who are eligible to receive EB 
benefits, thresholds have little effect during the highest periods of 
national unemployment, but reduce the percentage of eligible 
individuals both before and after the peak of the recession. It also 
should be noted that EUC did not become available until November 
1991, months after an EB program with either 6.5 percent trigger would 
have been available to a large percentage of exhaustees. 
As with trigger levels, cost considerations play a direct role in 
determining whether a threshold should be used and, if so, what the 
level of that threshold should be. Overall, the use of thresholds in an 
EB trigger would have the effect of reducing potential EB expenditures, 
all else being equal. 
Geographic Unit of Analysis 
There are a number of different geographical units that can be 
used as the basis of the triggering measure chosen for EB: (1) national, 
(2) regional, (3) state, and (4) substate. Each of these is discussed in 
greater detail below. 
National Triggers. From 1970 to 1981, in addition to the state 
triggers, a national EB trigger was in place. The existence of a national 
trigger is perhaps particularly appropriate in a countercyclical EB 
program that is designed to pay benefits during periods of recession, 
because the very concept of recession is one that continues to be 
essentially national in scope. Indeed, although there has not been a 
national EB trigger in operation since 1981, the current EUC program 
represents, in effect, a program that pays extended ur benefits on a 
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FIGURE 6-2 
NONSEASONALLY ADJUSTED TUR AND ESTIMATED PERCENT OF 
MONTHLY UI EXHAUSTEES ELIGIBLE FOR EB UNDER 6.5% TRIGGER, 
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All regular UI exhaustees were eligible for EUC as of November' 1991. 
Source: BLS. 
national level. While EVe has provided for some differentiation across 
states with regard to the potential duration of benefits (because 
economic conditions within each state partially determine the maximum 
potential duration of Eve benefits in that state), the program still has 
made some form of extended benefits available to individuals in all 
states during the most recent recession and its aftermath. 
There also exist a number of arguments against national triggers. 
Because recent recessions have been regional in impact (the most recent 
one was concentrated in the Northeast and in the West), paying 
benefits to individuals who reside in states that are relatively unaffected 
by a "national" recession is likely to result in the payment of scarce 
extended benefit funds to some individuals who do not face severe 
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FIGURE 6-3 
NONSEASONALLY ADJUSTED TUR AND ESTIMATED PERCENT OF 
MONTHLY VI EXHAUSTEES ELIGIBLE FOR EB UNDER 6.5% TRIGGER, 110% 
. THRESHOLD, JANUARY 1990 TO AUGUST 1993 
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labor market conditions. Targeting EB benefits on the state or substate 
level alone is likely to direct benefits more efficiently to those 
individuals who are most affected by poor or deteriorating labor 
market conditions. 
Regional Triggers. Some have suggested the creation of regional 
triggers for the EB program. Under such a system, the country would 
be divided into a number of geographic regions, within which EB 
triggers could operate to activate the program for the entire region. 
The use of regional triggers may represent an appropriate response to 
the apparent increase in the regionalization of recessions. 
It is likely, however, that the use of regional triggers would result 
in a poor targeting of benefits. Because it is possible for economic 
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conditions to vary across states within the same region, it would be 
expected that the use of a regional trigger would result, at times, either 
in the payment of extended ur benefits in states that are not 
experiencing serious labor market difficulties or in the absence of 
benefits in a state that is experiencing such difficulties. Further, there 
is the problem of defining the boundaries of the regions to be used. 
State Triggers. Currently, all EB triggers operate at the state level. 
This allows greater differentiation in the targeting of benefits than 
would exist under a national or regional trigger, but it does not allow 
direct targeting at the level of specific labor markets. With regard to 
data issues, many relevant data sets are focused already at the state 
level, allowing greater flexibility in determining triggers, as well as 
greater confidence in the accuracy of the data that are used. 
Substate Triggers. Some have suggested that triggering benefits at 
the substate level would allow for a more effective targeting of benefits 
toward those individuals who are experiencing significant difficulties 
in finding a new job in their labor market. 
Although the idea of targeting benefits based upon local area 
economic conditions is a conceptually attractive one, a number of 
administrative, logistical, and statistical problems combine to make the 
use of substate triggers quite problematic. Among the administrative 
issues often cited by opponents of substate triggers are difficulties in 
determining the appropriate level of geographic disaggregation and the 
proper locational assignment of individuals (i.e., by residence or by 
place of work). These issues also create equity concerns, as the 
possibility increases that similar individuals within geographic 
proximity will receive different treatment under the EB program. 
A number of recurring statistical problems also occur that are 
difficult or impossible to resolve. Data for some measures are simply 
not available on the substate level or the data are not saved by the 
states, rendering statistical analysis of this data impossible. Even for 
those data that are available (i.e., substate TUR estimates and estimates 
of employment levels in metropolitan areas), there are a number of 
obstacles. There is no way of determining the accuracy of substate 
TUR estimates~ bf2cause there is no other available periodic data source 
that would enable the data to be benchmarked. Officials of the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics voiced skepticism over the reliability of these data as 
an EB trigger. 
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Estimates of employment, on the other hand, can be validated, but 
are only available for 250 metropolitan areas in the country. In order 
for a trigger to be politically feasible, it would require that all regions 
have the possibility of triggering "on." To ensure this possibility with 
the use of employment statistics, so-called "balance of state" 
measurements would need to be created, and such statistics are 
typically marked by significant accuracy problems. 
Geographic Units of Analysis Summary. There are a number of 
important points that should be taken into consideration in determining 
the geographic unit of analysis for a countercyclical extended UI 
benefits program. First, the ability to target benefits generally increases 
as smaller geographic units are used as the basis for determining 
benefits, but the reliability of the data decreases as smaller units are 
used. Second, data at the substate level present particular problems 
with regard to reliability and, for some measures, availability. 
Requirements Imposed Upon EB Recipients 
Currently, the requirements that EB recipients search for work and 
accept so-called suitable work have been suspended by the Congress. 
The suitable work provision requires that those individuals who are 
receiving EB must, with some exceptions, accept a minimum wage job 
if one is offered, or become ineligible for benefits. In most cases, this 
requirement is stricter than the state standards that govern the work 
search activities of regular state UI recipients. Many have advocated 
the elimination of this federal provision. Currently, it has been 
suspended until 1995. 
With regard to work search generally, there is little evidence that 
directly addresses the impact of work search during periods of 
economic downturn, when jobs are relatively scarce. The existing 
research tends to analyze one of two related categories: (1) the effect 
of work search requirements upon individual search efforts and (2) the 
effect of the potential duration of unemployment benefits upon the 
duration of unemployment. The results of this research are discussed 
below. 
A study of the effects of varying work search rules and 
enforcement across states found that claimants from states where work 
search rules are strict are more likely to search for work, devote more 
hours to work search, and make contact with more potential employers 
than claimants in other states.9 An experiment in Tacoma, 
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Wasrungton, found that stricter work search requirements reduced 
unemployment spells for VI recipients, although the impact upon 
employment and earnings was less clear.lO Thus, there does appear 
to be evidence that the nature of work search requirements has an 
impact upon the behavior of VI claimants. 
In addition, there is evidence that individuals' rates of 
reemployment are much higher in the weeks just after exhaustion of VI 
benefits than just before. For example, existing research suggests that 
during periods of economic expansion, 25 percent to 40 percent of 
workers who exhaust their VI benefits find reemployment within four 
weeks of benefit exhaustion,u This is far higher than the rate at which 
jobless workers become reemployed in the four weeks before 
exhaustion of benefits; only about ten percent of workers drawing 
benefits four weeks before their benefits are scheduled to end become 
reemployed before they exhaust their benefits. 
Further, three reemployment bonus experiments have suggested 
that when VI recipients are offered a cash bonus to become rapidly 
reemployed, they do become reemployed more quickly. There is no . 
evidence that individuals accepted lower-paying jobs as a result of the 
bonus offer.12 Thus, existing research suggests that unemployed 
workers' job search behavior can be changed by job search 
requirements and monetary incentives. 
Finally, there is evidence that increases in the potential duration of 
VI tend to lengthen the duration of time out of work. A number of 
researchers have estimated the impact of adding a week to the potential 
duration of benefits on the duration of both unemployment (time out 
of work spent searching for work) and joblessness (time out of work 
spent either searching for work or out of the labor force). While there 
appears to be agreement that longer benefit durations have an effect, 
the existing research has produced a range of estimates. Researchers 
have estimated that adding a week to the potential duration of benefits 
adds from one-tenth to over four-tenths of a week to the duration of 
unemploymentP It also has been estimated that adding a week to the 
potential duration of benefits adds from four-tenths to over sixth-tenths 
of a week to the duration of joblessness.14 
Financing 
There are two significant policy decisions related to EB financing: 
(1) whether there should be experience rating in the EB program and 
EXTENDED BENEFITS REFORM 77 
(2) the proportion of the benefits paid by the federal and state 
governments. Each of these is discussed in more detail below. 
Experience Rating in EB 
An additional policy option that could be considered is mandating 
either that all states use experience rating in the EB program or that no 
states use experience rating. Currently, 34 states experience rate 
benefits under EB, meaning that some percentage of EB benefits paid 
are ultimately charged back to the employer. IS In large part, the 
experience rating of the EB program is consistent with one of the 
perspectives that distinguishes the UI program as a whole: employers 
should bear some degree of responsibility for their former employees 
who are UI claimants. It is unclear, however, that increases in EB 
experience rating would have any significant effect upon employer 
behavior, because EB costs represent such a small percentage of overall 
UI taxes. 
There are a number of arguments that can be made against the 
experience rating of EB. While an individual employer may be deemed 
partially responsible for the initial consequences arising from the layoff 
of an employee, an individual's eligibility for countercyclical extended 
benefits may be viewed as an indication that the unemployment spell 
is no longer the responsibility of the previous employer. Under such 
a perspective, extended benefits should be paid by society as a whole 
and there may be little justification for continuing to charge EB 
payments back to the previous employer. 
Further, because the experience rating of an employer already 
increases following a layoff, some may consider additional increases to 
be an undue burden. EB experience rating is felt only by those 
employers in states that have triggered EB "on," who are among the 
most likely employers to be facing severe economic problems. Thus, 
experience rating EB would disproportionately affect those employers 
who are least able to pay the costs. 
Federal-State Shares of EB 
Currently, the costs of EB benefits are shared equally by the federal 
and state governments. The EUC program, however, is fully federally 
funded. As a result, states have chosen to make EUC available to long-
term eligible unemployed, and the 50 percent state-funded EB program 
78 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
has been little-used in the most recent recession. Proposals have been 
advanced to change the funding mix in EB, with such changes tied to 
the adoption of a new EB trigger. Most such proposals have centered 
upon shifting 75 percent of the costs to the federal government, since 
EB eligibility (and therefore state costs) would be expected to increase 
dramatically under most new triggers. 
Determining Duration of Benefits 
In determining the maximum potential duration of benefits, 
there are three primary options: (1) the maximum duration can be 
fixed, (2) the duration can be determined by economic conditions 
within the state or area, or (3) the duration can be determined by the 
efforts of the individual. Both of these options are discussed in greater 
detail below. 
Fixed Duration 
The maximum potential duration of benefits can be fixed, as it is 
under the current EB program, which extends benefits for up to 
13 additional weeks. 
Duration Determined by Economic Conditions 
The maximum potential duration of benefits can be determined by 
economic conditions, under a provision that would be similar to the 
current Eue program, in which benefits are available to be paid for a 
longer period of time in states with particularly high unemployment 
rates. Such a determination may be most appropriate under a national 
trigger, in which economic conditions across eligible states would, 
perhaps, be the most varied. Under the current EB program, all states 
that trigger "on" have slack labor markets, and differentiating among 
them may not be productive. 
Duration Determined by Individual Actions 
It is also possible to determine maximum potential duration 
according to individual participation in job search activities and/or 
education and training programs. Because such programs may increase 
the likelihood of eventual reemployment, increased potential durations 
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may be justified for those individuals who participate in such 
programs. 
EXTENDED BENEFITS AS A PROGRAM TARGETED TO 
DISLOCATED WORKERS 
An alternative orientation of an extended UI benefit program 
would target benefits at dislocated workers. Although some worker 
dislocation is part of the normal working of the labor market because 
it serves to direct human resources to those areas where they are most 
valuable, the individuals who are dislocated often suffer greatly. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, there is evidence that workers who are 
dislocated from their jobs experience long spells of unemployment and 
that many suffer significant losses in earnings. As a result, programs 
designed to provide additional income maintenance to such individuals 
may be justified. There are a number of different ways in which such 
efforts could be folded into an extended VI benefits program. 
There are three significant policy decisions that must be made' to 
determine the shape of a dislocated worker EB program. The most 
fundamental issue to be resolved is the identification of those workers 
who are designated "dislocated" and are, therefore, eligible to receive 
dislocated worker extended VI benefits. Second, the method governing 
the duration of eligibility for EB also must be determined. Third, a 
decision must be made regarding the method of financing the program. 
Determining Eligibility 
There are two primary methods for determining eligibility for 
dislocated worker extended benefits. These potential methods are as 
follows: (1) a determination of dislocated worker status by the 
individual him/herself, as manifested by a willingness to participate in 
some public program targeted at dislocated workers; or (2) an external 
determination of the characteristics that identify dislocated workers, 
combined with participation in some dislocated worker program. Each 
of these options is discussed below. 
Requiring Participation in Dislocated Worker Program 
It would be possible to pay extended benefits to those individuals 
who choose to participate in programs targeted at dislocated workers. 
Research evidence suggests that job search assistance and job search 
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clubs are particularly effective in assisting individuals in a timely return 
to work, 16 It is possible that those individuals who perceive a 
potential benefit from programs such as job training, job search 
assistance, or job search clubs are the most likely actually to have been 
dislocated from their jobs. The participation requirement would help 
to screen out those who do not believe that they would benefit from 
participation. Conversely, however, such a requirement would 
encourage individuals to participate solely in order to be eligible for 
benefitsP One possible way to help ensure that only those 
individuals participate who would benefit would be to require that 
participants agree to repay some percentage of the training costs after 
becoming reemployed. Such payment could be structured in such a 
way that it would be spread over a lengthy time period, in order to 
ensure that it not represent an undue burden for participants. 
Designating Workers as "Dislocated" 
It is possible to determine eligibility for the program based 
partially upon some set of "dislocated worker" characteristics. For 
example, some simple screens for eligibility (e.g., a certain period of job 
tenure in previous job combined with no recall status with previous 
employer) could be used together with participation in a dislocated 
worker program, as described above. Such participation would help to 
ensure that those who are self-identified as most in need of assistance 
receive extended benefits, but would impose some limitations upon the 
characteristics of those individuals who are given the option of 
determining whether or not to participate in such a program. 
Financing 
A determination must be made regarding the share of program 
costs that should be borne by the federal and state governments. As 
noted above, the costs of the current EB program are shared equally 
between the federal and state governments. 
It should be recognized that it is quite possible that the costs of 
such a program would increase over spending levels on EB in the past. 
While the program would represent, to some extent, a consolidation of 
VI with existing training programs, other elements of it would likely 
represent an expansion of those concepts. In particular, it would be 
expected that demand for education and training programs would 
increase if participation were a requirement for the receipt of extended 
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VI benefits. As noted above, some percentage of this cost could be 
defrayed by requiring recipients to agree to repay in the future some 
percentage of their training costs. If overall costs still represent an 
increase over historic levels, it would be necessary to identify some 
appropriate funding mechanism. 
Determining Duration of Benefits 
For options, see the subsection of the same name in the section 
discussing countercyclical EB options. 
EXTENDED BENEFITS AS A PROGRAM AVAILABLE 
BOTH TO CYCLICALLY AND STRUCTURALLY 
UNEMPLOYED WORKERS 
An additional alternative is to target both the cyclically and 
structurally unemployed populations for extended VI benefits. One 
logical means for accomplishing this end would be to combine the 
elements of both the countercyclically focused concept of the program 
and the dislocation-targeted program in a two-pronged program. Such 
a program could allow extended benefits to be paid during periods of 
high cyclical unemployment, as identified by a trigger at some 
geographic level of analysis. In addition, such a program could allow 
benefits to be paid to workers who are in some way identified as 
dislocated. 
The specific programmatic features of each of the two segments of 
the program generally could be determined independently, based upon 
the options presented in the above sections. Indeed, many of the policy 
decisions apply only to one of the two segments. Triggering 
mechanisms and levels apply only in the countercyclical portion of the 
program. The definition of a dislocated worker applies only in the 
structural segment. Other policy issues, such as the financing of 
benefits, the potential duration of benefits, and the requirements 
imposed upon recipients, could be applied either uniformly or 
differently under the two segments, depending upon the desired 
features of the program. 
One additional decision that would need to be made concerns the 
relationship between the two segments of the program. The dislocated 
worker segment could be in effect at all times in all areas, even in the 
absence of high cyclical unemployment. Alternatively, the dislocated 
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worker segment could be available only as a supplement for EB 
exhaustees in states or areas that have triggered EB "on." 
Chapter 7 
State Trust Fund 
Solvency 
THE LEVEL of trust fund reserves available to pay UI benefits declined significantly in the 1970s and early 
1980s due to high and prolonged unemployment. As a result, the 
federal government enacted legislation to encourage state solvency. 
The federal government has taken the following actions: (1) raised 
the federal taxable wage base, (2) raised the federal tax rate, and 
(3) changed the loan and repayment provisions for those states 
that borrow from the federal loan fund in order to pay UI benefits. The 
states, in response to federal legislation and to their trust fund 
solvency problems, also enacted legislation. Many of the states 
passed legislation that focused upon one or more of the 
following: (1) increasing the state taxable wage base, (2) increasing 
employers' tax rates, (3) implementing solvency surtaxes that trigger on 
when a state experiences solvency problems, (4) tightening eligibility 
requirements, and (5) decreasing the maximum potential duration of 
benefits. The impact of this federal and state legislation has been a 
significant decline in the proportion of the unemployed who receive UI 
benefits. 
A number of policy options are available to provide additional 
encouragement for states to improve their trust fund solvency. Among 
the broad categories of policy changes that have been proposed are the 
following: (1) changes in the existing taxable wage base, (2) changes in 
the existing tax rates, and (3) new initiatives to encourage state 
solvency. 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FINANCING 
The UI program is funded through a combination of federal and 
state UI payroll taxes on employers based on separate taxable wage 
bases and tax rates. These various taxes are discussed below. 
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Federal Tax 
Currently, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) gross tax 
is 6.2 percent on the first $7,000 of an employee's salary. Since the UI 
system's inception, the federal government has generally given the 
states the freedom to determine their own policies regarding UI 
taxation and benefits. The federal government, however, offers a 5.4 
percent credit on the 6.2 percent FUTA tax to employers in those states 
with federally approved UI plans and no outstanding federal loans for 
the program. The potential net tax rate of 0.8 percent ($56 per worker) 
provides states with a strong incentive to comply with federal 
requirements, since in the absence of compliance, the 6.2 percent tax 
would cost employers $434 per worker.1 
Revenue from the federal tax is allocated to three federal UI funds: 
the Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA), which 
finances both state and federal administrative costSj the Extended 
Unemployment Compensation Account (EUCA), which pays 50 percent 
of EB payments; and the Federal Unemployment Account (FUA), which 
provides loans to states experiencing insolvencies in their accounts.2 
Figure 7-1 illustrates the flow and allocation of FUTA funds received. 
Figures 7-2 and 7-3 illustrate the historical levels of FUTA tax 
collections and the net balances of the associated federal UI trust funds. 
State Tax 
Each state is responsible for providing regular UI benefits for its 
own residents. To finance these payments, states levy payroll taxes on 
covered employers, as does the federal government through the FUTA 
tax. Taxes collected per worker vary significantly across states, ranging 
in 1992 from $42 in South Dakota to $493 in Alaska (see Table 7-1). 
Because of the financial incentive outlined above, all states comply with 
the $7,000 federal wage base requirement; 40 states have established 
state taxable wage bases higher than the federal level. During 
recessionary periods, because increases in the number of claimants tend 
to drain trust funds, states often shift the entire schedule of tax rates 
upward, charging more of all employers to replenish their UI trust fund 
balances. Conversely, during periods of low unemployment, states 
tend to shift their tax schedules downward. States are required to 
deposit all employer tax revenues with the Federal Treasury, which 
credits individual state accounts. As needed, funds are disbursed to 
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FIGURE 7-1 
FLOW OF FUTA FUNDS UNDER EXISTING FEDERAL STATUTES 
0.8% Employer Tax" 
i 
Monthly Transfers of All Net Collections 
! 
(1) EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNT (ESAA) for 
flnanclng admlnlslratlve costs of the employment secuMIY program. Monthly 
0.72% of the 0.8% employer tax is to be retained in the ESAA account while 
0.08% is to be lransferred to (2). Up to 95% after transfers to (2) may be 
appropriated to finance state administrative costs; balance available to 
meet federal administrative costs. 
Statutory limit retained in this account at the beginning of a fiscal year is 
40% of appropriation for the prior fiscal year. 
I I t I 
Effective January, Excess if (2) Excess if (1) Excess if (3) Excess if (1) & (2) 
1991 monthly Is over statutory is over statutory Is ovar statutory ara over statutory 
transfers=20% of limit of September 30 limit on October 1 limit on limit and (3) is 
net collections of any year of any year and September 30 of not, on October 1 
unless above (2) is not over any year of any year 
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(2) EXTENDED UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION ACCOUNT (EUCA) 
for financing federal-state EB & EUC 
programs 
Statutory limit: 0.5% of totel wages in 
covered employment in preceding 
calendar year 
(3) FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
ACCOUNT (FUA) for repayable adVances 
to states with depleted reserves 
Statutory limit: 0.25% of total wages in 
covered employment In preceding 
calendar year 
If (1) (2) & (3) are over statutory limit on October 1 of 
any year, excess funds are distributed to state trust fund 
accounts If there are no outstanding advances from 
General Revenue to either FUA or EUCA . 
• Effective tax, after 5.4% is offset against 6.2% federal unemployment tax. Current law value will 
drop to 0.6% on January 1, 1997. 
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FIGURE 7-2 
FUTA TAX COLLECTIONS IN CONSTANT 1992 DOLLARS, 
























54 58 62 66 70 74 78 82 86 90 
Fiscal Year 
Source: USDOL/ETA/UIS/Division of Actuarial Services. 
STATE TRUST FUND SOLVENCY 
FIGURE 7-3 
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TABLE 7-1 
PER WORKER STATE TAXES COLLECTED, BY STATE IN 1992 
Alaska $493 Minnesota $173 
Rhode Island $436 Louisiana $166 
New Jersey $384 Iowa $164 
Massachusetts $382 New Mexico $158 
Michigan $374 Montana $152 
Washington $325 New Hampshire $144 
Pennsylvania $316 Missouri $142 
Oregon $295 North Dakota $141 
District of Columbia $268 Colorado $137 
Maryland $250 South Carolina $132 
New York $245 Nevada $132 
West Virginia $243 Mississippi $130 
Virgin Islands $240 Georgia $127 
Ohio $228 Tennessee $125 
Maine $227 Texas $124 
Illinois $223 Utah $120 
Wyoming $216 Florida $107 
Connecticut $210 North Carolina $105 
California $208 Oklahoma $102 
Vermont $204 Hawaii $101 
Wisconsin $195 Alabama $98 
Puerto Rico $185 Indiana $93 
Arkansas $185 Nebraska $92 
Delaware $181 Arizona $87 
Idaho $179 Virginia $78 
Kansas $177 South Dakota $42 
Kentucky $173 
Source: USDOL \ ETA \UIS\Division of Actuarial Services. 
states for VI benefits payments. Federal loans are available from the 
FVA to cover revenue shortfalls. 
Experience Rating 
The VI payroll tax is "experience rated," meaning that the tax paid 
by employers is determined, at least in part, by either the actual or 
potential benefits that are collected by former employees. Experience 
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rating is intended to discourage layoffs, provide for an equitable 
allocation of the costs of VI benefit payments across employers, and 
give employers an incentive to challenge unjustified benefit claims. In 
an experience rated system, employers who frequently layoff 
employees are taxed at a higher rate than those who infrequently lay 
off employees. As a result, experience rating causes employer tax rates 
to vary greatly across industries, with those industries with the fewest 
layoffs also paying the lowest average VI taxes (see Figure 7-4). 
Some VI benefit payments, however, do fall outside the scope of 
experience rating. Cases in which benefit outlays cannot be or are not 
assigned as the responsibility of an active employer are categorized as 
one of the following: (1) noncharged benefits, which occur when 
benefits originate from an employer who did not cause the job 
termination; (2) benefits charged to inactive employers, which occur 
when former employees continue to collect benefits although an 
employer has become inactive; or (3) ineffectively charged benefits, 
which occur when the revenues that an employer has paid into the 
system do not cover the benefit charges originating with that employer. 
Ineffectively charged benefits are, in large part, the result of maximum 
tax rates within most of the states' systems. Thus, those employers 
who are at the maximum tax rate (because of layoffs) generate costs to 
the VI system that must be partially funded by other employers. 
The term "perfect" experience rating describes a system in which 
each extra dollar of benefits payments causes an employer to be 
charged an additional dollar in taxes. Because noncharges, charges to 
inactive employers, and ineffective charges diminish the effect of the 
experience rating system, experience rating is termed "imperfect." 
The Experience Rating Index (ERI) provides a measure of the 
degree of experience rating in a state. The ERI is a proportion 
calculated by (1) totaling all noncharges, ineffective charges, and 
charges to inactive employers; (2) subtracting this sum from total 
benefit payments; and then (3) dividing this difference by total benefit 
payments and multiplying by 100. An ERI of 60, therefore, indicates 
that these three types of charges represent 40 percent of total benefit 
payments. In the period between 1988 and 1992, the average state ERI 
was 63. In 1992, ERIs ranged from a minimum of 31 in Oklahoma to 
a maximum of 83 in Louisiana.3 Table 7-2 illustrates cross-state 
differences in ERIs. 
Four problematic consequences are commonly attributed to 
experience rating. The first is interindustry cross-subsidization, which 
results from imperfect experience rating. VI payroll taxes generally 
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FIGURE 7-4 
ill TAXES PAID AS PERCENT OF TAXABLE WAGES, BY MAJOR 
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TABLE 7-2 
EXPERIENCE RATING INDEX, BY STATE IN 1992 
Louisiana 83 Montana 55 
Illinois 79 New Hampshire 55 
Indiana 78 South Carolina 54 
Iowa 74 Vermont 54 
Tennessee 71 Florida 53 
Arizona 69 California 52 
Utah 68 Georgia 52 
Ohio 65 Virginia 51 
Maryland 65 Mississippi 51 
Wisconsin 65 Texas 51 
Colorado 64 New York 51 
Wyoming 63 Oregon 51 
New Jersey 63 Alabama 49 
Michigan 63 South Dakota 49 
New Mexico 62 Idaho 44 
District of Columbia 62 Massachusetts 43 
North Dakota 60 Connecticut 42 
Minnesota 58 Maine 41 
Kentucky 58 Nevada 41 
Arkansas 58 North Carolina 37 
Nebraska 57 Hawaii 32 
Kansas 57 Oklahoma 31 
Washington 57 Alaska a 
West Virginia 56 Puerto Rico b 
Pennsylvania 56 Virgin Islands N/A 
Rhode Island 55 Delaware N/A 
Missouri 55 
(a) index cannot be computed due to type of experience rating system. 
(b) all employers taxed at uniform rates in these years. 
N/ A indicates data are not available. 
Source: Vroman, 1993. 
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exceed benefit charges in those industries with traditionally low 
unemployment, resulting in employers in those industries subsidizing 
traditionally high unemployment industries, in which benefit charges 
usually exceed taxes. In order to counter the effects of industrial cross-
subsidization, some have suggested that employers be fully experience 
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rated or, alternatively, that the system should be redesigned to prohibit 
interindustry cross-subsidization, but to allow cross subsidies to exist 
within particular industries.4 
A second concern, which also results from imperfect experience 
rating, is that experience rating does not prevent layoffs when 
employers are taxed at the maximum rate. Because additional layoffs 
do not cause an increase in the employers' VI taxes in this situation, 
imperfect experience rating may result in higher unemployment. In 
order to reduce this effect, some have suggested increasing the 
maximum experience rating tax. An additional concern that has been 
expressed about experience rating is that it imposes high taxes on 
declining industries. These taxes may, in tum, contribute to further 
declines in employment. 
Finally, experience rating has been faulted for creating an overly 
adversarial relationship between employers and claimants. Experience 
rating gives employers a financial incentive (reduced taxes) to contest 
former employees' VI claims. While this incentive encourages sel£-
policing, the level of contentiousness in the system exceeds that found 
in other industrialized nations. Indeed, about 30 percent of the 
administrative costs associated with paying VI benefits are the result 
of administrative processes that decide appeals and nonmonetary 
issues.s 
REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS 
This section describes the linkages between economic conditions, 
state trust fund solvency problems, changes in federal and state 
legislation, and declines in VI recipiency. It examines trends in trust 
fund reserves and VI recipiency within the context of recent economic 
conditions; discusses the options available to states when they are faced 
with solvency problems; and points to potential conflicts between 
states' objectives and federal goals for the VI program. 
Decline in Trust Fund Reserve Adequacy 
A number of different measures indicate that the adequacy of state 
trust funds has declined over time. This evidence is discussed below. 
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Trust Fund Balances 
Since the inception of the regular VI program in 1939 until the 
1960s, the program operated on a forward-funded, or pre-funding basis. 
States set their tax rates and benefit levels to accumulate adequate trust 
fund reserves during times of economic expansion, which allowed them 
to pay VI benefits from their reserves in periods of economic downturn. 
Unusually high and prolonged unemployment during the 1970s 
drained many states' trust fund reserves. As a result, many states had 
to rely for the first time on automatic federal loans in order to make VI 
payments (see Figure 7-5). 
In 1972, only two states needed loans from the federal government, 
totaling $100 million. By the end of 1979, however, 25 states had 
borrowed more than $5.6 billion, with $3.8 billion still owed by 13 
states.6 The peak in state debt occurred in 1983 at $13.4 billion. 
Benefit payments in 1982 and 1983 exceeded tax receipts by $9.5 billion 
in 1982 and $4.1 billion in 1983. 
This situation began to reverse itself between 1984 and 1989, as the 
economy improved. As a result, fewer states required loans. After 
1989, the situation once again deteriorated; in 1990, 1991, and 1992, 
outlays surpassed VI tax revenues by $3 billion, $10 billion, and $8 
billion, respectively.7 Recent state borrowing, however, has been at 
fairly low levels; only four states had loans outstanding at the end of 
1992 for a total of $1.1 billion. 
High Cost Multiple 
The high cost multiple (HCM), which measures how long 
recession-level benefits could be paid from a state's current trust fund 
balance, is the most common measure used to indicate a trust fund's 
solvency (or adequacy).8 The HCM is calculated by comparing two 
ratios: (1) the ratio of current net trust fund reserves to current year 
total wages earned in insured employment divided by (2) the ratio of 
the largest amount of total state benefit payments experienced in any 
12 consecutive months to the total wages in insured employment 
during those 12 months. Historically, the Interstate Commission of 
Employment Security Administrators has endorsed a high cost multiple 
of 1.5. Others, however, have advocated a standard of 1.0 as 
adequate.9 Figure 7-6 illustrates how the HCM for the overall VI 
system has changed over time. Between 1954 and 1969, the average 
HCM was 2.1. It declined steadily during the 1970s and was actually 
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FIGURE 7-5 
AMOUNT OF FEDERAL LOANS AND NUMBER OF 
STATES WITH OUTSTANDING LOANS, 1972-1992 
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negative in 1982 and 1983. The HeM rebounded somewhat in 1989 
and 1990, but has been in decline since the most recent recession. The 
number of states maintaining adequate reserves, as measured by an 
HeM of 1.5 has declined between 1972 and 1983 and remained fairly 
low thereafter. Using a less conservative HeM standard of 1.0 provides 
a somewhat more positive picture of state solvency. Table 7-3 
illustrates 1992 state HeMs and Figure 7-7 illustrates the number of 
states with adequate HeMs over time. Nevertheless, many 
policymakers fear that states' trust funds are currently unprepared for 
a serious recession. This view is supported in simulation models 
performed by the GAO and by Vroman.lO 
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TABLE 7-3 
HIGH COST MULTIPLE, BY STATE IN 1992 
Virgin Islands 3.21 Louisiana 0.72 
Puerto Rico 2.15 Tennessee 0.69 
New Mexico 1.69 North Dakota 0.65 
Oklahoma 1.53 Nevada 0.65 
Oregon 1.47 Montana 0.62 
Kansas 1,47 South Carolina 0.60 
Utah 1,40 New Hampshire 0.55 
Vermont 1.37 Arizona 0.55 
Hawaii 1.35 Kentucky 0.54 
South Dakota 1.29 California 0,42 
Mississippi 1.26 Texas 0.36 
Wyoming 1.23 West Virginia 0.35 
Iowa 1.21 Rhode Island 0.32 
Idaho 1.16 Illinois 0.28 
Wisconsin 1.13 Minnesota 0.27 
Delaware 1.13 Pennsylvania 0.25 
Indiana 1.11 Ohio 0.21 
Alaska 1.06 Arkansas 0.20 
Washington 0.99 Maryland 0.17 
North Carolina 0.98 Maine 0.15 
Nebraska 0.97 Michigan 0.05 
Alabama 0.90 New York 0.05 
Colorado 0.87 Missouri 0.00 
New Jersey 0.85 Massachusetts 0.00 
Florida 0.80 Connecticut 0.00 
Georgia 0.79 District of Columbia 0.00 
Virginia 0.74 
Source: USDOLjETA/UISjDivision of Actuarial Services. 
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The reserve ratio is another measure of trust fund solvency. 
Beginning with the steady increases in employment and inflation in the 
1950s and 1960s, the reserve ratio (net reserves as a share of total 
covered wages) has declined. From a maximum of lOA percent of 
covered wages in 1945, the reserve ratio declined to 6.8, 3.3, and 3.1 
percent in 1950, 1960, and 1970, respectively. Continuing its decline, 
the reserve ratio dipped below zero in 1982 and 1983; by 1990, 
however, it had risen to 1.9 percent of covered wages. Despite this 
recovery, many analysts consider the current reserve to be unacceptably 
low. 
Figure 7-8 illustrates that, with the exception of some minor 
upturns during periods of growth, the reserve ratio fell between 1945 
and 1983. The reversal of this long-term trend in 1983 appears to be 
attributable, at least in part, to the growing number of states that raised 
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their taxable wage base above the federal level. Table 7-4 illustrates the 
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TABLE 7-4 
RESERVE RATIO, BY STATE IN 1992 
Puerto Rico 9.05 Tennessee 1.50 
Virgin Islands 7.33 Kentucky 1.49 
Oregon 4.71 Florida 1.47 
Alaska 4.57 Nebraska 1.46 
Vermont 4.45 Rhode Island 1.41 
Washington 4.18 West Virginia 1.38 
Wyoming 3.71 New Hampshire 1.38 
Idaho 3.67 Arizona 1.36 
Hawaii 3.57 South Dakota 1.34 
Iowa 3.16 Colorado 1.10 
Delaware 3.04 California 0.98 
Wisconsin 2.90 Virginia 0.96 
Kansas 2.89 Pennsylvania 0.84 
Utah 2.83 Illinois 0.74 
New Jersey 2.83 Ohio 0.66 
New Mexico 2.77 Arkansas 0.55 
Mississippi 2.48 Minnesota 0.54 
North Carolina 2.25 Maine 0.44 
Louisiana 2.22 Texas 0.41 
Oklahoma 2.10 Maryland 0.37 
Indiana 1.99 Michigan 0.17 
Alabama 1.96 New York 0.12 
Montana 1.87 Missouri 0.01 
Nevada 1.79 Massachusetts 0.00 
South Carolina 1.73 Connecticut 0.00 
Georgia 1.68 District of Columbia 0.00 
North Dakota 1.51 
Source: USDOLjETAjUISjDivision of Actuarial Services. 
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Decline in Unemployment Insurance Recipiency 
Chapter 4 reviews the decline in the percentage of unemployed 
workers who receive regular VI benefits, a decline that was especially 
pronounced during the early 1980s. Researchers have focused on the 
relationship between state trust fund solvency (as expressed by the 
HCM) and VI recipiency. A state's HCM could be low in a given year 
for a number of reasons, including the level of the HCM in previous 
years, small tax collections, and large benefit outlays. A recent GAO 
report indicates the decline in recipiency is often the direct consequence 
of state legislation designed to improve their solvency status. Table 7-5 
illustrates changes in recipiency during the recessionary period of 1980 
to 1985, based on the level of a state's HCM in 1980. Those states with 
lower HCMs in 1980 experienced larger declines in recipiency in the 
years between 1980 and 1985 than those states with higher than average 
HCMs in 1980Y The correlation between the decline in trust fund 
adequacy and the decline in VI recipiency can be seen in Figure 7-9. 
This decline in recipiency is important. When the number of 
recipients declines, the VI program loses its effectiveness as a 
countercyclical stimulus tool and as a temporary wage replacement for 
the unemployed. A 1990 GAO report estimates that if recipiency rates 
were similar to those in the mid-1970s (before states began experiencing 
solvency problems), then an additional $20 billion in VI benefits would 
have been available to the economy during the most recent recession.12 
Tradeoff Among Borrowing, Taxation, and Benefit Levels 
A variety of alternative legislative responses are available to states 
that face solvency problems. One option is to take out loans from the 
federal government. Another option is to increase reserves by raising 
or restructuring employers' VI tax rates. 13 The third option is to limit 
the benefits either by restricting the number of individuals eligible for 
VI, or by decreasing the payments that VI claimants receive. Each of 
these options is discussed below. 
Borrowing 
In order for states to ensure they are always solvent and never 
need to borrow from the federal government (Le., no risk of 
insolvency), states would require either very large trust fund reserves 
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TABLE 7-5 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HIGH COST MULTIPLE AND CHANGES 
IN UI RECIPIENCY 
Quintile (Ranked by 
HCM in 1980) 
Lowest 10 states 
Next lowest 10 states 
Middle 11 states 
Next highest 10 states 
Highest 10 states 
Average 






Source: GAO (1993), Table 2.1, p.31 
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or very responsive tax systems. Under the present law, reserves can be 
used only to pay cash benefits to UI claimants; therefore any funds 
collected are not transferable for other purposes. As a result, states fear 
that high trust fund balances will result in increased pressure for 
benefit liberalization. 
Borrowing from the federal government lessens the need to 
maintain excessive balances or impose high tax rates during recession. 
States' willingness and ability to borrow from the federal government 
has varied over time because of federal policy changes. For example, 
when the federal government began charging states interest on loans, 
the increased costs of borrowing caused many states to either raise UI 
taxes, reduce benefits, or both. The changes in federal legislative policy 
regarding trust fund insolvency are discussed in more detail in a later 
section. 
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FIGURE 7-9 
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Employer UI Taxes 
States' determination of employers' tax schedules, the amount of 
experience rating, and the taxable wage base reflect their implicit choice 
of a funding mechanism, which can be either forward-funding or pay-
as-you-go. A pay-as-you-go funding mechanism can either be 
automatic or discretionary. 
The VI program generally operated on a self-financing, forward-
funded basis during its first four decades. The past decade has seen 
the system move to pay-as-you-go funding. Vnder automatic pay-as-
you-go funding, states build mechanisms into their tax structure that 
automatically increase tax receipts by raising employers' tax rates when 
the trust fund balance declines.14 Vnder discretionary pay-as-you-go 
funding, states enact changes in their VI laws to raise the effective tax 
rate on employers or the taxable wage base when the trust fund balance 
becomes too low. As a result of this system, VI taxes collected per 
worker vary with the economic cycle (see Figure 7-10). 
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FIGURE 7-10 
STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TAX COLLECTIONS PER WORKER 
IN CONSTANT 1992 DOLLARS, 1938-1992 
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Benefits 
States can take a number of steps to decrease the number of 
individuals eligible to receive benefits, as well as the benefit amounts 
paid to VI recipients. There are a number of eligibility conditions that 
a VI applicant faces; these conditions often overlap with factors 
involved in determining the duration and amount of weekly benefits. 
Among the important factors involved in determining benefit outlays 
are the following: 
• Minimum earnings and duration qualifying requirements 
• Minimum and maximum weekly benefit amounts 
• Method of computing weekly benefit amounts 
• Indexation of the maximum weekly benefit amount 
• Minimum and maximum duration of benefits 
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,. Method of computing duration of benefits 
e Waiting period requirements 
e Allowances for dependents 
,. Disqualifying income 
,. Definition of disqualifications and the associated penalty in 
terms of benefit amount and duration 
Conflicting Objectives of States and Federal Government 
The federal-state nature of the VI system allows states to retain 
flexibility in the design of their programs, while maintaining, albeit 
loosely, a national unemployment insurance policy. The system, 
however, suffers from some inherent conflict between the objectives of 
the federal government and those of the states. 
The federal objectives under the VI program are to provide 
economic stability/5 provide income maintenance to unemployed 
workers, and prevent unemployment. Erosion in the effectiveness of 
the VI program, as evidenced by declining recipiency and state trust 
fund solvency problems, results in fewer resources being put back into 
the economy. In order to ensure that broad program goals are met, 
therefore, the federal government seeks to ensure that recipiency rates 
and benefit payments are adequate and that states are able to remain 
solvent. 
States, on the other hand, are justifiably concerned with prevailing 
economic and political conditions, the alleviation of economic suffering 
among the unemployed, as well as the state business climate. The 
regionalization of economic distress in recent years has left states with 
concerns about placing their employers at a competitive disadvantage 
and questions about their ability to foster economic growth within their 
state boundaries. To compete for industry, new investment, and jobs, 
states may seek to keep their VI taxes low in order to provide 
additional incentives for businesses to locate in their state. States seek 
to maintain autonomy over VI to ensure their capacity to respond to 
their own economic situation however they see fit, whether it is by 
controlling the size of the eligible population, the amount of benefits 
paid, or the amount of taxes collected. Over time, however, tax rates 
as a percentage of total and taxable wages have declined (see Figure 7-
11). These rates vary significantly across states (see Table 7-6). 
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FIGURE 7-11 
AVERAGE EMPLOYER TAX RATE (AS PERCENTAGE OF TAXABLE 
AND TOTAL WAGES), 1938-1992 
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TABLE 7-6 
AVERAGE EMPLOYER TAX RATE AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL WAGES AND 
TAXABLE WAGES, BY STATE IN 1992 
Total Taxable 
Rhode Island 1.95 
Alaska 1.71 
Oregon 1.59 
Puerto Rico 1.51 




















New Mexico 0.81 
North Dakota 0.78 




































South Carolina 0.64 
Missouri 0.62 











































Source: USDOL/ETA/UIS/Division of Actuarial Services. 
The federal-state nature of the program also raises two equity 
issues. First, two individuals in precisely the same job-loss 
circumstance may face very different eligibility, benefits, and job search 
requirements based on their state of residence. While this always has 
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been true, state formulae for calculating eligibility and benefits have 
become increasingly complex and more diverse over time.16 Second, 
unemployment is often concentrated geographically, which places an 
uneven financing burden on the states. 
FEDERAL ACTIONS TO ADDRESS STATE SOLVENCY 
Congress has responded to the deterioration of states' VI trust fund 
solvency by passing legislation that combined fiscal relief with pressure 
to initiate improvements in states' trust fund solvency. This section 
outlines the most important aspects of this legislation. 
FUTA Taxable Wage Base 
At the inception of the program (in 1939) the federal taxable wage 
base was 100 percent of payrolls. This was changed starting in 1940 to 
tax only the first $3,000 of a covered worker's earnings, which covered 
93 percent of all wages at that time. With each passing year, the $3,000 
wage base limit covered a smaller and smaller percentage of wages as 
the general wage level rose. By 1948, about 82 percent of all covered 
payrolls were subject to the tax; whereas in 1969, only about one-half 
of covered payrolls were subject to the tax. Federal legislation 
increased the taxable wage base to $4,200 in 1972, $6,000 in 1978, and 
$7,000 in 1983. These increases in the taxable wage base have not, 
however, kept pace with the increase in covered wages. By 1992, the 
ratio of taxable wages to covered wages had eroded to 36 percent, the 
lowest level in historyP In addition, the taxable wage base is 
significantly below the average annual wage, which was approximately 
$25,500 in 1992. 
FUTA Tax Rate 
The federal unemployment gross tax under FVT A applies to the 
federal taxable wage base. The federal government, however, offers 
employers within a state an offsetting credit provided that the state's 
VI program (1) has a taxable wage base at least as high as the federal 
tax base, (2) has a maximum employer tax rate under experience rating 
of at least 5.4 percent, and (3) does not have outstanding loans. The 
offsetting credit provides such a strong financial incentive that every 
state complies with the federal wage base. 
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Table 7-7 illustrates the change in the FVTA rate and the inflation-
adjusted per-worker cost over time. The table includes information on 
the year the change became effective, the gross FVTA tax rate, the tax 
credit offset, the potential net tax rate on employers, the federal taxable 
wage base, and the inflation-adjusted per-worker cost. Increases in the 
net tax rate have been adopted to cover administration costs due to 
inflation and to support the EB program. Tax rate increases also were 
used to encourage states to raise the upper limits of their tax schedules 
and to encourage increased tax revenues for reserve funds. The 
inflation-adjusted per-worker VI cost illustrates how program 
administration funds have fluctuated with changes in the tax rate and 
federal wage base over time. 
Federal Loan and Repayment Provisions 
A federal loan fund account was first established by legislation in 
1944; the provision expired in 1952. No states needed loans during the 
eight-year period. At that time, loans were interest-free and states with 
insolvent trust funds were allowed to repay their loans slowly or not 
at all. In 1954, the Reed Act reactivated the loan fund and instituted 
"penalties" for late repayments. Penalties are assessed when loans are 
not repaid within two to three years after they are made.18 These 
penalties require increased taxes on employers, which are used to repay 
the loan debts and are assessed until the loan is repaid. The penalties 
take the form of graduated reductions in the federal unemployment tax 
credit allowed to employers: 0.3 percent of taxable payrolls was 
assessed in the first year, 0.6 in the second, 0.9 in the third, and so on. 
Because of severe unemployment, Congress allowed a three year 
deferral of these penalties for states that met certain tax structure 
criteria between 1975 and 1979.19 Congress passed a law that 
temporarily capped the reduction in the federal tax credit at 0.6 percent 
in 1981; this law was made permanent, provided that a state met 
conditions regarding tax effort and indebtedness.2o 
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TABLE 7-7 
FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT TAX RATE, WAGE BASE, AND 
PER-WORKER COST 
Federal Inflation-Adjusted 
Year Gross FUTA Offsetting Potential Net Taxable Per Worker Cost 
Effective Tax Rate Credit Tax Rate Wage Base (1992 Dollars') 
1939 3.00% 2.7% 0.30% $3,000 $91 
1960 3.10% 2.7% 0.40% $3,000 $57 
1970 3.20% 2.7% 0.50% $3,000 $54 
1972 3.20% 2.7% 0.50% $4,200 $70 
1973 3.28%' 2.7% 0.58% $4,200 $77 
1974 3.20% 2.7% 0.50% $4,200 $60 
1977 3.40%' 2.7% 0.70% $4,200 $68 
1978 3.40% 2.7% 0.70% $6,000 $90 
1983 3.50% 2.7% 0.80% $7,000 $79 
1985 6.20% 5.4% 0.80% $7,000 $73 
1992 6.20% 5.4% 0.80% $7,000 $56 
I The calculation of the 1992 price index is based on 11 months of data. 
1 Reflects a 0.08 percent increase in federal unemployment tax in 1973 only to pay for additional benefit costs. 
, A temporary surtax of 0.2 percent was enacted in 1977, and was extended in 1987, 1990, and 1993. It is 
now scheduled to expire in 1997. 
Source: USDOL/ETA/UIS/Division of Actuarial Services. 
Congress passed legislation to revise federal loan provisions and 
to charge interest on loans to states that borrowed after March 1982 and 
that do not repay the loan during the same fiscal year in which the 
money is borrowed,21 These interest payments cannot be made 
directly from a state's benefit reserves or indirectly through a change 
in a state's VI tax rate,22 Legislation passed in 1983 allowed debtor 
states completely to avoid penalty taxes on employers if they paid an 
amount equivalent to the penalty taxes from their reserves and met 
other conditions.23 This practice allows states to finance repayment 
through experience rating, as opposed to a flat tax on all employers. 
Thus, as of 1983, states can defer interest payments on VI loans for 
up to four years, provided that (1) their insured unemployment rate 
was at least 7.5 percent for the first six months of the calendar year 
preceding the interest due date (under the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
110 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
Responsibility Act of 1982) or (2) their taxes were at least 2 percent of 
payroll in 1982 (under the Social Security Amendments). Vnder this 
scenario, states can pay 25 percent of their annual interest payment 
when due and 25 percent of the interest in each of the following 
years.24 States can also reduce their interest rates on loans and 
partially freeze employer tax credit deductions.25 To requalify for 
annual relief, states usually had to maintain previously enacted cost-
cutting and tax-increasing measures, as well as initiate new steps.26 
While these laws did encourage states to reverse their negative 
trust fund balances, the laws have not yet resulted in a restoration of 
the high reserves or HeMs (1.5 or higher) that characterized the 
program in earlier years. 
STATE RESPONSES TO FEDERAL ACTIONS AND 
SOLVENCY ISSUES 
During the 1980s, states changed their regular VI laws, often in 
direct response to federal legislation and trust fund insolvency. 
Overall, these changes were designed to increase the revenues collected 
by the VI system, while decreasing the benefits paid by the system. In 
particular: 
II Most states now set their wage base above the current federal 
minimum of $7,000, and 18 states index their wage base with 
the change in state annual wages. 
II During the early 1980s, those states that experienced the largest 
decreases in their trust fund solvency also experienced the 
largest increases in their effective employer tax rates. 
II Since the early 1980s, a number of states have implemented 
solvency surtaxes that are triggered during times of trust fund 
solvency problems. While these surtaxes do not eliminate the 
need for borrowing, they can reduce the scale of borrowing 
and slightly affect trust fund balances. 
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• During the 1980s, it became harder for unemployed workers to 
qualify for VI. States increased the minimum earnings 
requirements to qualify for UI, imposed stiffer qualification 
requirements, and increased the penalties related to 
disqualifications. 
• Many states decreased their maximum potential benefit 
duration and the majority of states have either increased or not 
changed their minimum potential benefit duration. 
The remainder of this section discusses each of the specific state VI 
law changes that have been made (primarily in the 1980s) in response 
to federal legislation and trust fund insolvency and the impact of these 
changes on the availability and receipt of UI. 
State Taxable Wage Base 
As noted above, in order to allow its employers to receive the 
maximum credit against the federal tax, each state must currently have 
a taxable wage base of at least $7,000. In 1981, 31 states set their 
taxable wage base as low as the federally mandated level (then $6,000); 
by 1987, however, only 17 states set their taxable wage base as low as 
the federally mandated level of $7,000. Many states with levels above 
the 1981 federal taxable wage base of $6,000 had increased their wage 
base above $7,000 by 1987, with the average change among the states 
that increased their base above $7,000 being 39 percent. Between 1987 
and 1993, the overall increase in states' taxable wage base was 12 
percent. Figure 7-12 illustrates the distribution of state taxable wage 
bases, with only 12 states currently setting their base at the federal 
minimum. In 1993, the state bases ranged as high as $23,900 in Hawaii 
in 1993.27 Some states have incorporated an automatic adjustment for 
wage increases in the form of a flexible taxable wage base. Vnder this 
method, states calculate the wage base as a fixed percentage of the 
average annual wage in their state. Currently, 18 states calculate their 
taxable wage base using between 50 to 100 percent of average wage.28 
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FIGURE 7-12 
























Employer VI Tax Rates 
Revenues from collections of state VI taxes are used to pay VI 
benefits for both the regular VI program and one-half of the EB 
program. States usually structure their employer VI taxes to include 
several tax rate schedules. Ranging from the least favorable schedule 
(which applies when trust fund balances have fallen below a specific 
level) to the most favorable schedule (which applies when trust fund 
balances are above a specific level), the schedule that is in effect 
depends on a measure of the state's trust fund solvency. Within a 
given tax schedule, there is a range of rates, with the assessed rate for 
each employer varying according to the firm's unemployment 
experience rating. 
Declining high cost multiples have led to increasingly higher 
effective tax rates on employers. Table 7-8 demonstrates that those 
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states experiencing the greatest decreases in their HCMs between 1980 
and 1983 also experienced the highest increase in their effective 
employer tax rate. Conversely, states that experienced modest increases 
in their HCM had only minor increases in their effective employer tax 
rates. 
TABLE 7-8 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHANGES IN TAX RATE AND 
MINIMUM EARNINGS AND CHANGES IN HIGH COST MULTIPLE 
Quintile (ranked by 
change in HCM) 
Lowest 10 states 
Next lowest 10 states 
Middle 11 states 
Next highest 10 states 









Source: GAO (1993), Table 2,4, p,37, 























Solvency surtaxes represent a mechanism for increasing trust fund 
balances and avoiding or minimizing borrowing, These surtaxes are 
triggered in a number of different ways, with the three most common 
triggers being tied to one of the following: (1) a percentage of payroll, 
(2) the reserve ratio, or (3) a specific trust fund dollar amount. These 
surtaxes are paid in addition to the regular DI tax and have the effect 
of putting a state's funding on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
In 1978, only seven states had a solvency surtax; by 1983, however, 
24 states had a solvency surtax. Currently, 27 states have a solvency 
surtax,29 The results from a simulation model of seven states indicate 
that, while surtaxes do not prevent insolvency or even eliminate the 
potential need for heavy borrowing, surtaxes can reduce the scale of 
borrowing and have a modest impact on trust fund balances.3o 
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Tightening Eligibility Requirements 
Each state determines what requirements must be met by 
unemployed workers in order to be eligible for the state's UI 
program, as well as the amount and duration of benefits to be paid. 
Three factors are common to most state program eligibility standards: 
(1) monetary standards (i.e., minimum level of recent employment and 
earnings to qualify); (2) availability for work; and (3) quit, job offer 
refusal, or misconduct benefit denials. States can opt to tighten 
eligibility requirements by increasing the minimum earnings 
requirements level, increasing the minimum required number of weeks 
worked, adding restrictions on the types of earnings that qualify, or 
expanding the severity and type of disqualifications. Each of these 
activities is discussed below. 
Minimum Qualifying Requirements 
Qualifying requirements usually specify the minimum earnings 
and/ or employment duration needed to be eligible for UI benefits.31 
As either or both of these minimum levels increase, fewer people 
become eligible to receive UI. Federal legislation in 1981 imposed a 
minimum federal qualifying requirement of either 20 weeks, 1.5 times 
high quarter wages, or 40 times the weekly benefit amount to be used 
in the EB program.32 This action may have spurred some states to 
adopt identical standards in their regular UI program. Between 1981 
and 1987, 18 states changed their earnings distribution formula to 
reduce the number of unemployed eligible for benefits. Overall, there 
has been a tendency for states to (1) impose stiffer qualification 
requirements, as reflected in greater use of the weeks-of-work and 
high-quarter wage tests that better reflect actual employment than the 
flat earnings test, and (2) increase the minimum requirement levels. 
For example, in 1971,11 states used flat annual earnings and 12 states 
used a multiple of high-quarter wages; in 1990, however, seven states 
used flat annual earnings and 24 states used a multiple of high-quarter 
wages. State qualifying formulae have become more complex, often to 
screen out those individuals with weak attachment to the labor force. 
States calculate a minimum earnings level each year based on their 
formulae. Between 1981 and 1987, 35 states increased the minimum 
earnings requirements (in inflation-adjusted terms) needed to qualify 
for UI benefits; the average increase among these being 63 percent. The 
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average decline in the remaining 15 states, where minimum weekly 
earnings requirements decreased in inflation-adjusted terms, was 18 
percent.33 
The relationship between changes in solvency and changes in the 
minimum earnings requirements is shown in Table 7-8. Those states 
with the largest drop in their HCM had an increase in their earnings 
requirement of $811 in 1990 dollars, whereas those states with an 
increase in the HCM decreased their minimum earnings requirement 
by an average of five dollars. 
Disqualifications 
Between 1978 and 1990, 20 states increased the penalties for one or 
more disqualification reasons (quitting without sufficient reason, firing 
for misconduct, or refusal to accept suitable employment).34 The 
penalties imposed usually specify a period of benefit ineligibility and 
the earnings required to requalify. In some cases, benefit rights 
associated with the most recent employment were significantly reduced, 
or even canceled. The increasing use of harsher penalties makes it 
more difficult for potential claimants to requalify for benefits. States 
have significantly increased the instances when benefits are postponed 
for the entire duration of unemployment. In 1971, for example, only 28 
states postponed benefits for the duration of unemployment for 
voluntary leaving, but, in 1990, 50 states had implemented that 
practice. 35 
Duration of Benefits 
The maximum potential duration for a UI recipient varies with the 
wage credits or weeks of employment. A decrease in the maximum 
potential benefit duration results in some claimants exhausting benefits 
earlier and therefore no longer being included in the insured 
unemployed. Between 1978 and 1990, eight out of the ten states with 
a maximum duration of benefits greater than 26 weeks decreased their 
maximum duration to 26 weeks.36 Approximately 22 states increased 
their minimum benefit duration between 1978 and 1990, eight states 
decreased their duration, and 21 states remained unchanged. 
While the minimum and maximum benefit duration are designated 
by state law, the actual average benefit duration is another measure of 
how these laws actually affect claimants.37 Between 1978 and 1990, 18 
states experienced a decline in actual average benefit duration, which 
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averaged 13.6 percent. Thirty-four states had an increase in actual 
average benefit duration, which averaged 13.3 percent. Thus, the 
combination of decreases in the maximum benefit duration and modest 
increases in the minimum benefit duration, along with changes in the 
calculation of duration, have resulted in a national increase in average 
duration of 0.8 percent. This increase could be explained by a change 
in the characteristics of the unemployed receiving benefits (e.g., 
reduced recipiency may result in the possibility that those individuals 
eligible for benefits have stronger ties to the labor force than in earlier 
years). Some increase in the average benefit duration is expected 
because the average duration of unemployment spells and the 
percentage of unemployed workers who are unemployed for extended 
periods of time have increased throughout the last decades.38 When 
examining changes in actual duration, it is important to recognize that 
even if average duration remains stable over time, the decline in 
recipiency results in an overall decline in VI outlays, since fewer of the 
unemployed are receiving benefits. 
Benefit Levels 
Many states have allowed the value of their mmlmum and 
maximum benefits to decline, or at least not keep up with inflation. 
Between 1978 and 1990, inflation-adjusted minimum weekly benefits 
decreased an average of 33 percent in 30 states. In 10 of these 30 states, 
nonadjusted minimum weekly benefits did not change between 1978 
and 1990. In four states the benefit level has kept up with inflation 
and, in 18 states, the minimum benefit level has increased an average 
of 52 percent. Between 1978 and 1990, the maximum weekly benefit 
level, adjusted for inflation, has increased in 21 states an average of 13 
percent and has decreased in 31 states an average of 14 percent. 
Another measure of benefits is the average weekly benefit amount, 
which has fallen slightly nationwide from $169 in 1978 to $162 in 1990 
(a 3.6 percent decline), after adjusting for inflation. Fourteen states have 
experienced a decline of 8 percent on average, and the remaining 38 
states have had an increase of 18 percent on average. Overall, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, replacement rates have remained fairly constant 
over time. 
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Impact of State Law Changes 
As discussed more fully in Chapter 4, analysts have tried to 
quantify the extent to which changes in state policy account for declines 
in UI recipiency. Corson and Nicholson found that 21 to 54 percent of 
the recipiency decline between 1980 and 1986 was attributable to state 
policy changes, and Baldwin and McHugh's results indicate that state 
policy changes account for 54 percent of the decline in recipiency 
between 1979 and 1990, although more recent research by Baldwin 
found substantially smaller effects of state policy changes. A number 
of significant state policy changes were cited in these studies, including 
the following: increases in monetary eligibility requirement formulae, 
changes in monetary eligibility standards for minimum benefits, 
increases in disqualification penalties, declines in the maximum 
duration of benefits, and increases in the earnings to qualify for the 
maximum benefit. 
A GAO report, released in September 1993, also analyzes the effect 
of state policy changes by using a combination of statistical techniques 
and in-depth case studies of seven states. GAO assumed that laws do 
not change instantaneously with economic conditions or changes in the 
trust fund status, but that existing laws do affect current solvency. 
GAO modeled the interaction among state trust fund solvency, UI 
recipiency rates, state law changes, and the demographics of the 
unemployed.39 GAO's analysis found that states with declining or 
insolvent trust funds took a number of legislative actions that made it 
difficult for the unemployed to qualify for benefits and, consequently, 
reduced recipiency. 
Using different statistical and regression techniques, the staff of the 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation have analyzed the 
database used by GAO, In general, their findings support the 
conclusion of the GAO that declining trust fund solvency leads to 
reductions in the percentage of the unemployed who receive VI 
benefits.40 
POLICY OPTIONS 
There are three basic policy approaches the federal government 
could pursue to encourage states to improve their trust fund solvency 
and maintain adequate reserve balances: (1) establish specific uniform 
standards of financing and! or benefit eligibility and amount, and 
require that the states achieve these standards; (2) establish broad 
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financial and/or regulatory goals, and provide incentives for states to 
meet those goals; or (3) do nothing. Each of these three approaches 
reflects a different philosophy about the level of involvement the 
federal government should have in state VI programs. 
In the past, the federal government has focused primarily on a 
combination of the latter two approaches. It has, for example, used 
financial rewards and penalties in a number of instances to influence 
state behavior. Foremost among these are (1) providing large offsetting 
tax credits to employers in states that meet certain federal criteria and 
(2) providing loans to states with insolvent trust funds, but charging 
interest on those loans and levying tax penalties on employers in states 
with delinquent loans. These financial incentives are often so 
significant that the result is effectively a mandate, although the activity 
is not legislatively required. The federal government has not, however, 
mandated many detailed changes in states' eligibility requirements, 
benefit levels, disqualification penalties, or other aspects of states' VI 
programs. Nor has the federal government required states to maintain 
specific reserve balances or high cost multiples. 
This section discusses the following general policy options: 
(1) changes in the taxable wage base, (2) changes in tax rates, and 
(3) new initiatives to encourage state solvency. Under the first two of 
these options, the federal government essentially mandates the specific 
changes that states must make to improve their trust fund solvency. 
Vnder the last option (initiatives to encourage state solvency) the 
federal government sets broad goals or incentive structures, but does 
not dictate specific requirements of the states. 
In addition to the options discussed here, there are other 
requirements the federal government could mandate that indirectly 
affect trust funds solvency, such as establishing uniform eligibility 
requirements or establishing minimum benefit levels across states. 
Since these options would affect trust fund solvency only indirectly, 
they will be addressed in a future report. Each of the policy options 
discussed below vary in terms of their funding strategy (forward or 
pay-as-you-go). States often prefer flexible financing options because 
they allow the states to maintain lower trust fund reserves, while 
responding to trust fund solvency problems. Many analysts believe, 
however, that there are strong arguments against flexible financing, 
including (1) the effects of the flexible policies are usually not large 
enough to prevent insolvency in recessions and (2) employers are likely 
to be hit with increased taxes precisely when a recession is driving 
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down firm profitsY These analysts tend to prefer options that would 
restore the VI system to a forward funding mechanism. 
Changes in the Taxable Wage Base 
Three primary options exist regarding changes in the taxable wage 
base: (1) the federal taxable wage base could be raised, (2) the federal 
taxable wage base could be indexed, and (3) the state taxable wage 
bases could be indexed. Each of these options is discussed in more 
detail below. 
Raise the Federal Taxable Wage Base 
One option is to raise the absolute level of the federal taxable wage 
base. The current federal taxable wage base is set at $7,000, with states 
encouraged to adopt a state taxable wage base of at least $7,000 
through the use of the offsetting tax credit. Increases in the taxable 
wage base have been legislated over time. These increases, however, 
have been relatively small, and the taxable wage base has continued to 
decline relative to covered wages. 
An increase in the federal taxable wage base would serve to 
increase state tax collections, except when (1) states already have wage 
bases above the new federal level (39 states have a wage base above 
$7,000 in 1993) or (2) states decrease their employer tax rates in 
response to increases in the federal wage base.42 
Index the Federal Taxable Wage Base 
A second option, which could be applied independently or in 
combination with an increase in the federal taxable wage base, is to 
index the federal taxable wage base. Increasing the federal base in 
proportion with a measure of wages, such as the national average 
annual wage, would provide an automatic mechanism to account for 
wage increases over timeY .An alternative option is for the indexation 
to be based on individual state wage increases. A similar practice is 
already followed by the 18 states that currently have a flexible state 
wage base automatically linking annual increases in the taxable wage 
base to state wage increases. 
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Index the State Taxable Wage Base 
The federal government could encourage states to index their state 
taxable wage bases. For example, a larger offsetting tax credit could be 
offered to states whose taxable wage base is indexed to annual wage 
changes in the state. This option might be particularly appealing if the 
federal wage base is not indexed and/or remains relatively low 
compared to covered payroll. 
Changes in the Tax Rates 
States currently have latitude in setting the range and conditions 
of their employer tax rates, with the exception of having a maximum 
employer tax rate of 5.4 percent (to qualify for the offsetting tax credit). 
The federal government could be more prescriptive in what rates states 
must charge their employers. For example, a federally set minimum 
employer tax rate is a forward-funding option that could push states to 
increase their reserves. States could also be encouraged to adopt 
flexible financing provisions in the form of (1) timely adjustments 
to employer tax rates given changes in the state's trust fund balance or 
(2) wide minimum ranges for experience rating tax rates. 
New Initiatives to Encourage State Solvency 
There have also been a number of proposals made regarding 
methods of encouraging state solvency. Five of these proposals are the 
following: (1) national solvency standards, (2) increased interest 
payments on state reserve balances, (3) new loan and repayment 
provisions, (4) allowing some alternative uses of state trust funds, and 
(5) permitting pooling of state trust fund reserves. Each of these 
options is discussed in greater detail below. 
National Solvency Standards 
A number of analysts have suggested that implementing trust fund 
reserve standards would improve state trust fund adequacy and 
decrease the scale of future borrowing.44 'The most likely solvency 
standard is adopting an HeM standard. 'There is some controversy, 
however, regarding the most appropriate target level (1.0, 1.5, or some 
other multiple). 
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Interest Payments on Reserve Balances 
The federal government has paid interest on positive state VI trust 
fund balances since the inception of the VI program.45 To encourage 
states to maintain higher reserves, the government could provide 
supplemental interest payments on a portion of reserve balances in 
states that maintain "large" trust fund balances or achieve designated 
solvency standards. For example, a state could receive an interest rate 
supplementation (such as one percentage point) on those reserves in 
excess of a 0.5 HeM. 
Loan and Repayment Provisions 
To discourage borrowing by the states, the federal government 
could increase the interest rate assessed on loans not repaid in a timely 
manner. The government could also change the structure or types of 
penalties assessed on employers in states that do not meet certain loan 
repayment conditions. 
Alternatively, preferential interest rates could be offered to states 
that need to borrow when they have maintained "adequate" solvency 
prior to a recession. For example, a state that maintained a specific 
solvency standard could be charged a lower interest rate on borrowing 
than that charged to states that failed to maintain a specific solvency 
standard. 
Alternative Uses of State UI Trust Funds 
Allowing alternative uses of VI trust funds in states maintaining 
"large" balances could encourage states to build their reserves. Any 
such policy would have to be explicit about allowable expenditures 
(e.g., education, training, job search assistance, VI administration, 
Employment Services) and the amount of funds that could be used. 
Pooling of Trust Fund Reserves 
Some analysts believe that states should be allowed to pool their 
trust funds so that those states that are experiencing insolvency could 
borrow from those states that are not.46 There are two basic types of 
pooling. Both types, cost reinsurance and cost equalization, would 
alleviate excessive costs to those states experiencing to economic factors 
beyond their control. Vnder cost reinsurance, states would pay into a 
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common fund and those states that experience solvency problems 
beyond their control would receive payments from the fund to cover 
part or all of their "excess" costs. Past benefit payments would be used 
to identify reimbursable costs that are above those costs that could have 
been reasonably expected. Under cost equalization, states that have 
costs (or perhaps unemployment rates) above an absolute threshold 
would be partially or fully reimbursed by payments from either the 
current federal trust fund accounts or some other account established 
for this purpose. These additional costs could be funded through 




ALIEN AGRICULTURAL WORKERS include legal permanent residents, legal temporary residents (e.g., 
aliens receiving H-2A visas), individuals residing under color of law 
(e.g., refugees), and illegal aliens. Currently, FUTA taxes are not paid 
on H-2A workers or illegal aliens, and these workers are virtually never 
eligible for UI benefits.l 
The payment of FUTA taxes on H-2A workers is currently 
scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 1995. Congress requested that 
the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation recommend 
whether or not employers should continue to be exempt (on either a 
permanent or temporary basis) from paying FUTA taxes on H-2A 
workers. 
TREATMENT OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS UNDER 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
Agricultural workers were originally excluded from UI coverage; 
however, there have been a number of legislative amendments that 
have affected their participation in the UI program. The current law 
(based on the 1976 amendments) extends UI coverage to employees of 
farms that either (1) paid wages in cash of $20,000 or more for 
agricultural labor in any calendar quarter in the current or preceding 
calendar year or (2) employed 10 or more workers on at least one day 
in each of 20 different weeks in the current or immediate preceding 
calendar year.2 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) was 
passed to control unauthorized immigration into the United States. It 
contained employer sanctions requiring all employers, including 
agricultural firms, to hire only U.S. citizens and any others with the 
right to work in the United States.3 Additional provisions in IRCA 
were designed to (1) ensure an adequate supply of agricultural 
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workers; (2) provide certain undocumented foreign farmworkers with 
legal immigrant status; and (3) streamline the existing nonimmigrant 
program, while continuing to protect u.s. farmworkers from 
displacement and depression of wages and working conditions. While 
IRCA did not extend VI coverage to any additional classes of workers, 
it extended coverage indirectly by changing the status of many 
agricultural workers so that they fell into covered classes for the first 
time. 
RELEVANT CATEGORIES OF ALIEN 
AGRICULTURAL LABOR 
H-2A Agricultural Workers 
An H-2A agricultural worker, as defined by the 1986 amendments 
to the Immigration and Nationality Act, is an alien who comes to the 
United States to perform agricultural work of a temporary or seasonal 
nature when agricultural employers anticipate a shortage of domestic 
workers. An alien worker can be used only when an employer submits 
an application and the U.S. Department of Labor approves the 
certification.4 Employment for H-2A workers is temporary, where the 
employer's need to fill a position will last no longer than one year, and 
H-2A workers must leave the country when the time specified on their 
visa expires.5 
Special Agricultural Workers 
IRCA legalized many aliens who had worked illegally in 
agriculture in the U.S. by granting them lawful temporary resident 
status and, after a period of time, lawful permanent resident status 
under the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program.6 SAWs were 
included in IRCA in order to allow farm owners to hire legal workers, 
rather than illegal labor. 
Undocumented Aliens 
Some estimates indicate that approximately 10 percent of 
agricultural workers are undocumented and in the United States 
illegally? Many others believe that this figure is much higher. 
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NUMBER OF H-2A WORKERS AND SPECIAL 
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS 
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Approximately 20,000 H-2A job certifications were granted by the 
Division of Alien Labor Certification in the U.S. Department of Labor 
in 1992. Table 8-1 provides a description of the number and type of 
jobs certified under the H-2A program. There were 16,385 H-2A 
workers actually admitted by the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) in fiscal year 1992. Early projections had estimated that 
the H-2A program would expand rapidly after IRCA. Because of the 
large number of SAWs legalized (over one million to date) and 
continued illegal immigration (despite IRCA's more aggressive 
employer sanctions for hiring illegal immigrants), the number of H-2A 
workers has remained at a low, stable level. 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Arguments for levying the FUTA tax on H-2A workers are that the 
tax (1) currently serves as the primary source of funds to cover the 
costs of the H-2A certification process, (2) would increase the costs of 
H-2A workers, thereby decreasing the incentive for employers to prefer 
H-2A workers over U.S. workers, and (3) may increase revenues for the 
UI system. 
Arguments against paying the FUTA tax are that the tax would 
pose additional costs on employers and, at the same time, would 
undermine the insurance nature of the UI program, since taxes would 
be collected even though H-2A workers are technically unable to 
receive UI benefits.8 Some also allege that the application of this tax 
would increase the number of illegal aliens hired, rather than the 
number of U.S. workers. It is difficult to evaluate these arguments on 
economic grounds because they are based on employers' behavior. 
It is unclear whether assessing a FUTA tax on H-2A workers 
would, on the margin, encourage farmers to hire u.s. workers over H-
2A workers. First, employers already face significant costs when 
deciding to apply for H-2A workers; these costs include transportation 
to and from the home country, housing during employment, a flat 
certification fee of $100 plus $10 per worker, and increased oversight 
by state agencies.9 Second, making H-2A workers more expensive to 
employers may encourage the substitution of illegal immigrants, rather 
than u.s. workers, for H-2A workers. The extent to which this would 
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occur would depend on the level of INS enforcement, employers' 
willingness to ignore the IRCA legislation, and the extent to which 
employers can identify illegal aliens when hiring. 
If policymakers seek to ensure that employers will only seek H-2A 
certifications when U.S. workers are unavailable, then the issue should 
be addressed more directly than through the FUTA tax. Instead of 
levying UI payroll taxes, for example, the H-2A certification process 
could be made more difficult, higher certification fees could be 
imposed, or immigration reform and/or enforcement could be 
promoted.IO 
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TABLE 8-1 
JOBS CERTIFIED BY CROP OR ACTIVITY AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF 
H-2A WORKERS IN 1991 
State No. of Crop or Activity Origin of Foreign 
Jobs Workers 
Alaska 1 Farmworking (General) Scandinavia 
Arizona 191 Citrus (Hand Harvest) Mexico 
79 Sheepherding Chile, Mexico, Peru '2:.1 
11 Vegetable (Harvest) India 
Arkansas 26 Vegetable (Harvest) Mexico 
California 1 Horticulture China 
457 Sheepherding Chile, Mexico, Peru '2:.1 
10 Sheepshearing Australia, New Zealand 
TOTAL JOBS: 
ALL STATES - 25,702 
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11 Work pattern for majority of custom combine crew members is to start work in 
Oklahoma or Texas, and move north into other central states. 
'2:.1 Majority of sheepherders work in ten (10) western states, and are primarily from 
Mexico and Peru. Some workers are from Chile and Spain, with a few from China, 
Mongolia and Portugal. 
'§../ BWI - British West Indies. In New England states only Jamaican workers are 
employed, although in 1991 some workers from the Dominican Republic were reported. 
Elsewhere, the majority of BWI workers are from Jamaica. Also included in the BWI 
category are workers from most of the other countries in the British West Indies island 
chain. 
Source: USDOL, Employment Service, Division of Foreign Labor Certificates 
(1992), Table 3, pp. 9-11. 
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TABLE 8-1 (Continued) 
JOBS CERTIFIED BY CROP OR ACTIVITY AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF 
H-2A AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IN 1991 
State No. of Crop or Activity Origin of Foreign 
Jobs Workers 
Colorado 6 Custom Combining Canaday 
164 Sheepherding Chile, Mexico, Peru '1:.1 
21 Sheep shearing Australia, New Zealand 
Connecticut 198 Apple (Harvest) BWI'2.1 
9 Christmas Tree (General) BWI '2.1 
61 Diversified Crops (General) BWI'2.1 
148 Nursery (General) BWI'2.1 
6 Poultry BWI'2.1 
2 Sod BWI'2.1 
1,323 Tobacco (Harvest) BWI'2.1 
8 Vegetable (Harvest) BWI'2./ 
Florida 7,978 Sugarcane (Harvest-Manual) BWI'2.1 
20 Sugarcane (Harvest-Mech.) Australia 
Georgia 152 Greens (Harvest) Mexico 
Hawaii 8 Farmworking (General) Nicaragua 
Idaho 709 Irrigating Mexico 
264 Sheepherding Chile, Mexico, Peru '1:.1 
21 Sheep shearing Australia, New Zealand 
Kansas 15 Custom Combining Canaday 
2 Farmworking (General) Scotland 
Kentucky 388 Tobacco (Harvest) Mexico 
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TABLE 8-1 (Continued) 
JOBS CERTIFIED BY CROP OR ACTIVITY AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF 
H-2A WORKERS IN 1991 
State No. of Crop or Activity Origin of Foreign 
Jobs Workers 
Maine 747 Apple (Harvest) BWI~I 
45 Blueberry (Harvest) BWI~I 
14 Diversified Crops (Gen.) BWI~I 
2 Nursery (General) BWI~I 
5 Vegetable (Harvest) BWI ~/, Mexico 
Maryland 3 Vegetable (Harvest) Mexico 
Massachusetts 602 Apple (Harvest) BWI~I 
16 Cranberry (Harvest) Scotland 
11 Diversified Crops (General) BWI~I 
6 Nursery (General) BWI~I 
4 Sod BWI~I 
12 Strawberry (Harvest) BWI~I 
262 Tobacco (Harvest) BWI~I 
213 Vegetable (Harvest) BWI ~/, Scotland 
Montana 8 Custom Combining Canaday 
55 Irrigating Mexico 
40 Sheepherding Chile, Mexico, Peru'lJ 
Nevada 3 Irrigating Mexico 
129 Sheepherding Chile, Mexico, Peru'lJ 
95 Vegetable (Harvest) Mexico 
New Hampshire 424 Apple (Harvest) BWI~I 
36 Diversified Crops (Gener~l) BWI~I 
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TABLE 8-1 (Continued) 
JOBS CERTIFIED BY CROP OR ACTIVITY AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF 
H-2A WORKERS IN 1991 
State No. of Crop or Activity Origin of Foreign 
Jobs Workers 
New York 2,862 Apple (Harvest) BWI ,}j, Mexico 
67 Horticultural Poland 
3 Vegetable (Harvest) Korea, Mexico 
North Carolina 682 Diversified Crops (General) Mexico 
1,490 TobaCCO/Vegetable (Harvest) Mexico 
73 Vegetable (Harvest) Mexico 
Oklahoma 190 Custom Combining Canada!!, England, Mexico 
Oregon 43 Sheepherding Chile, Mexico, Peru '1:,/ 
9 Sheepshearing Australia, New Zealand 
Pennsylvania 2 Grapevine (Pruning) Czechoslovakia 
Rhode Island 13 Apple (Harvest) BWI;Y 
3 Sod BWI}.! 
South Dakota 6 Custom Combining Canada!! 
Tennessee 197 Tobacco (Harvest) Mexico 
10 Tomato (Harvest) Mexico 
Texas 73 Custom Combining Canada!!, England 
19 Livestock (Cattle) Mexico 
1 Sheep & Cattle Ranch Hand Mexico 
2 Sheep & Goat Ranch Hand Mexico 
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TABLE 8-1 (Continued) 
JOBS CERTIFIED BY CROP OR ACTIVITY AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF 
H-2A WORKERS IN 1991 
State No. of Crop or Activity Origin of Foreign 
Jobs Workers 
Utah 125 Sheepherding Chile, Mexico, Peru '1/ 
10 Sheep shearing Australia, New Zealand 
Vermont 565 Apple (Harvest) BWI,£/ 
20 Blueberry (Harvest) BWI'£.I 
37 Diversified Crops (General) BWI'£.I 
Virginia 839 Apple (Harvest) BWI '£.1, Mexico 
27 Apple (Pruning) BWI '£.1, Mexico 
40 Cabbage (Harvest) Mexico 
2 Goatherding Philippines 
1 Hay (Harvest) Mexico 
87 Tobacco (Harvest) Mexico 
2,523 Tobacco/Vegetable (Harvest) Mexico 
18 Vegetable (Harvest) Mexico 
9 Vegetable/Berry (Harvest) Mexico 
Washington 26 Sheepherding Chile, Mexico, Peru 2:,1 
West Virginia 244 Apple (Harvest) BWI '£.1, Mexico 
Wyoming 19 Livestock Mexico 
19 Sheep (Lambing) Mexico 
230 Sheepherding Chile, Mexico, Peru 2:,1 




















Chapter 3: Overview 
1. Employees also pay UI taxes in three states. 
2. It should be noted that state and local governments, as well as 
many non-profit organizations, do not pay VI taxes. Instead, they 
reimburse the UI system directly for benefits paid to their former 
employees. 
3. Other emergency programs include the Federal Supplemental 
Benefits program (FSB), which paid benefits between 1975 and 1978, and 
the Federal Supplemental Compensation program (FSC), which paid 
benefits between 1982 and 1985. 
4. Blank and Card (1991, 1166). Baldwin and McHugh (1992) also find 
results that are consistent with this conclusion. 
5. Data produced by U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment 
Insurance Service, Division of Actuarial Services. 
6. Most states define individual benefit levels as a certain percentage 
of lost earnings, up to a certain maxi-mum level. As a result, individuals 
who are being paid at the maximum benefit level are likely to be 
receiving a smaller percentage of their lost earnings than individuals 
who are not at the maximum level. 
7. In nine states, all eligible claimants have uniform potential 
durations. 
8. Massachusetts and Washington allow up to 30 weeks of benefits, 
while Delaware allows 24 weeks. 
Chapter 4: Trends in Unemployment Insurance Recipiency 
1. The IUR is defined as the number of regular UI benefit claimants 
divided by the average number of people in UI-covered employment 
over four of the last six completed calendar quarters. The TUR is 
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defined as the number of all active unemployed job seekers divided by 
the total civilian labor force. 
2. The two ratios are comparable, but the IUR/TUR is more difficult 
to interpret because of various mathematical complications. 
Nevertheless, the IVR/TUR ratio is widely reported, and the IUR itself 
is of particular importance because it represents the primary trigger for 
federal-state EB. The specific measure of recipiency used by researchers 
in examining this question has varied. Corson and Nicholson (1988) 
examined both ratios, but focused upon the IV ITU, which they call the 
UI claims ratio. Blank and Card (1991) also examined this measure, 
which they call the fraction of insured unemployment. Vroman (1991) 
also focused upon the IV ITU. Baldwin and McHugh (1992) also 
examine IU ITU, but include EB recipients in addition to regular state UI 
recipients. 
3. Falk, 1990. 
4. The IVR/TUR and IV ITU can be statistically predicted quite 
accurately for the years up to 1980 by knowing only two variables: 
(1) the year (a reflection of the long-term decline of the system) and 
(2) the unemployment rate (because of the tendency for the ratio to 
increase significantly during periods of high unemployment). Since 
1980, however, the recipiency ratios no longer have the same statistical 
relationship to these two variables. 
5. For more information on this issue, see Chapter 6. 
6. This was particularly likely to be true for state and local 
government employees, since they experienced quite low levels of 
unemployment in the early 1980s. 
7. Burtless and Saks (1984, 20). 
8. GAO, 1993. See Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of the 
effects of federal and state policy changes as they relate to the solvency 
of state trust funds. 
9. Corson and Nicholson (1988). 
10. Any apparent discrepancy in totals is due to rounding error. 
11. Corson and Nicholson (1988). 
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12. Burtless and Saks (1984). 
13. In order to facilitate greater comparability between the Baldwin and 
McHugh (1992) findings and those of other studies, Baldwin and 
McHugh's findings have been reformulated in the text. In particular, 
Baldwin and McHugh report that state policy changes account for 97.4 
percent (rather than 54 percent) of the total net change in IU ITU. 
Overall, they find three primary factors that decreased the IU /TU, along 
with other factors that partially offset the decrease. Thus, when only the 
three factors that decrease the ratio are combined, they are larger than 
the net decline. As a result, each of the factors independently appears 
to be a large percentage of the net decrease. In order to determine the 
relative impact of each factor, the percentage of the overall negative 
impact upon IU lTU that is attributable to each of those factors that 
serve to decrease IU /TU must be calculated. These calculations indicate 
that state policy changes account for 54 percent of the decrease in 
IU ITU, decreased unionization for 29 percent, and decreases in the 
manufacturing sector for 16 percent. The remaining 1 percent is 
attributable to the lagged unemployment level. 
14. In part because Baldwin (1993) was released quite recently, the 
research literature has not yet reconciled the variations in the Baldwin 
(1993) results and the Baldwin and McHugh (1992) results. 
15. Any apparent discrepancy in totals is due to rounding error. 
16. Blank and Card (1991). 
17. Burtless (1983) dismissed regional shift as a possible explanation, 
but later studies have appeared to confirm the merit of this factor. 
18. Curme, et a!. (1990,5-34) and Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985,497-
542). 
19. A recent supplement to the Current Population Survey will allow 
this question to be answered more definitively, but the results will not 
be available for some time. 
20. Corson and Rangarajan (1993) emphasize that this result is 
unexpected, and suggest that it should be viewed with caution. 
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Chapter 5: Dislocated Workers 
1. For more information on the increase in durations of unemployment 
spells, see Chapter 6. 
2. Hamermesh (1989) finds that the number of workers whose plants 
close has shown a significant increase independent of the business cycle. 
Summers (1986) concludes that a large percentage of the increase in the 
overall unemployment rate since 1970 has been concentrated among 
mature men, job losers, and the long-term unemployed. 
3. Department of Labor data for 1992 show that nearly 80 percent of 
workers who lost their jobs were not expected to get their jobs back. 
This is the highest proportion of job losers not on temporary layoff that 
has ever been recorded. 
4. Congressional Budget Office (1993) is based on data from the 1984, 
1986,1988,1990, and 1992 Displaced Worker Supplements to the Census 
Bureau's Current Population Survey. These supplements represent the 
only nationally representative sample of individuals who have 
permanently lost jobs. 
5. Congressional Budget Office (1993, 7). Unless otherwise noted, all 
facts and statistics that are cited in the "Extent," "Characteristics," and 
"Consequences" sections of this chapter were taken from the 
Congressional Budget Office report. 
6. Jacobson, et a1. (1993). 
7. The exact time period depends upon the timing of the survey 
relative to the time of unemployment for each individual. 
8. Because workers are often compensated for their company-specific 
expertise, they incur losses in wages when dislocated and forced to find 
new jobs. This is because company-specific expertise is of little or no 
value in the new job, and is, therefore, reflected by a decrease in wages. 
9. Because the 29 week average includes unemployment spells still in 
progress, it underestimates the average total length of unemployment 
spells. 
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10. It should be noted that more sophisticated statistical analysis 
techniques show that the differences observed by job tenure do not exist 
when controlling for age (Le., there is no independent impact of job 
tenure after controlling for age). 
11. Other smaller programs tha t are not discussed in this report include 
those that were created to assist workers displaced by the expansion of 
the Redwood National Park, the reorganization of several railroads into 
Conrail, and the deregulation of the airline industry. Combined, these 
programs total less than $2 million per year. In the decades before the 
1980s, there were many other such programs, most of which are no 
longer in operation. 
12. Roughly 50 percent to 60 percent of the certificates are completed 
within 60 days; the remainder are completed within 90 days. 
13. Corson, et a1. (1993). 
14. Corson, et a1. (1993). 
15. GAO (1992b). 
16. GAO (1992a). 
17. For additional information on this subject, see Leigh (1990) and 
Leigh (1989). 
18. Bloom, et a1. (1993). 
19. U.S. Department of Labor (1993a). 
Chapter 6: Extended Benefits Reform 
1. For more detail on these changes, see Chapter 4. 
2. Corson and Rangarajan (1993, 4). 
3. The increases in unemployment that accompanied the 1991 
recession were heavily concentrated in 16 states (New England, the 
Atlantic coast, and California). See Vroman (1993, 11). Thus, only half 
of the states that appeared to most urgently require EB assistance 
actually qualified for any such benefits. 
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4. Storey (1993, 24). 
5. For more information on increases in the duration of 
unemployment, dislocated workers, and the programs that serve these 
individuals, see Chapter 5. 
6. It should be noted that such a program would not address the 
structural needs of those individuals who lack the very training and 
education necessary to acquire and retain a job. Because extended 
benefits would be available only to workers eligible for VI, only those 
who already have an attachment to the labor market would be able to 
receive whatever income or training benefits might be made available 
under EB. 
7. "Individual attributes" could include factors such as previous 
occupation, recall status, or reason for layoff (e.g., factory closing). 
8. There is, however, an interstate equity complication that arises 
when the IVR is used as the trigger. This issue is discussed more fully 
in the section describing the IVR. 
9. Corson, et al. (1988). 
10. Johnson and Klepinger (1991). 
11. Corson and Dynarski (1990) and Woodbury (1989). 
12. Corson, Decker, Dunstan, and Kerachsky (1992); Decker and 
O'Leary (1992); Spiegelman, O'Leary, and Kline (1992); and Woodbury 
and Spiegelman (1987). 
13. Moffitt (1985) found that an additional week of VI offered to 
workers increases the duration of unemployment by 0.17 to 0.45 weeks 
for men and by 0.10 to 0.37 weeks for women. Katz and Meyer (1991) 
found that an addition week of VI increases the duration unemployment 
by 0.16 to 0.20 weeks. 
14. Moffitt (1985) found that an additional week of ur offered to 
workers increases the duration of joblessness by 0.52 weeks for men and 
by 0.66 weeks for women. Woodbury (1991) found that an additional 
week of VI increases the duration of joblessness by 0.37 to 0.40 weeks. 
The finding that increasing the potential duration of VI benefits has a 
greater impact on joblessness than on unemployment raises the concern 
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that additional weeks of benefits may induce workers to leave the labor 
force. 
15. Unemployment Insurance Service (1993, 2-31). 
16. Bloom (1990). 
17. Thus, caution should be taken to ensure that participation 
requirements are significant enough that individuals who would not 
benefit from the services do not participate simply to receive EB benefits. 
Chapter 7: State Trust Fund Solvency 
1. The tax rate includes a 0.2 percent temporary surtax. This surtax 
was enacted in 1976, and has been extended in 1987, 1990, and 1993. It 
is now scheduled to terminate in 1997. 
2. There are 59 separate accounts in the Federal Unemployment Trust 
Fund; this chapter focuses primarily on the 53 state UI program 
accounts. States' tax revenues are credited to their individual state 
account in the Unemployment Trust Fund. These funds are used to pay 
regular UI benefits and half of the benefit payments in the EB program. 
The federal accounts include ESAA, EUCA, and FUA, as well as the 
Railroad Unemployment Insurance Account, the Railroad Administration 
Account, and the Federal Employee Compensation Account. 
3. Vroman (1993). 
4. U.S. Department of Labor (1989). 
5. Vroman (1993, 37). 
6. Blaustein (1993, 247). 
7. Blaustein (1993, 339) and U.S. Department of Labor (1992). 
8. Vroman discusses some problems in the ability of the HCM to 
measure reserve adequacy. Among them, he notes that the highest 
historical 12-month period may have limited usefulnel;>s in predicting 
future benefit payments, especially when states have made changes in 
their UI benefit provisions (e.g., eligibility requirements, benefit levels). 
In addition, the HCM ignores the ability of many states' tax laws to 
respond to decreases in their UI trust fund. Vroman also noted that the 
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target HCM level of 1.5 does not ensure that a state's trust fund could 
not become insolvent in a given year or that a state won't need to 
borrow from the federal loan fund. Nevertheless, many UI practitioners 
believe the 1.5 multiple is a reasonable target, but that insolvency could 
also be avoided at smaller fund balances. 
9. See, for example, Barnow and Vroman (1987). 
10. GAO (1988) and Vroman (1990). 
11. GAO (1993, 31). 
12. Half of this estimate is for regular UI benefits and half is for the 
Extended Benefits program. (GAO 1990.) 
13. This option takes effect automatically if a state has incorporated a 
flexible tax schedule into its legislation. In addition, tax increases may 
occur on a case-by-case basis when a state chooses to increase 
employers' tax rates. 
14. Indexation of the taxable wage base is another type of automatic 
financing; however, it has less to do with trust fund solvency and 
instead ensures that current collections keep up with inflation. 
15. This includes providing countercyclical stimulus during periods of 
economic downturn and also ensuring states' ability to foster economic 
growth within their boundaries. 
16. Blaustein (1993, 278-282). 
17. Preliminary estimate produced by u.s. Department of Labor. 
18. Loan repayment must be made by November 10 of the second 
calendar year after funds are borrowed in order to avoid penalties. 
(Blaustein 1993, 248.) 
19. To qualify for the deferral, the state's average tax rate as a 
percentage of total payrolls had to exceed the average benefit cost rate 
of the preceding ten years, and the minimum tax rate had to be at least 
1.0 percent. Or, states had to repay a portion of their Federal 
Unemployment Account loan while continuing to meet their benefit 
obligations. Congress allowed this deferral to expire in 1980, primarily 
because states were not repaying their loans in a timely manner. 
(Blaustein 1993, 248.) 
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20. In 1981 and 1982, states could limit penalty taxes by (1) maintaining 
unemployment tax effort and (2) not reducing net solvency in the 
program. States could limit the penalty taxes in 1981 and 1982 by not 
lowering employer taxes and not raising benefits or easing benefit 
eligibility. For 1983 to 1987, two additional requirements were added: 
(3) maintaining a tax rate (based on total wages) of at least equal to the 
prior five-year average benefit cost rate and (4) avoiding increases in 
indebtedness after 1981. (Vroman 1986.) 
21. The noncharging of interest was, in essence, a subsidy to debtor 
states, especially in the inflationary environment of the 1970s. The 
interest rate charged on the average outstanding loan balance is the rate 
the federal government paid on positive state trust fund reserves (a 
weighted average of all long-term and short-term federal debt) during 
the first quarter of the preceding calendar year. The interest rate is 
levied annually and capped at 10 percent. 
22. A state that does not conform to this standard loses approval of its 
VI law. (Blaustein 1993, 249.) 
23. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 allowed 
debtor states to avoid penalty taxes by (1) repaying current year 
advances before November 10, (2) paying from reserves an amount 
toward reducing its prior debt equivalent to the potential penalty taxes, 
(3) having a trust fund balance on November 1 equal to at least three 
months of benefits, and (4) enacting a net increase in program solvency. 
24. From 1983 to 1985, states could defer 80 percent of the interest due 
(to be paid in four subsequent installments) and obtain a discounted 
interest rate, if they maintained their tax rate and increased their net 
solvency by 25 percent in 1983, 35 percent in 1984, and 50 percent in 
1985. 
25. Interest rates could be reduced by one percentage point if net 
solvency improved by 50 percent in 1983, or the first year the loan was 
taken. In the second and third years of indebtedness, interest rates 
could be reduced if net solvency increased by 80 percent and 90 percent, 
respectively. (Vroman 1986,19 and 43.) Employer penalty taxes could 
be reduced to 0.1 percent or 0.2 percent per year, if states met some, but 
not all, federal criteria. 
26. GAO (1988, 70). 
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27. From time to time, there have been proposals to increase the federal 
taxable wage base. For example, in 1990, Congressman Thomas Downey 
proposed the Unemployment Compensation Reform Act. This 
legislation would have increased the taxable wage base from $7,000 to 
$10,000 over three years and then indexed to the growth in the average 
annual covered wages after that point. 
28. New Jersey calculates their taxable wage base as a percentage of the 
average weekly wage, rather than average hourly wage. 
29. Some states have an additional surtax to pay interest on federal 
loans. Although interest-related taxes affect employers, they are not 
discussed in this section because they do not affect trust fund balances. 
30. Those features that affect the performance of a solvency tax include 
the following: (1) threshold trust fund level activator, (2) range of 
statutory (minimum and maximum) rates, (3) proportion of employers 
affected, and (4) existence of both negative and positive solvency 
adjustments. In order to maximize effectiveness, Vroman (1990) finds 
that solvency taxes should have higher trigger thresholds, provide a 
wider range of statutory rates, and apply to all employers. 
31. Earnings qualifying requirements are usually expressed as a 
multiple of high-quarter wages, a multiple of the weekly benefit amount, 
or a flat earnings leveL 
32. Blaustein (1993, 281). 
33. One state had no change. 
34. GAO (1993, 22). 
35. In 1971, 20 states postponed benefits for the duration of 
unemployment for a misconduct discharge and 23 states postponed 
benefits for the duration of unemployment for a refusing suitable work. 
These numbers of states increased in 1990 to 42 and 41, respectively. 
36. The states included Alaska (28), District of Columbia (34), Indiana 
(39), New Mexico (30), Louisiana (28), Pennsylvania (30), Utah (36), and 
Wisconsin (34). Washington and Massachusetts still have maximum 
benefit durations of 30 weeks and Delaware has a maximum benefit 
duration of 24 weeks. 
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37. Average benefit duration is based on the regular UI program, not 
the EB program or other emergency extensions. 
38. See Chapter 5. 
39. The state law changes in GAO's model included the average 
employer VI tax rate (tax revenues as a percentage of total wages), the 
VI wage replacement rate (average VI benefit as a percentage of average 
wage), and the minimum earnings requirement to qualify for VI benefits. 
The demographics of the unemployed included gender, race, type of job, 
number long-term unemployed, unionization, and number job losers. 
GAO estimated simultaneous equation systems that linked solvency, 
state VI laws, and recipiency using lagged values of the HCM as a 
measure of state trust fund solvency. 
40. The Department of Labor was critical of the GAO report for its 
reliance on case study data; however, GAO reported that their panel 
database analysis supported the same conclusions of the case study. 
41. Vroman (1990, 147-148). 
42. Raising the taxable wage base would also increase federal tax 
collections; however, these additional funds would not directly improve 
state trust funds since the funds are currently designated for program 
administration, the EB program, and the federal loan fund. The 
increased federal tax collections could, however, help pay for any 
financial incentives offered by the federal government to encourage state 
trust fund solvency. 
43. Applying the national increase to the federal taxable wage base 
across all states inherently favors those states with very high increases 
in wages (Le., they are required to put less money in their reserves 
relative to the actual wage increase in their state) relative to those states 
with low or negative wage annual changes. 
44. Proponents of solvency standards argue that states should be 
encouraged to maintain larger reserves than they do currently, primarily 
because current trust fund levels are inadequate for a serious recession. 
Arguments against solvency standards include possible pressures to 
liberalize benefits when trust funds become large and the inability of 
states to use accumulated funds for purposes other than paying benefits. 
Research has shown that while requiring or encouraging a HCM at a 
certain level would not ensure the solvency of a state's trust fund or that 
a state would not need to borrow from the federal loan fund, the level 
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of borrowing would be reduced if a solvency standard were in place. 
Furthermore, a solvency standard would encourage states to return to 
a forward-funding strategy. 
In the past, the Department of Labor has expressed concerns about 
the feasibility and necessity of adopting a reserve standard, citing the 
statistical and methodological problems involved in defining a standard 
and the current effectiveness of charging interest and assessing penalties 
as deterrents to borrowing. (GAO 1988, 79.) 
45. The interest paid is the weighted average of all long-term and 
short-term federal debt during the first quarter of the preceding calendar 
year. 
46. Proponents of pooling state trust funds assert that regional labor 
markets deviate significantly from the national labor market for long 
periods of time, and that these geographic differences make interstate 
arrangements for sharing VI trust fund reserves appealing. Proponents 
also note that under pooling, the VI system as a whole would need 
smaller aggregate reserves than when each state is solely responsible for 
its own trust fund. Issues that would have to be addressed in designing 
a cost reinsurance or cost equalization plan include (1) individual state 
eligibility criteria, (2) definitions of "normal" benefit costs and "excessive" 
costs, (3) amount of reimbursement available to states, and (4) the 
funding source. (Vroman 1990, 150.) 
Chapter 8: Alien Agricultural Workers 
1. In addition, employers do not have to pay FICA (Social Security) 
taxes or Federal income taxes (Medicare) on H-2A workers, which 
increases the cost difference between U.S. workers and H-2A workers. 
An additional issue is whether employers should be required to pay 
state VI taxes on these workers. Vntil January 1996, states have the 
option of excluding H-2A workers from state VI taxes. Currently, 13 
states exclude H-2A workers, which results in an exclusion of 
approximately two-thirds of all H-2A workers. 
While the Council has not been asked specifically to comment on this 
issue, it is linked to the issue of federal VI taxes. If Congress decides to 
permanently exclude employers from paying FVTA taxes on H-2A 
workers, it will probably continue to allow states the option of excluding 
H-2A workers from VI coverage. 
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2. While H-2A workers are not covered by UI, they are counted when 
determining whether an agricultural employer meets the wage or size-of-
firm requirements for coverage. The definition of an "employer" 
includes a crew leader or other intermediaries, such as farm labor 
contractors. Crew leaders face the same size-of-firm coverage provisions 
as farm operators. 
3. Fines between $250 to $10,000 are assessed for each unauthorized 
alien. Repeated offenses can result in jail sentences for the employer. 
(Runyon 1992.) 
4. The labor certification process determines that "there are not 
sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified, and who will be 
available at the time and place needed, to perform the labor or services 
involved in the petition, and ... the employment of the alien in such labor 
or services will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions 
of workers in the United States similarly employed." (US. Department 
of Labor 1992.) 
5. An alien may remain longer to engage in other qualifying 
temporary agricultural employment by obtaining an extension of stay. 
However, an individual who has held an H-2A status for a period of 
three years may not again be granted that status or any other 
nonimmigrant status based on agricultural activities until he or she 
remains outside the United States for an uninterrupted period of six 
months. 
6. Aliens could apply for lawful temporary resident status under 
section 210 from June 1, 1987, to November 30,1988. In order to qualify, 
these SAWs had to meet the folloWing criteria: (1) resided in and 
performed seasonal agricultural work in the United States for at least 90 
days during the 12-month period ending May 1, 1986, and (2) be 
admissible as an immigrant. 
7. U.S. Department of Labor, 1993. 
8. By the nature of their visa status, H-2A workers are allowed to 
work in this country only for the time specified on their labor 
certification. Unless they obtain additional contracts with approved 
labor certifications, they must leave the country and, therefore, would 
not be available for work. This, in turn, makes them ineligible for 
receipt of VI benefits. Furthermore, many H-2A workers may not be 
able to meet the state UI minimum eligibility criteria. 
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9. Transportation into the United States is reimbursed after the 
individual has worked 15 days and transportation out of the United 
States is reimbursed only if the individual completes the length of stay 
on his/her visa. There is a maximum certification fee per employer of 
$1,000. 
10. As part of the certification process, employers are currently 
required to post the job openings with the state Employment Security 
office. 
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Appendix A 
Extended Benefits 
Reform: Principles and 
Related Policy Options 
I N AN EFFORT to clarify the relationships among the EB policy options described elsewhere in Chapter 6, as well as 
the more basic programmatic goals that drive those policy options, a 
brief menu of principles is presented below. Overall, there are four 
mutually exclusive principles for determining the fundamental 
orientation of an extended benefits program. There are then a number 
of more specific programmatic principles and policy options that are 
associated with each of those fundamental principles. 
The overall size of the program selected from the available options 
could be large or small. In those cases in which the size is large, 
thereby requiring an increase over historic levels of expenditures on 
extended VI benefits, the increase in costs would require the 
identification of a new funding source. 
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Alternative General Principles 
1. Economic conditions should be the sole determinant of when 
extended UI benefits are available to be paid to eligible UI 
exhaustees. 
OR 
2. Extended UI benefits should be paid only to UI exhaustees who 
are identified as dislocated workers. 
OR 
3. Extended UI benefits should be available based upon some 
combination of economic conditions and/ or the characteristics of 
individual UI exhaustees. 
OR 
4. Extended UI benefits should not be made available under any 
conditions. 
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General Principle 1 
Economic conditions should determine when extended VI benefits 
are available to be paid to eligible VI exhaustees. 
Possible Specific Principles To Be Adopted: 
(1) Extended VI benefits should be made available during periods of 
severe economic downturn. Such conditions are estimated to 
prevail approximately (X) percent of the time. 
(2) Eligibility for extended UI benefits should be determined based 
upon a measure of the percentage of unemployed individuals 
among the UI-covered popUlation (Le., the Insured Unemployment 
Rate). 
OR 
Eligibility for extended UI benefits should be determined based 
upon a measure of the percentage of unemployed individuals 
among the population as a whole (i.e., the Total Unemployment 
Rate). 
OR 
Eligibility for extended UI benefits should be determined based 
upon a measure of long-term unemployment among the UI-
covered population (i.e., the rate of VI exhaustion). 
OR 
Eligibility for extended UI benefits should be determined based 
upon a measure of the scarcity of jobs (i.e., deviation from 
employment trends). 
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(3) The trigger should ensure that extended VI benefits are made 
available in those (states or areas) that experience the greatest 
cyclical deterioration in labor market conditions. 
OR 
The trigger should ensure that extended VI benefits are made 
available in those (states or areas) that experience the most severe 
labor market conditions. 
(4) Triggers should operate on the following level(s): 
(a) national, so that individuals in all states become eligible for 
extended VI benefits during periods of national recession. 
AND/OR 
(b) regional, so that individuals are eligible for extended VI 
benefits during periods of severe regional economic 
conditions. 
AND/OR 
(c) state, so that individuals are eligible for extended VI benefits 
during periods of severe state economic conditions. 
AND/OR 
(d) substate, so that individuals are eligible for extended VI 
benefits during periods of severe economic conditions within 
their local labor market. 
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(5) The federal government should not require extended VI benefits 
recipients to search for work. 
OR 
The federal government should require extended VI benefits 
recipients to search for work. 
(a) This should apply to all individual recipients. 
OR 
This should not apply to individual recipients who are 
enrolled in an approved education or training program. 
(b) States should be required to exhibit a minimum degree of 
enforcement of the work search requirement. 
OR 
No minimum work search enforcement requirements should 
be imposed on the states. 
(6) Extended VI benefits should ,be experience rated (i.e., paid by the 
previous employer). 
OR 
Extended VI benefits should not be experience rated (i.e., they 
should be paid by society as a whole). 
OR 
Each state should be allowed to determine who pays for extended 
VI benefits within that state. 
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(7) The cost of extended VI benefits should continue to be shared 
equally between the federal and state governments. 
OR 
(X) percent of the cost of extended VI benefits should be borne by 
the federal government, with the remaining cost paid by the states. 
(a) This change should be (temporary or permanent). 
(b) This change should be contingent upon (identify certain state 
actions). 
OR 
100 percent of the cost of extended VI benefits should be borne by 
the federal government. 
(a) This change should be (temporary or permanent). 
(b) This change should be contingent upon (identify certain state 
actions). 
OR 
100 percent of the cost of extended VI benefits should be borne by 
the states. 
(a) This change should be (temporary or permanent). 
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(8) Potential duration of benefits should be uniform across all eligible 
individuals. 
OR 
Potential duration of extended DI benefits should be determined 
by the following factor(s): 
(a) economic conditions among the relevant population. 
AND/OR 
(b) the participation of an individual recipient in an approved 
education, training, or job search program. 
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General Principle 2 
Extended VI benefits should be paid to VI exhaustees who are 
identified as dislocated workers. 
Possible Specific Principles To Be Adopted: 
(1) Dislocated workers are those who 
(a) possess certain characteristics. 
AND/OR 
(b) participate in an approved education, training, or job search 
program. 
(i) Such workers (should or should not) be required to repa.y 
a percentage of training costs after finding reemployment. 
(2) The cost of extended VI benefits should continue to be shared 
equally between the federal and state governments. 
OR 
(X) percent of the cost of extended VI benefits should be borne by 
the federal government, with the remaining cost paid by the states. 
(a) This change should be (temporary or permanent). 
(b) This change should be contingent upon (identify certain state 
actions). 
OR 
100 percent of the cost of extended VI benefits should be borne by 
the federal government. 
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(a) This change should be (temporary or permanent). 
(b) This change should be contingent upon (identify certain state 
actions). 
OR 
100 percent of the cost of extended UI benefits should be borne by 
the states. 
(a) This change should be (temporary or permanent). 
(3) Potential duration of benefits should be uniform across all eligible 
individuals. 
OR 
Potential duration of extended VI benefits should be determined 
by the following factor(s): 
(i) economic conditions among the relevant population. 
AND/OR 
(ii) the participation of an individual recipient in an approved 
education, training, or job search program. 
AND/OR 
(iii) the work history of the individual recipient. 
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General Principle 3 
Extended UI benefits should be available based upon some 
combination of economic conditions and/or the characteristics of 
individual UI exhaustees. 
Possible Specific Principles To Be Adopted: 
(1) Extended VI benefits under the dislocated worker component of 
the program should be available at all times to workers identified 
as dislocated. 
OR 
Extended VI benefits under the dislocated worker component of 
the program should be available only in (states or areas) that have 
activated the countercyclical component of the program. 
(2) In addition, in order to define the other specific elements of the 
program, some logically consistent combination of the Specific 
Principles cited under General Principles 1 and 2 should be 
adopted. 
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General Principle 4 
Extended VI benefits should not be made available under any 
conditions. 
Possible Specific Principles To Be Adopted: 


























Charter of the Advisory 
Council on Unemployment 
Compensation 
THE COUNCIL'S OFFICIAL DESIGNATION 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (hereinafter called 
"Council"). 
THE COUNCIL'S OBJECTIVES AND THE SCOPE OF ITS 
ACTIVITY 
It shall be the function of the Council to evaluate the unemployment 
compensation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical 
effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding 
of State administrative costs, administrative efficiency, and any other 
aspects of the program and to make recommendations for 
improvement. 
PERIOD OF TIME NECESSARY FOR THE COUNCIL TO CARRY 
OUT ITS PURPOSES 
Four Years. 
THE AGENCY AND/OR OFFICIAL TO WHOM THE COUNCIL 
REPORTS 
The President and the Congress. 
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THE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THE NECESSARY 
SUPPORT TO THE COUNCIL 
The Unemployment Insurance Service of the Employment and Training 
Administration of the Department of Labor. 
MEMBERSHIP 
The Council shall consist of 11 members as follows: 
(A) Five members appointed by the President, to include 
representatives of business, labor, State government, and the 
public. 
(B) Three members appointed by the President pro tempore of the 
Senate, in consultation with the Chairman and the ranking member 
of the Committee on Finance of the Senate. 
(C) Three members appointed by the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, in consultation with the Chairman and the 
ranking member of the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
House of Representatives. 
(D) The President shall appoint the Chairman of the Council from 
among its members. 
(E) In appointing members under subparagraphs (B) and (C) above, 
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives shall each appoint-
(a) one representative of the interests of business, 
(b) one representative of the interests of labor, and 
(c) one representative of the interests of State governments. 
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A DESCRIPTION OF THE DUTIES FOR WHICH THE COUNCIL IS 
RESPONSIBLE 
It shall be the function of the Council to evaluate the unemployment 
compensation program, including the purpose, goals, countercyclical 
effectiveness, coverage, benefit adequacy, trust fund solvency, funding 
of State administrative costs, administrative efficiency, and any other 
aspects of the program and to make recommendations for 
improvement. Not later than February 1, 1995, the Council shall submit 
to the President and the Congress a report setting forth the findings 
and recommendations of the Council as a result of its evaluation of the 
unemployment compensation program, including the Council's findings 
and recommendations with respect to determining eligibility for 
extended unemployment benefits on the basis of unemployment 
statistics for regions, States or ,subdivisions of States. 
THE ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS IN DOLLARS 
AND STAFF YEARS FOR SUCH COUNCIL 
It is anticipated that expenditures will be approximately $1,200,000, 
including six FTEs. 
THE ESTIMATED NUMBER AND FREQUENCY OF COMMITTEE 
MEETINGS 
It is anticipated that the Council will meet five times during each year. 
TERMINATION DATE 






















November 15, 1991 
January 24, 1992 
May 11, 1993 
September 20, 1993 
September 21, 1993 
December 9, 1993 
January 10, 1994 
January 11-12, 1994 
Establishment of Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation by 
statute. 
Chartering of Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation. 
First Counci~ Meeting Postal Square 
Building, Washington, D.e. 
Public Hearing Southland Center 
Hotel, Dallas, Texas 
Second Council Meeting Southland 
Center Hotel, Dallas, T~xas 
Third Co~ncil Meeting Postal 
Square Building, Washington, D.e. 
Focus Groups of ill Claimants 
San Francisco, California 
Fourth Council Meeting and Public 
Hearing Sheraton Palace Hotel 





THE COUNCIL held two sets of public hearings in order to offer a w~de spectrum of individuals and organizations the 
opportunity to provide their views and recommendations on improving 
the Unemployment Insurance system. Hearings were held in Dallas, 
Texas on September 20, 1993, and in San Francisco, California on 
January 11 and 12, 1994. 
The public was asked to address a number of topics related to 
Unemployment Insurance and what can be done to improve the 
system. 
To date, 44 witnesses have presented testimony before the Council. 
In addition, written statements were submitted by a variety of 
individuals and organizations. Both the hearings and the written 
statements proved to be a rich source of information, providing many 
new perspectives on the issues in our charter. The Council expresses 
its appreciation to the members of the public who shared their thoughts 
with us. 
In order to encourage broad-based participation both with respect 
to regions of the country and diversity of perspective, the Council plans 
to hold additional hearings as it continues with its work. 
WITNESSES PRESENTING TESTIMONY 
Stephen Bingham, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation 
Malcolm Bonner 
John Bourg, Louisiana AFL-CIO 
Debra Bronow, State of California Employment Development Department 
Larry Clark, Gibbens Company 
Brenda Cochrane, San Francisco State University 
Loleta Didrickson, Illinois Department of Employment Security 
Eunice Elton, Private Industry Council of San Francisco 
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James Evatz, JCPenney Company, Inc. 
Terry Evert, Gibbens Company 
Roger Gette, Legal Services of North Texas 
Mary Katherine Gillespie, California Rural Legal Assistance 
Bruce Goldstein, Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. 
Robert L. Harvey, California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board 
Charles Howarth, Council of State Chambers of Commerce 
John Humphrey, Employment and Training Administration - San Francisco 
James Jackson, Texas Employment Commission 
Thomas Jackson 
Patrick Johnston, California State Senate 
Bob Kenyon, Employment and Training Administration" Dallas 
Laurie B. Larrea, Private Industry Council of Dallas 
David Lien, San Francisco Department of Social Services 
Larry A. Malo, State of Washington Employment Security Department 
Rodolfo Mares, Jr., Legal Services of North Texas 
Philip Martin, University of California at Davis 
Dave Murrie, Oklahoma Employment Security Commission 
National Employment Law Project 
Nils L. Nordberg, Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training 
Diana M. Pearce, Women and Poverty Project 
Don Peitersen, Colorado Department of Labor and Employment 
Donnie Potts 
Tom Rankin, AFL-CIO 
Cynthia Rice, California Rural Legal Assistance 
Ted B. Roberts, Texas Association of Business 
Carol Ross-Evans, California Tax Payers Association 
Rashan Sanchez, San Francisco Department of Social Services 
Emmett Sheppard, Texas AFL-CIO 
Liston L. Thomasson, Mississippi Employment Security Commission 
Donald Vial, California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy 
Judy Villa, Bank of America 
Don Villerejo, California Institute for Rural Studies 
Richard Virgili 
Christine Worthington 
Stephen Yelenosky, Legal Aid Society of Central Texas 
Appendix E 
Council Staff 
Laurie J. Bassi, Executive Director 
Stephen A. Woodbury, Deputy Director 
Ellen S. Calhoun 
Amy B. Chasanov 
Janice C. Davis 
Daniel P. McMurrer 
Robert Pavosevich 
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Additional copies of this report may be obtained by making a written 
request to the following address: 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 
200 Constitution Avenue, N.W. 
Suite 5-4206 
Washington, D.C. 20210 
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